Strategic form games
3min
LISTOFPlayers q
PURESTRATEGIES
Payoffs
g
E i c i c E 01
s 10 El 10101
PURESTRATEGIES playersactions
MEDSTRATEGIES playersactions w prob
allowsforrandomisation
PAYOFFSFROM GEE
MIXEDSTRATEGIES
L
Col choosingPaper I p t o g ti il i pg
Dominance strict payoff payoff
week payoff payoff
appliestopure mixedstrats
NashEa bestresponsegivenother'slunchangedistrat a onedeviatingalone
won'thavea
betteroutcome
3TYPES
purestrat strict
payoffmatrix
Mixedstrat
indie
subgameperfect backwardsinduction
, Finding Nash Equilibria
strictDominanceonce
ifweak someNE maybelost
Eliminated.in
gi
mixedstrategies
lil p ti p needsto
beequal
INDIFFERENT
tobewilling
1 lil p Itp
NE Row 42L 42121 coal I
Underlining
o
reveals2L ME
changingintostrategicform underliningrevealsALLN E
Intersectionofbestresponses
mincost max util via F o c
, Extensive form games
oneuniquepathtoeachnode
PERFECTINFORMATION
PILE I
F R strategyname
2 2
F R F R
PayoffPROFILE 12.01 I till 11 11 O
pi iz Ipl H T i pl
1 1.11 12 21
PURESTRATEGIES G MIXEDSTRATEGIES G STRATEGIES
BEHAVIOUR
P1 FF1 P 441F F 314112,121 P1 44F 31412
42F 1212
1stplayerhasfirstmoveradvantage musthaveinstructions ateverynode
canchoosebestpayoffforthem
IMPERFECTINFORMATION
F R INFOSET
2
I2
F R F R
FYFFE C I l till 11 11 10,01
pi iz
simultaneousmoves
set
musthavethesamestrategyafteraninfo
, Purestrats P2 Lip Lia m.pl mid RIP 12,01
P2 Ac E A.C.FI A D EI AD.FI
B C El B C FI BID E B D Fl
mixedstats perplayerbasis
henceshouldn'thaveincentivetodeviate
3min
LISTOFPlayers q
PURESTRATEGIES
Payoffs
g
E i c i c E 01
s 10 El 10101
PURESTRATEGIES playersactions
MEDSTRATEGIES playersactions w prob
allowsforrandomisation
PAYOFFSFROM GEE
MIXEDSTRATEGIES
L
Col choosingPaper I p t o g ti il i pg
Dominance strict payoff payoff
week payoff payoff
appliestopure mixedstrats
NashEa bestresponsegivenother'slunchangedistrat a onedeviatingalone
won'thavea
betteroutcome
3TYPES
purestrat strict
payoffmatrix
Mixedstrat
indie
subgameperfect backwardsinduction
, Finding Nash Equilibria
strictDominanceonce
ifweak someNE maybelost
Eliminated.in
gi
mixedstrategies
lil p ti p needsto
beequal
INDIFFERENT
tobewilling
1 lil p Itp
NE Row 42L 42121 coal I
Underlining
o
reveals2L ME
changingintostrategicform underliningrevealsALLN E
Intersectionofbestresponses
mincost max util via F o c
, Extensive form games
oneuniquepathtoeachnode
PERFECTINFORMATION
PILE I
F R strategyname
2 2
F R F R
PayoffPROFILE 12.01 I till 11 11 O
pi iz Ipl H T i pl
1 1.11 12 21
PURESTRATEGIES G MIXEDSTRATEGIES G STRATEGIES
BEHAVIOUR
P1 FF1 P 441F F 314112,121 P1 44F 31412
42F 1212
1stplayerhasfirstmoveradvantage musthaveinstructions ateverynode
canchoosebestpayoffforthem
IMPERFECTINFORMATION
F R INFOSET
2
I2
F R F R
FYFFE C I l till 11 11 10,01
pi iz
simultaneousmoves
set
musthavethesamestrategyafteraninfo
, Purestrats P2 Lip Lia m.pl mid RIP 12,01
P2 Ac E A.C.FI A D EI AD.FI
B C El B C FI BID E B D Fl
mixedstats perplayerbasis
henceshouldn'thaveincentivetodeviate
