2014 ZA Q4
It seems that Beatrix atempted to create trusts for diferent purposes in her will
because they do not specify any benefciaries. But purpose trusts are generally void
for lack of benefciaries (Morice v Bishop of Durham) subject to few exceptonss one
of which is charitable trust. Therefores if these purposes are charitables the trusts will
be valid. Otherwises they will fail and results back to Beatrix’s estate if they are for
private purposes.
For a trust purpose to be charitables there are three conditonss the purpose must fall
within one or more of the 13 purposes listed under s. 3(1) of Charites Act 2011 ((CA
2011”)s satsfy public beneft reeuirement under s. 4 of CA 2011s and be exclusively
charitable (s. 1(1)(a) CA 2011).
(a) £250,000 to promote the worship of animals
At frst sights this purpose seems to be related to animal welfare which is under s.
3(1)(k) because it is about worship of animals. But case law suggests that the
purpose itself must be related to the welfare of animalss e.g. their protecton (Re
Wedgwood; Re Moss)s and must therefore accrue some beneft (such as promoton
of morality and humanity) to mankind (Re Grove-Grady) . Worship of animals is not
for animal welfare nor does it promote humanity and morality of mankind. It seems
to be related to religious purposes instead.
Advancement of religion is a purpose under s. 3(1)(c) CA 2011 and had long been
recognized by case law as charitable (e.g. the classifcaton of charitable purposes by
Lord MacNaughten in IRC v Pemsel based on the preamble in the Charitable Uses Act
1601) before the enactment of Charites Act 2006 ((CA 2006”). For our present
purposes the startng point is whether worshipping animals advances religion for the
purpose of s. 3(1)(c).
Prior to CA 2006s case law suggested that religion reeuired a spiritual belief or faith in
some higher unseen powers and some worship or veneraton of that higher power
(Re South Place Ethical Society). In Ex parte Segerdals Winn LJ did not regard
Scientology as a religion because it did not involve any worship at all but as ‘a
philosophy of the existence of man or of life.’ Even though ‘religious worship’ was
later given a wider meaning in R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and
Marriagess this does not change the fact that worship is a symbolic element for a
, belief to be regarded as religion. Secondlys s. 3(2)(a) changed the case law meaning
of ‘religion’ to include belief that involves more than one god or does not involve any
god at all. Therefores if this trust purpose is judged based on case law prior to CA
2006 (now CA 2011) such as Re South Place Ethical Societys the court may hold that
animals are not supreme deitys the worshipping of which not amountng to a religion.
But afer the enactment of CA 2006 and CA 2011s the court has already changed
their attitude and recognised that religion is no longer confned to beliefs that involve
a supreme deity (R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages). So it is
likely that the court in our case will also follow this decision and hold that the
purpose of present trust falls within s. 3(1)(c) of CA 2011.
The public beneft reeuirement under s. 4 is based on the public beneft test
established by common law. The problem is thats before CA 2006 came alongs trusts
for advancement of religion had long been presumed to be of public beneft.
Therefores in cases like Thornton v Howes the court took a non-judgmental attitude
to whether the religion in eueston was benefcial to the public so long as it was not
subversive of all morality. Since s. 4(2) CA 2011 abolishes such presumptons trusts
for advancement of religion are now obliged to establish public beneft. The problem
thus arises as to the lack of certainty as to the law on public beneft and religion post
CA 2006 and CA 2011.
Based on the decision in ISC v Charity Commissions in deciding whether a trust for
advancement of religion is for public benefts the court needs to consider whether
the purpose is benefcial to the publics whether such beneft is outweighed by any
detriment arising from such purposess and whether those benefted are so sufcient
as to be regarded as the public or an appreciably important class of the public.
In the decision on the applicaton for registraton of the Preston Down Trust as a
charitys the Charity Commission followed ISC v Charity Commission when deciding
on the issue of public beneft. They concluded that public beneft for a religious
charity would be determined by the extent to which its moral and ethical teaching
impacted on the community leading to a beterment of society generally. In that
cases they considered the nature of the religious practces of the religion in eueston
and whether they conferred public beneft. In our present cases it would be difcult
to identfy any beneft to the public from the religious practce of worshipping
animals because there is no evidence of moral and ethical teaching by doing so that
will lead to a beterment of the society generally. Therefores this trust is likely to fail
the public beneft test. Due to lack of further informatons a decision cannot be made
It seems that Beatrix atempted to create trusts for diferent purposes in her will
because they do not specify any benefciaries. But purpose trusts are generally void
for lack of benefciaries (Morice v Bishop of Durham) subject to few exceptonss one
of which is charitable trust. Therefores if these purposes are charitables the trusts will
be valid. Otherwises they will fail and results back to Beatrix’s estate if they are for
private purposes.
For a trust purpose to be charitables there are three conditonss the purpose must fall
within one or more of the 13 purposes listed under s. 3(1) of Charites Act 2011 ((CA
2011”)s satsfy public beneft reeuirement under s. 4 of CA 2011s and be exclusively
charitable (s. 1(1)(a) CA 2011).
(a) £250,000 to promote the worship of animals
At frst sights this purpose seems to be related to animal welfare which is under s.
3(1)(k) because it is about worship of animals. But case law suggests that the
purpose itself must be related to the welfare of animalss e.g. their protecton (Re
Wedgwood; Re Moss)s and must therefore accrue some beneft (such as promoton
of morality and humanity) to mankind (Re Grove-Grady) . Worship of animals is not
for animal welfare nor does it promote humanity and morality of mankind. It seems
to be related to religious purposes instead.
Advancement of religion is a purpose under s. 3(1)(c) CA 2011 and had long been
recognized by case law as charitable (e.g. the classifcaton of charitable purposes by
Lord MacNaughten in IRC v Pemsel based on the preamble in the Charitable Uses Act
1601) before the enactment of Charites Act 2006 ((CA 2006”). For our present
purposes the startng point is whether worshipping animals advances religion for the
purpose of s. 3(1)(c).
Prior to CA 2006s case law suggested that religion reeuired a spiritual belief or faith in
some higher unseen powers and some worship or veneraton of that higher power
(Re South Place Ethical Society). In Ex parte Segerdals Winn LJ did not regard
Scientology as a religion because it did not involve any worship at all but as ‘a
philosophy of the existence of man or of life.’ Even though ‘religious worship’ was
later given a wider meaning in R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and
Marriagess this does not change the fact that worship is a symbolic element for a
, belief to be regarded as religion. Secondlys s. 3(2)(a) changed the case law meaning
of ‘religion’ to include belief that involves more than one god or does not involve any
god at all. Therefores if this trust purpose is judged based on case law prior to CA
2006 (now CA 2011) such as Re South Place Ethical Societys the court may hold that
animals are not supreme deitys the worshipping of which not amountng to a religion.
But afer the enactment of CA 2006 and CA 2011s the court has already changed
their attitude and recognised that religion is no longer confned to beliefs that involve
a supreme deity (R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages). So it is
likely that the court in our case will also follow this decision and hold that the
purpose of present trust falls within s. 3(1)(c) of CA 2011.
The public beneft reeuirement under s. 4 is based on the public beneft test
established by common law. The problem is thats before CA 2006 came alongs trusts
for advancement of religion had long been presumed to be of public beneft.
Therefores in cases like Thornton v Howes the court took a non-judgmental attitude
to whether the religion in eueston was benefcial to the public so long as it was not
subversive of all morality. Since s. 4(2) CA 2011 abolishes such presumptons trusts
for advancement of religion are now obliged to establish public beneft. The problem
thus arises as to the lack of certainty as to the law on public beneft and religion post
CA 2006 and CA 2011.
Based on the decision in ISC v Charity Commissions in deciding whether a trust for
advancement of religion is for public benefts the court needs to consider whether
the purpose is benefcial to the publics whether such beneft is outweighed by any
detriment arising from such purposess and whether those benefted are so sufcient
as to be regarded as the public or an appreciably important class of the public.
In the decision on the applicaton for registraton of the Preston Down Trust as a
charitys the Charity Commission followed ISC v Charity Commission when deciding
on the issue of public beneft. They concluded that public beneft for a religious
charity would be determined by the extent to which its moral and ethical teaching
impacted on the community leading to a beterment of society generally. In that
cases they considered the nature of the religious practces of the religion in eueston
and whether they conferred public beneft. In our present cases it would be difcult
to identfy any beneft to the public from the religious practce of worshipping
animals because there is no evidence of moral and ethical teaching by doing so that
will lead to a beterment of the society generally. Therefores this trust is likely to fail
the public beneft test. Due to lack of further informatons a decision cannot be made
