Why was it so difficult for Britain to administer Palestine between 1919 and 1939?
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the region of Palestine was placed under
British administration with the League of Nations’ Mandate of Palestine in 1922. Due to the
widespread persecution of Jews, the concept of Zionism, the desire for a Jewish homeland,
had begun to develop. Jews began to immigrate to Palestine, where tensions grew between
them and the Palestinian Arabs. Considering that this conflict is still ongoing a century later,
it is imperative to understand its origins and how the British government at the time dealt
with the issue. The difficulty the British faced in administering Palestine was primarily due to
their inability to implement consistent legislation both in Britain and in Palestine, as well as
the rise of Jewish and Arab nationalism leading to growing hostility between the two groups.
Britain’s difficulty in administering Palestine was in a large part due to the government’s
policies and priorities at the time. In 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a
declaration stating that Britain would be supportive of the idea of a “national home” for Jews
after discussions with Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organisation. The
declaration left the meaning of a national home “intentionally ambiguous,” as written by
scholars Michael and David Makovsky, as there was no way to compare it to the idea of a
Jewish “state” according to international law. Therefore, when the Balfour Declaration was
incorporated into the legally binding Mandate for Palestine, Britain was under no obligation
to create a Jewish state.
Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill also issued a White Paper in 1922 clarifying that the
establishment of Jewish National Home in Palestine would not infringe on the culture of the
Arabs living there. Again, there is no mention of a “Jewish state,” although Churchill
confirmed that as of international law, the Jews were in Palestine “as of right and not of
sufferance,” revealing Britain's pro-Zion mindset and policies.
However, the White Paper failed to mention how this assimilation would be carried out or
how the two populations would be able to coexist in terms of geographical location. There
were also no references to how local government or legislative parties would be created or
implemented in a way that was fair to both communities. These policies therefore might have
been empty promises that would eventually lead to Palestinians Arabs and Jews feeling
dissatisfied with British action. Their lack of clarity would also make it difficult for Britain to
remain with one course of action for mandatory Palestine.
Another factor that might have affected the ability to administer Palestine was that the
governing party was often changing. Until 1922, the head of government was David Lloyd
George, who was pro-Zionist and whose coalition government had a “firm embrace” of the
Balfour declaration, according to historian Sahar Huneidi. However, once the conservative
party, led by Stanley Baldwin, came to power, she writes there was a “real chance” that the
policy could be reversed. This shows that lack of consensus within the British government
also prevented its legislation from being consistent. Up to 1939, the governing party shifted
between conservative and labour, eventually ending up with a national party made up of
several parties, possibly making it more difficult to settle on a single viewpoint.
Another factor preventing effective legislation was the influence of Jewish/Zionist lobby
groups. This is most evident with the reversal of the 1930 Passfield White Paper, when
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the region of Palestine was placed under
British administration with the League of Nations’ Mandate of Palestine in 1922. Due to the
widespread persecution of Jews, the concept of Zionism, the desire for a Jewish homeland,
had begun to develop. Jews began to immigrate to Palestine, where tensions grew between
them and the Palestinian Arabs. Considering that this conflict is still ongoing a century later,
it is imperative to understand its origins and how the British government at the time dealt
with the issue. The difficulty the British faced in administering Palestine was primarily due to
their inability to implement consistent legislation both in Britain and in Palestine, as well as
the rise of Jewish and Arab nationalism leading to growing hostility between the two groups.
Britain’s difficulty in administering Palestine was in a large part due to the government’s
policies and priorities at the time. In 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a
declaration stating that Britain would be supportive of the idea of a “national home” for Jews
after discussions with Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organisation. The
declaration left the meaning of a national home “intentionally ambiguous,” as written by
scholars Michael and David Makovsky, as there was no way to compare it to the idea of a
Jewish “state” according to international law. Therefore, when the Balfour Declaration was
incorporated into the legally binding Mandate for Palestine, Britain was under no obligation
to create a Jewish state.
Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill also issued a White Paper in 1922 clarifying that the
establishment of Jewish National Home in Palestine would not infringe on the culture of the
Arabs living there. Again, there is no mention of a “Jewish state,” although Churchill
confirmed that as of international law, the Jews were in Palestine “as of right and not of
sufferance,” revealing Britain's pro-Zion mindset and policies.
However, the White Paper failed to mention how this assimilation would be carried out or
how the two populations would be able to coexist in terms of geographical location. There
were also no references to how local government or legislative parties would be created or
implemented in a way that was fair to both communities. These policies therefore might have
been empty promises that would eventually lead to Palestinians Arabs and Jews feeling
dissatisfied with British action. Their lack of clarity would also make it difficult for Britain to
remain with one course of action for mandatory Palestine.
Another factor that might have affected the ability to administer Palestine was that the
governing party was often changing. Until 1922, the head of government was David Lloyd
George, who was pro-Zionist and whose coalition government had a “firm embrace” of the
Balfour declaration, according to historian Sahar Huneidi. However, once the conservative
party, led by Stanley Baldwin, came to power, she writes there was a “real chance” that the
policy could be reversed. This shows that lack of consensus within the British government
also prevented its legislation from being consistent. Up to 1939, the governing party shifted
between conservative and labour, eventually ending up with a national party made up of
several parties, possibly making it more difficult to settle on a single viewpoint.
Another factor preventing effective legislation was the influence of Jewish/Zionist lobby
groups. This is most evident with the reversal of the 1930 Passfield White Paper, when
