TS Kuhn: From Revolutionary to Social Democrat
1. Kuhn and the image of science
● Two lines of attack on normal image of science:
○ Weak/boring attack - there is a special method and ideal mode of
application but scientific practice falls short of this
○ Strong/exciting attack - there is no such defensible ideal with which
actual practice can be compared (early Kuhn)
● Is Kuhn’s use of term ‘paradigm’ too vague? Components include:
○ Shared symbolic generalizations - theoretical assumptions that are
deployed without question
○ Models - agreement over particular analogies or that certain connections
should be treated as identities
○ Values - theories ought to be accurate, consistent, wide in scope, simple
and fruitful. Which theories are most ‘simple’ etc will be contested, intractably
○ Metaphysical principles - untestable assumptions that guide research
e.g. preference for field theories over particle theories
○ Exemplars or concrete problem situations - agreement on what
constitutes the nice problems of a field and what constitutes their solution. Demonstrated
by textbooks. Also, consensus on what are the unsolved problems
● According to Newton-Smith, the final meaning is the ‘genesis’ of Kuhn’s understanding
of paradigm, or ‘disciplinary matrix’
○ We cannot make rules specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
simple, observational predicates (e.g. is a swan) so insofar as we make such observations,
we rely on exemplar cases of the instantiation of the predicate
○ Similarly in science, where shared exemplars of successful solutions are
substituted for shared rules of successful solutions
● Kuhn’s use of paradigm is too broad and vague to support his assertion that the history of
science is the history of clear, delineated paradigms
○ it is, however, useful in drawing attention the the importance of
background beliefs, attitudes, procedures and techniques in understanding science
2. Revolutions
● Normal science includes agreement over problems and over what constitutes a solution
○ during normal science, if a test fails, the ability of the tester is
questioned, not the theory
● Breakdown leads to competition between paradigms. There is no standard higher than
the assent of relevant scientific communities, so propagandizing plays a key role. In fact, given
that opposing paradigms are incommensurable, only propagandizing plays a role
● Kuhn assumes radical meaning variance (RMV), which holds that there is no logical
contradiction between Newton’s assertion that simultaneity is not relative and Einstein’s assertion
that simultaneity is relative
● RMV means that the problem of rational comparison of rival theories does not arise
(what about degrees of RMV?)
● Incommensurability of paradigms would surely rely on radical variance in what
constitutes a good explanation - incommensurability due to radical standard variance
○ Kuhn does not show that what constitutes a good explanation has varied
1. Kuhn and the image of science
● Two lines of attack on normal image of science:
○ Weak/boring attack - there is a special method and ideal mode of
application but scientific practice falls short of this
○ Strong/exciting attack - there is no such defensible ideal with which
actual practice can be compared (early Kuhn)
● Is Kuhn’s use of term ‘paradigm’ too vague? Components include:
○ Shared symbolic generalizations - theoretical assumptions that are
deployed without question
○ Models - agreement over particular analogies or that certain connections
should be treated as identities
○ Values - theories ought to be accurate, consistent, wide in scope, simple
and fruitful. Which theories are most ‘simple’ etc will be contested, intractably
○ Metaphysical principles - untestable assumptions that guide research
e.g. preference for field theories over particle theories
○ Exemplars or concrete problem situations - agreement on what
constitutes the nice problems of a field and what constitutes their solution. Demonstrated
by textbooks. Also, consensus on what are the unsolved problems
● According to Newton-Smith, the final meaning is the ‘genesis’ of Kuhn’s understanding
of paradigm, or ‘disciplinary matrix’
○ We cannot make rules specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
simple, observational predicates (e.g. is a swan) so insofar as we make such observations,
we rely on exemplar cases of the instantiation of the predicate
○ Similarly in science, where shared exemplars of successful solutions are
substituted for shared rules of successful solutions
● Kuhn’s use of paradigm is too broad and vague to support his assertion that the history of
science is the history of clear, delineated paradigms
○ it is, however, useful in drawing attention the the importance of
background beliefs, attitudes, procedures and techniques in understanding science
2. Revolutions
● Normal science includes agreement over problems and over what constitutes a solution
○ during normal science, if a test fails, the ability of the tester is
questioned, not the theory
● Breakdown leads to competition between paradigms. There is no standard higher than
the assent of relevant scientific communities, so propagandizing plays a key role. In fact, given
that opposing paradigms are incommensurable, only propagandizing plays a role
● Kuhn assumes radical meaning variance (RMV), which holds that there is no logical
contradiction between Newton’s assertion that simultaneity is not relative and Einstein’s assertion
that simultaneity is relative
● RMV means that the problem of rational comparison of rival theories does not arise
(what about degrees of RMV?)
● Incommensurability of paradigms would surely rely on radical variance in what
constitutes a good explanation - incommensurability due to radical standard variance
○ Kuhn does not show that what constitutes a good explanation has varied
