Retallack
Germany in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II
Chapter 3 Rattling the Sabre: Weltpolitik and the Great War
“Historians occupying the middle ground cannot ignore the possible connections between the
apologist tenor of the 1950s and that conservative nationalist historians refuse to put the principle
blame for war on German shoulders”. (pg. 74)3
“Attacks on the Prussian officer as a bayonet-quilled porcupine in German satirical magazines were
as sharp as any caricature in the foreign press”. (pg. 76)2
“The military establishment itself was hardly as feudal, archaic and narrow-minded as historians
once believed”. (pg. 76)1
“Many middle-class Germans tended to view both the army and navy as fully in tune with their own
values”. (pg. 76)-1-2
“Over time, a consistently anti-militarist position within Germany liberalism became marginalised,
and the 1848 ideal of an apolitical army grew less compelling as the army’s modern functions came
more sharply into view”. (pg. 76-77)1-2
“The military functioned instead as an ‘ideology’ that responded to the needs of certain segments of
society”. (pg. 77)2
“The two Moroccan crises revealed the futility of German efforts to divide Britain and France with
the tactic of brinkmanship”. (pg. 78)1
“After a powerful German navy was built, Britain would either not dare enter a war in Europe
involving Germany or would cut a deal that enhanced Germany’s position elsewhere in the world”.
(pg. 79)1
“The Army Bills of 1912-13 reflected the growing awareness that Germany’s fate would be decided
in a two-front war against France and Russia”. (pg. 80) Encirclement 1
“On 4 August 1914 Wilhelm declared that ‘I no longer recognise parties; I recognise only Germans’”.
(pg. 83) 2
“The military impasse in 1914 had sent domestic politics in an authoritarian direction”. (pg. 84) 2
After graduating from Trent University in 1978, I studied as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford
University and received my D.Phil. in 1983. I subsequently held SSHRC and Mactaggart
postdoctoral fellowships at Stanford University and the University of Alberta. I joined
the University of Toronto in 1987, where I am now University Professor of History, with
cross-appointments to the German Department and the Munk School of Global Affairs
and Public Policy. (I served as Chair of the German Department from 1999 to 2002.)
I teach courses and supervise Ph.D. dissertations in German and European history from
1740 to 1945. My work has been assisted by research grants, fellowships, and prizes
from the Killam Program at the Canada Council for the Arts, the John Simon
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the
Connaught Program and the Jackman Humanities Institute at the University of Toronto,
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
Germany in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II
Chapter 3 Rattling the Sabre: Weltpolitik and the Great War
“Historians occupying the middle ground cannot ignore the possible connections between the
apologist tenor of the 1950s and that conservative nationalist historians refuse to put the principle
blame for war on German shoulders”. (pg. 74)3
“Attacks on the Prussian officer as a bayonet-quilled porcupine in German satirical magazines were
as sharp as any caricature in the foreign press”. (pg. 76)2
“The military establishment itself was hardly as feudal, archaic and narrow-minded as historians
once believed”. (pg. 76)1
“Many middle-class Germans tended to view both the army and navy as fully in tune with their own
values”. (pg. 76)-1-2
“Over time, a consistently anti-militarist position within Germany liberalism became marginalised,
and the 1848 ideal of an apolitical army grew less compelling as the army’s modern functions came
more sharply into view”. (pg. 76-77)1-2
“The military functioned instead as an ‘ideology’ that responded to the needs of certain segments of
society”. (pg. 77)2
“The two Moroccan crises revealed the futility of German efforts to divide Britain and France with
the tactic of brinkmanship”. (pg. 78)1
“After a powerful German navy was built, Britain would either not dare enter a war in Europe
involving Germany or would cut a deal that enhanced Germany’s position elsewhere in the world”.
(pg. 79)1
“The Army Bills of 1912-13 reflected the growing awareness that Germany’s fate would be decided
in a two-front war against France and Russia”. (pg. 80) Encirclement 1
“On 4 August 1914 Wilhelm declared that ‘I no longer recognise parties; I recognise only Germans’”.
(pg. 83) 2
“The military impasse in 1914 had sent domestic politics in an authoritarian direction”. (pg. 84) 2
After graduating from Trent University in 1978, I studied as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford
University and received my D.Phil. in 1983. I subsequently held SSHRC and Mactaggart
postdoctoral fellowships at Stanford University and the University of Alberta. I joined
the University of Toronto in 1987, where I am now University Professor of History, with
cross-appointments to the German Department and the Munk School of Global Affairs
and Public Policy. (I served as Chair of the German Department from 1999 to 2002.)
I teach courses and supervise Ph.D. dissertations in German and European history from
1740 to 1945. My work has been assisted by research grants, fellowships, and prizes
from the Killam Program at the Canada Council for the Arts, the John Simon
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the
Connaught Program and the Jackman Humanities Institute at the University of Toronto,
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
