AQA A-level HISTORY 7042/2M Component 2M Wars and Welfare: Britain in Transition, 1906–1957 Version: 1.0 Final IB/M/Jun23/E4 7042/2M A-level HISTORY

AQA A-level HISTORY 7042/2M Component 2M Wars and Welfare: Britain in Transition, 1906–1957 Version: 1.0 Final IB/M/Jun23/E4 7042/2M A-level HISTORY Component 2M Wars and Welfare: Britain in Transition, 1906–1957 Friday 9 June 2023 Afternoon Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes Materials For this paper you must have: • an AQA 16-page answer book. Instructions • Use black ink or black ball-point pen. • Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The Paper Reference is 7042/2M. • Answer three questions. In Section A answer Question 01. In Section B answer two questions. Information • The marks for questions are shown in brackets. • The maximum mark for this paper is 80. • You will be marked on your ability to: – use good English – organise information clearly – use specialist vocabulary where appropriate. Advice • You are advised to spend about: – 1 hour on Question 01 from Section A – 45 minutes on each of the two questions answered from Section B. A 2 IB/M/Jun23/7042/2M Section A Answer Question 01. Source A From the minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 23 August 1931. The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet that he was strongly in favour of accepting the May Committee’s recommendations. The Bank of England needed to restore confidence in sterling. He warned the Cabinet of the dreadful consequences that would inevitably follow from a financial panic and a run on the pound. He was confident that a majority of the Party was in favour. If the government inflicted spending cuts and tax rises but made no significant reduction in unemployment benefit, it would alienate much middle-class support and lose the Party its moral prestige, which was one of its greatest assets. In conclusion, the Prime Minister admitted that the recommendations as a whole represented the opposite of everything that the Labour Party stood for, and yet he was absolutely satisfied that it was in the national interest to implement them if the country was to be saved. He then pointed out that, if on this question there were any important resignations, the government as a whole must resign. 5 10 Source B From a diary entry of JCC Davidson, 23/24 August 1931. Davidson, a Conservative MP and close friend and political ally of Baldwin, held several ministerial positions between 1920 and 1937. MacDonald requested a meeting with Baldwin after his Cabinet meeting ended. Samuel and Chamberlain were also present. MacDonald told them of the situation in the Cabinet. It was clear that he had declined the King’s request to form a coalition. Chamberlain pressed him to consider the support in the country he would bring to such an administration and the effect it would have in restoring confidence. His arguments seemed to have no effect. To everyone at the meeting, it seemed certain that MacDonald intended to resign. The next morning all was dramatically changed. The party leaders met with the King at 10 am. The King again urged MacDonald not to resign. Their discussions lasted for two hours. There was to be no coalition, but a so-called cooperation of individuals to cope with the emergency. Once the required measures had been passed, the parties would contest an election independently. MacDonald set out for Downing Street to tell the Cabinet what had been decided. 5 10 3 IB/M/Jun23/7042/2M Turn over ► Source C From the autobiography of Clement Attlee, 1954. Attlee was a member of MacDonald’s Cabinet in 1930/31. Attlee turned down MacDonald’s offer of a position in the National Government. In the old days I had looked up to MacDonald as a great leader. The unpopular line he took during the Great War seemed to mark him as a man of character. I had not appreciated his defects until I entered the Cabinet as a junior minister. I then realised his reluctance to take positive action and noted with dismay his increasing vanity and snobbery. His habit of telling me the poor opinion he had of all his Cabinet colleagues made an unpleasant impression. I had not, however, expected that he would perpetuate the greatest betrayal in the political history of this country by accepting a commission from the King to form a so-called ‘National’ Government. The shock to the Party was very great. I had not thought him capable of such hatred of those who had served him loyally, though we had become conscious of a growing separation between him and the rest of the Party. He was increasingly mixing only with people who did not share Labour