5. Sue(d) might be charged for murder as the consequence of her conduct was Bill(v)’s death.
Considering that she unlawfully caused the death of a human being, elements of the actus reus
of murder are to be satisfied. Bill being a human who was killed satisfies the “death of a human
being”. In order to assess whether the actus reus has been completed, it is to be determined
whether D’s conduct caused the consequence i.e death. Factually it did, as death is attributable
to D in accordance with the but for test (White). Had D not stabbed V in the eye, the knife would
not have penetrated into V ‘ s brain and V would not have died .
To assess whether D was also the legal cause of the death, it is required that D’s act was not
too remote (clause 17 Draft Criminal Code). The consequence here being the sole cause is
substantial enough to cause the result (Benge). Therefore, considering there was no event or
intervention that could have possibly broken the chain, th e chain remains intact and death of V
was caused by D’s act of throwing the knife.
The mensrea of murder is malice aforethought. As per Vickers case, this could be express
malice (Intention to kill ) or implied malice (intention to cause GBH). Intention can be subdivided
into two forms: direct and oblique. Direct intent is when D desires a particular consequence (R v
Mohan), whereas oblique intent is D desiring something else but in bringing about the desired
consequence there is virtual certainty of another consequence occurring( Woolle). Even when
throwing the knife, defendant did not desire V’s death , there was a virtual certainty that a knife
being thrown at V’s eye would kill him.Alternatively if the jury is not convinved that there is virtual
certainty, the mensrea of murder still stands satisfied as when throwing the knife defendant at
lowest had an intention to cause GBH.
Considering that other elements of actus reus and mensrea are completed D will be liable for
murder unless a valid defence is accepted. In this case, the special defence for murder i.e Loss
of Self Control may apply and result in the conviction being lowered to that of manslaughter. For
this defence to be argued, according to s 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act, defence needs to
prove three elements. Firstly D’s conduct was due to a loss of self control, secondly the loss of
self control had a qualifying trigger, and thirdly to objectively assess whether a person of D’s sex
and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self restraint and in the circumstances of D
would have reacted in same or similar manner(54)(1)(c).
According to Devlin J, loss of self control is when a person is “not the master of ones mind
momentarily”. Merely being frenzied or disproportionate is not sufficient (R v Goodwin). As
illustrated by Ahluwalia, loss needs not be sudden especially for victims of cumulative domestic
abuse. However, the response needs not to be premeditated.
Here too, Sue had been a victim of abusive parents, and even Bill abused her, therefore she
was more prone to lose self control. Also, as she had not planned to strike Bill but did so in the
heat of the moment her strike was not premeditated.Considering that she lost control, it needs
to be examined whether there was a qualifying trigger that justifies her loss of self
control(54(1)(b)). As both types of qualifying triggers ( i.e 55(3) and 55(4)) appear applicable,
defence may resort to s 55 (5) to establish both triggers. S 55 (3) requires that V feared violence
from D against themselves or another identified person. Sui feared that Bill would beat her up,
and therefore her loss of self control had a qualifying trigger. However, arguably this trigger did
not lead to her loss of self control, as out of fear she did not lost control and attacked Bill, bit
merely cut her own wrist.This explains why self defence is not suitable, as the fear did not result
Considering that she unlawfully caused the death of a human being, elements of the actus reus
of murder are to be satisfied. Bill being a human who was killed satisfies the “death of a human
being”. In order to assess whether the actus reus has been completed, it is to be determined
whether D’s conduct caused the consequence i.e death. Factually it did, as death is attributable
to D in accordance with the but for test (White). Had D not stabbed V in the eye, the knife would
not have penetrated into V ‘ s brain and V would not have died .
To assess whether D was also the legal cause of the death, it is required that D’s act was not
too remote (clause 17 Draft Criminal Code). The consequence here being the sole cause is
substantial enough to cause the result (Benge). Therefore, considering there was no event or
intervention that could have possibly broken the chain, th e chain remains intact and death of V
was caused by D’s act of throwing the knife.
The mensrea of murder is malice aforethought. As per Vickers case, this could be express
malice (Intention to kill ) or implied malice (intention to cause GBH). Intention can be subdivided
into two forms: direct and oblique. Direct intent is when D desires a particular consequence (R v
Mohan), whereas oblique intent is D desiring something else but in bringing about the desired
consequence there is virtual certainty of another consequence occurring( Woolle). Even when
throwing the knife, defendant did not desire V’s death , there was a virtual certainty that a knife
being thrown at V’s eye would kill him.Alternatively if the jury is not convinved that there is virtual
certainty, the mensrea of murder still stands satisfied as when throwing the knife defendant at
lowest had an intention to cause GBH.
Considering that other elements of actus reus and mensrea are completed D will be liable for
murder unless a valid defence is accepted. In this case, the special defence for murder i.e Loss
of Self Control may apply and result in the conviction being lowered to that of manslaughter. For
this defence to be argued, according to s 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act, defence needs to
prove three elements. Firstly D’s conduct was due to a loss of self control, secondly the loss of
self control had a qualifying trigger, and thirdly to objectively assess whether a person of D’s sex
and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self restraint and in the circumstances of D
would have reacted in same or similar manner(54)(1)(c).
According to Devlin J, loss of self control is when a person is “not the master of ones mind
momentarily”. Merely being frenzied or disproportionate is not sufficient (R v Goodwin). As
illustrated by Ahluwalia, loss needs not be sudden especially for victims of cumulative domestic
abuse. However, the response needs not to be premeditated.
Here too, Sue had been a victim of abusive parents, and even Bill abused her, therefore she
was more prone to lose self control. Also, as she had not planned to strike Bill but did so in the
heat of the moment her strike was not premeditated.Considering that she lost control, it needs
to be examined whether there was a qualifying trigger that justifies her loss of self
control(54(1)(b)). As both types of qualifying triggers ( i.e 55(3) and 55(4)) appear applicable,
defence may resort to s 55 (5) to establish both triggers. S 55 (3) requires that V feared violence
from D against themselves or another identified person. Sui feared that Bill would beat her up,
and therefore her loss of self control had a qualifying trigger. However, arguably this trigger did
not lead to her loss of self control, as out of fear she did not lost control and attacked Bill, bit
merely cut her own wrist.This explains why self defence is not suitable, as the fear did not result
