Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Private Language
1. Overview: Wittgenstein’s Argument and its Interpretations
● 243-315 is not just a critique of private language but also a discussion of privacy, identity,
inner/outer relations, sensations as objects, sensations as justification for sensation talk
○ but the conclusion of 244-271 is ‘that a language in principle
unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is impossible’ - it would be unintelligible
to its user as well
1.1 Recent Developments and Their Consequences
● The attempt to interpret the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations together has
led to two groups of interpretation
○ the orthodox/substantial/non-Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as
critiquing the method of other philosophers, and also presenting a positive model for how
philosophy should be done
○ the resolute/Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as presenting no positive
theories, but rather showing traditional philosophical theorizing to be nonsensical
1.2 Are Claims Affirming the Possibility of a Private Language False or Nonsense?
● One interpretation of the private language argument holds that its form is reductio ad
absurdum - that it assumes the premises of a private language before showing this assumption to
lead to absurdity/contradiction
○ on this interpretation the possibility of a private language is false
■ but on another interpretation (more likely a resolute
reading) W shows the possibility to be nonsensical, even as a consequence of a
reductio argument
■ the resolute reading rejects the idea that there is
something determinate that we cannot do; rather, the idea is simply nonsense
2. The Significance of the Issue
● The argument shows that not only actual language, but the very possibility of language
depends on the possibility of agreement in human behaviour
● The argument opposes the idea that there are metaphysical absolutes which are within our
reach e.g. numbers
○ they are not self-identifying objects that force their use upon us
○ there is the same temptation with sensations: we feel a sensation, we call
it an ‘itch’, and then the rules for application of the word ‘itch’ are governed by the
sensation itself
■ this implies that the possibility of a shared practice is
irrelevant to the concept of itching; the nature of itching would be revealed in a
single mental act of naming it
● this is Russell’s view, and Wittgenstein
is beefing it
● W is also beefing the philosophical orthodoxy that sees language as a matter of
translating internal mental vocabulary into social vocabulary every time we speak
○ Descartes thought he could talk about his own sensory experiences
whilst knowing nothing of the external world
○ we feel we can infallibly avoid error when describing ‘internal’
1. Overview: Wittgenstein’s Argument and its Interpretations
● 243-315 is not just a critique of private language but also a discussion of privacy, identity,
inner/outer relations, sensations as objects, sensations as justification for sensation talk
○ but the conclusion of 244-271 is ‘that a language in principle
unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is impossible’ - it would be unintelligible
to its user as well
1.1 Recent Developments and Their Consequences
● The attempt to interpret the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations together has
led to two groups of interpretation
○ the orthodox/substantial/non-Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as
critiquing the method of other philosophers, and also presenting a positive model for how
philosophy should be done
○ the resolute/Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as presenting no positive
theories, but rather showing traditional philosophical theorizing to be nonsensical
1.2 Are Claims Affirming the Possibility of a Private Language False or Nonsense?
● One interpretation of the private language argument holds that its form is reductio ad
absurdum - that it assumes the premises of a private language before showing this assumption to
lead to absurdity/contradiction
○ on this interpretation the possibility of a private language is false
■ but on another interpretation (more likely a resolute
reading) W shows the possibility to be nonsensical, even as a consequence of a
reductio argument
■ the resolute reading rejects the idea that there is
something determinate that we cannot do; rather, the idea is simply nonsense
2. The Significance of the Issue
● The argument shows that not only actual language, but the very possibility of language
depends on the possibility of agreement in human behaviour
● The argument opposes the idea that there are metaphysical absolutes which are within our
reach e.g. numbers
○ they are not self-identifying objects that force their use upon us
○ there is the same temptation with sensations: we feel a sensation, we call
it an ‘itch’, and then the rules for application of the word ‘itch’ are governed by the
sensation itself
■ this implies that the possibility of a shared practice is
irrelevant to the concept of itching; the nature of itching would be revealed in a
single mental act of naming it
● this is Russell’s view, and Wittgenstein
is beefing it
● W is also beefing the philosophical orthodoxy that sees language as a matter of
translating internal mental vocabulary into social vocabulary every time we speak
○ Descartes thought he could talk about his own sensory experiences
whilst knowing nothing of the external world
○ we feel we can infallibly avoid error when describing ‘internal’
