School of Politics & International Relations
Critical Review of C.H. Wellman's 'Immigration and Freedom of Association
Introduction
Within Christopher Wellman’s 2008 ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, he puts
forward a provocative argument declaring states possess a moral right to exclude potential
immigrants based on their inherent right to freedom of association. Making a comparison
between individual autonomy in personal associations and state sovereignty in determining
membership, Wellman believes that just as individuals choose who to associate with, states
can decide who to omit or reject from their political communities. Within this review, it will
critically examine Wellman’s argument and explore its foundational premises and broader
ethical implications of equating individual freedoms with state rights.
Summary of Wellman’s Argument
Wellman’s key argument is that the right to freedom of association, a fundamental individual
liberty, is extended to collective entities like states, allowing them authority to control
immigration. He demonstrates this argument through a few key points. Firstly, Wellman
begins his argument by grounding the right to exclude immigrants in the principle of freedom
of association on an individual level. He believes individuals possess fundamental rights to
choose their associations, not only the right to form social, religious and political
relationships, but also the right to reject these associations. An example that emphasises
this is marriage. The right to marry normally implies the right to reject marriage proposals,
the freedom to form romantic relationships is incomplete without the freedom to refuse them
(Wellman, 2008, p. 111). This freedom expands beyond romantic relations to other parts of
life such as the right to refuse membership of a religious group or political party. By framing
exclusion as an extension of individual autonomy, Wellman positions freedom of association
as not just a right to form relationships but also a right to refuse them. This sets the
foundation for his wider arguments that states, as collective entities, possess the moral
authority to regulate immigration through the same principle. However, critics argue that this
approach does overlook the complex moral obligation that states, unlike individuals, have
toward non-citizens under international law and human right norms.
Wellman extends this principle of individual association to states, arguing political
communities as collective agents, have a similar right to determine their membership. Just
like individuals can reject associations, states are allowed to exclude non-citizens from
entering their territory.
Another key foundation of Wellman’s argument is the principle of state sovereignty and self-
determination. He declares, just as individuals have the right to control their personal
associations, states have the right to control their political associations, including regulating
immigration. Wellman defines self-determination as the state's ability to shape its political
and social future, involving who can join the political community (Wellman, 2008, p. 115).
Wellman believes the demographic composition of a state is central to its identity and
functioning. So by allowing unrestricted immigration, it would undermine a state's ability to
maintain social cohesion as political decisions would be shaped by individuals who are not
part of the political community. Therefore, controlling borders becomes an essential function
of self-governance.
, Critical Evaluation
Whilst Wellman’s argument is well constructed and grounded in liberal principles, there are a
few critics. Firstly, there is a flawed analogy between individuals and states. Individuals
possess freedom of association to protect personal autonomy and intimate choices, whereas
states are complex establishments with obligations to both their citizens and the international
community (Vinx, 2012). Lars vinx critiques this analogy, stating that the individualist
construction of collective rights does not effortlessly apply to states, as the nature of state
associations vary significantly from personal associations (Vinx, 2012, p. 5).
Secondly, there is tension between state sovereignty and individual rights. Wellman’s
defense of state sovereignty over immigration raises significant ethical concerns about the
conflict between state autonomy and individual rights to freedom of movement. Allowing
states the right to exclude migrations undermines the liberal commitment to individual
autonomy, as it restricts people's ability to seek better opportunities or escape persecution
(Dietrich, 2008, p. 618). This creates a moral tension where state sovereignty is prioritised
over individual freedoms, contradicting the equal moral worth.
Further, a significant critique from Frank Dietrich (2008) challenges Wellman’s stance on the
analogy between individual and state rights. Dietrich argues that constituting civic borders
exercises political power over outsiders, as it excludes them. Dietrich believes Wellman’s
position is controversial as it puts forward a liberal case for a state’s right to exclude
immigrants, which may not align with broader liberal democratic values (Dietrich, 2008, p.
625).
Conclusion
Wellman’s Immigration and Freedom of Association’ puts forward a compelling argument in
defence of a state’s moral right to control immigration through the principle of freedom of
association. By extending the right to exclude individuals from political entities, Wellman
establishes a provocative case for state sovereignty and self-determination. His argument
that states, like individuals, have a moral right to determine their membership based on the
freedom to exclude is consistent and rooted in liberal principles of autonomy.
However, Wellman’s framework creates significant ethical tensions. The analogy between
individual and state rights has been critiqued as too simplistic, as states have wider legal
and moral obligations to citizens and noncitizens. Having the right to exclude becomes
strongly controversial when it conflicts with individual human rights, such as the right to
freedom of movement or to seek asylum. Furthermore, critics such as Dietrich highlight that
state decisions to exclude migrants have extreme humanitarian consequences, which
Wellman’s theory fails to address. Whilst Wellman’s argument offers a strong philosophical
foundation for state control over immigration, the broader political and moral implications
highlight the need for a more nuanced approach that addresses state autonomy with the
fundamental rights of individuals.
Critical Review of C.H. Wellman's 'Immigration and Freedom of Association
Introduction
Within Christopher Wellman’s 2008 ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, he puts
forward a provocative argument declaring states possess a moral right to exclude potential
immigrants based on their inherent right to freedom of association. Making a comparison
between individual autonomy in personal associations and state sovereignty in determining
membership, Wellman believes that just as individuals choose who to associate with, states
can decide who to omit or reject from their political communities. Within this review, it will
critically examine Wellman’s argument and explore its foundational premises and broader
ethical implications of equating individual freedoms with state rights.
Summary of Wellman’s Argument
Wellman’s key argument is that the right to freedom of association, a fundamental individual
liberty, is extended to collective entities like states, allowing them authority to control
immigration. He demonstrates this argument through a few key points. Firstly, Wellman
begins his argument by grounding the right to exclude immigrants in the principle of freedom
of association on an individual level. He believes individuals possess fundamental rights to
choose their associations, not only the right to form social, religious and political
relationships, but also the right to reject these associations. An example that emphasises
this is marriage. The right to marry normally implies the right to reject marriage proposals,
the freedom to form romantic relationships is incomplete without the freedom to refuse them
(Wellman, 2008, p. 111). This freedom expands beyond romantic relations to other parts of
life such as the right to refuse membership of a religious group or political party. By framing
exclusion as an extension of individual autonomy, Wellman positions freedom of association
as not just a right to form relationships but also a right to refuse them. This sets the
foundation for his wider arguments that states, as collective entities, possess the moral
authority to regulate immigration through the same principle. However, critics argue that this
approach does overlook the complex moral obligation that states, unlike individuals, have
toward non-citizens under international law and human right norms.
Wellman extends this principle of individual association to states, arguing political
communities as collective agents, have a similar right to determine their membership. Just
like individuals can reject associations, states are allowed to exclude non-citizens from
entering their territory.
Another key foundation of Wellman’s argument is the principle of state sovereignty and self-
determination. He declares, just as individuals have the right to control their personal
associations, states have the right to control their political associations, including regulating
immigration. Wellman defines self-determination as the state's ability to shape its political
and social future, involving who can join the political community (Wellman, 2008, p. 115).
Wellman believes the demographic composition of a state is central to its identity and
functioning. So by allowing unrestricted immigration, it would undermine a state's ability to
maintain social cohesion as political decisions would be shaped by individuals who are not
part of the political community. Therefore, controlling borders becomes an essential function
of self-governance.
, Critical Evaluation
Whilst Wellman’s argument is well constructed and grounded in liberal principles, there are a
few critics. Firstly, there is a flawed analogy between individuals and states. Individuals
possess freedom of association to protect personal autonomy and intimate choices, whereas
states are complex establishments with obligations to both their citizens and the international
community (Vinx, 2012). Lars vinx critiques this analogy, stating that the individualist
construction of collective rights does not effortlessly apply to states, as the nature of state
associations vary significantly from personal associations (Vinx, 2012, p. 5).
Secondly, there is tension between state sovereignty and individual rights. Wellman’s
defense of state sovereignty over immigration raises significant ethical concerns about the
conflict between state autonomy and individual rights to freedom of movement. Allowing
states the right to exclude migrations undermines the liberal commitment to individual
autonomy, as it restricts people's ability to seek better opportunities or escape persecution
(Dietrich, 2008, p. 618). This creates a moral tension where state sovereignty is prioritised
over individual freedoms, contradicting the equal moral worth.
Further, a significant critique from Frank Dietrich (2008) challenges Wellman’s stance on the
analogy between individual and state rights. Dietrich argues that constituting civic borders
exercises political power over outsiders, as it excludes them. Dietrich believes Wellman’s
position is controversial as it puts forward a liberal case for a state’s right to exclude
immigrants, which may not align with broader liberal democratic values (Dietrich, 2008, p.
625).
Conclusion
Wellman’s Immigration and Freedom of Association’ puts forward a compelling argument in
defence of a state’s moral right to control immigration through the principle of freedom of
association. By extending the right to exclude individuals from political entities, Wellman
establishes a provocative case for state sovereignty and self-determination. His argument
that states, like individuals, have a moral right to determine their membership based on the
freedom to exclude is consistent and rooted in liberal principles of autonomy.
However, Wellman’s framework creates significant ethical tensions. The analogy between
individual and state rights has been critiqued as too simplistic, as states have wider legal
and moral obligations to citizens and noncitizens. Having the right to exclude becomes
strongly controversial when it conflicts with individual human rights, such as the right to
freedom of movement or to seek asylum. Furthermore, critics such as Dietrich highlight that
state decisions to exclude migrants have extreme humanitarian consequences, which
Wellman’s theory fails to address. Whilst Wellman’s argument offers a strong philosophical
foundation for state control over immigration, the broader political and moral implications
highlight the need for a more nuanced approach that addresses state autonomy with the
fundamental rights of individuals.
