Britain’s Responsibility for WW1
A view from the outside – early 1914, an American statesman took a tour of Europe
and reported back to the US stating, “the situation is extraordinary, jingoism run
stark mad”. “There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. Whenever England
consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria”.
- Colonel Mandell House, May 1914
- This interpretation suggests Britain are to blame. He sensed a tense atmosphere,
potential for something on the horizon.
- Britain feared Russia, as Russia may threaten India if Britain did not support
them.
-
Sir Edward Grey
- Foreign Secretary from 1905-1916.
- Was not a conventional Foreign Secretary.
- He disliked travelling – first official trip to France in 1914 – preferring to conduct
relations through ambassadors in London. Suggesting potential incompetence
and arrogance.
- Hated being in London, away from his north-country pursuits, birdwatching, and
hill-walking.
- The job imposed a heavy workload, with 6 times more papers than usual
received by the Foreign Office in the 20 years from 1895.
- His diplomatic priorities were friendship with the USA, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance and the Anglo-French entente (lack of hostility, mutual agreement for
peace).
- He was less about securing the empire and more about maintaining the balance
of power in Europe against an increasingly dominant Germany. He sought to
prevent France and Russia from being drawn into the German orbit or allowing
them to feel they could rely on British support to challenge Germany themselves.
- Critics accused Grey of being secretive, as he didn’t inform the Cabinet as he held
talks with the French after the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, believing it was not
necessary as he had given no commitment to the French, also claiming Grey was
influenced too much by his officials. After the start of WW1, he was criticised for
not converting the ententes with France and Russia into formal alliance and for
making the agreements in the first place.
- H G Wells (21st September 1866 – 13th August 1946) “I think Grey wanted the
war, and I think he wanted it to come when it did”.
British Foreign Policy up to the 20th century
- 19th century was the ‘pax Britannica’ (peaceful period of stability).
- Allowed Victoria to secure economic strength and rule of the seas.
- Allowed for the development and consolidation of the empire.
, - ‘Splendid Isolation’ was the title given to this, as it allowed Britain to stay out
of inter-European hostilities.
- Change in direction of policy in 1894 – Franco-Russian Alliance, and by
sudden enthusiasm for imperial and naval expansion by all European powers.
These exerted new pressures on Britain, and she had to respond.
- Therefore, it has been suggested there was no real serious long-term
appetite for war, but the tone changed between 1900-1914.
British Enthusiasm for War
- Bertrand Russel (18th May 1872 – 2nd February 1970), a philosopher, recalled
how shocked he was by the happiness of the British people when war was
declared.
- He commented on Sir Edward Grey’s secretive policy making, going so far as
to say “I had noticed during previous years how carefully Sir Edward Grey lied
in order to prevent the public from knowing the methods by which he was
committing us to the support of France in the event of war”.
- Mendacious – commenting on their mendacity.
- Winston Churchill (30th November 1874 – 24th January 1965) was extremely
happy that war was approaching in the early 1900s.
- A professional army officer by training, Winston Churchill became forever
linked with the Royal Navy as a result of his service as First Lord of the
Admiralty in the early months of both world wars.
- In late July 1914, the Navy displaced their ships to the King. They were then
sent north, to Scapa Flow (north of Germany), and this was seen by the Kaiser
as a clear sign that war was on the near horizon.
- In the months prior to war breaking out, Churchill wrote to his wife
(Clementine): “Everything tends towards catastrophe and collapse. I am
interested, geared up and happy. Is it horrible to be built like that?”.
The significance of Belgium
- Britain had no formal alliance or agreement with France – Grey had achieved
this covertly.
- When it became clear that the French were going to war as Germany had
mobilised their troops, there was a need to create a reason to go and help
the French.
- In 1839 the treaty of London had pledged British support for Belgian
neutrality, so that ‘call to arms’ in 1914 hinged heavily on generating
sympathy for Belgium from the British.
- Belgium had not been neutral – when the Germans invaded, they found
stockpiles of ammunition for British canon, British army coasts and so on,
suggesting that Belgian ‘neutrality’ was not really what it seemed.
, - The enthusiasm for war which came from Grey and Churchill was not shared
by the Prime Minister (Asquith) or the Cabinet, so they had to find a way to
get the country and leadership on side.
British Propaganda
- The engine of propaganda: “the indelible memory of atrocity stories that had
taken place only in the imaginations of British propaganda agents proved to
be stronger and more persistent than any facts. The curious discovery, the
power of myths over facts, was the real legacy of the First World War”.
- Richard Milton, Best of Enemies, 2007, pg. 68.
- Additionally, the literary genre of ‘invasion literature’ was extremely popular
in Britain between 1871 and the First World War. In the Battle of Dorking
(George Tomkins Chesney, 1871), there is an account of a German invasion of
England, which put the nation on high alert to the idea that they were
vulnerable and needed to be protected.
- There is a strong argument that the British people were being conditioned to
expect and accept that war was necessary, and that investment should be
made to prepare for it.
- Barbara Tuchman wrote
The Guns of August made
it clear that Britain was
committed to war by 1911
at the latest.
- The plans that had been
contrived by Sir Henry
Wilson and the French
military leaders ‘committed us [Britain] to fight whether the Cabinet liked it
or not’.
- Since 1906 Britain’s director of military operations, Sir Henry Wilson, had
been working with the French general staff to plan a counter to any German
attack which, he had researched and believed to be true, would go through
Belgium. He knew the details of the German Schlieffen Plan and campaigned
for a decisive land based military presence in Belgium and France from the
earliest opportunity.
- Owing to the British tendency to favour the navy (island nation) over the
army, the Admiralty (under Churchill) remained fixated on the idea of
blockading enemy ports instead.
A view from the outside – early 1914, an American statesman took a tour of Europe
and reported back to the US stating, “the situation is extraordinary, jingoism run
stark mad”. “There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. Whenever England
consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria”.
- Colonel Mandell House, May 1914
- This interpretation suggests Britain are to blame. He sensed a tense atmosphere,
potential for something on the horizon.
- Britain feared Russia, as Russia may threaten India if Britain did not support
them.
-
Sir Edward Grey
- Foreign Secretary from 1905-1916.
- Was not a conventional Foreign Secretary.
- He disliked travelling – first official trip to France in 1914 – preferring to conduct
relations through ambassadors in London. Suggesting potential incompetence
and arrogance.
- Hated being in London, away from his north-country pursuits, birdwatching, and
hill-walking.
- The job imposed a heavy workload, with 6 times more papers than usual
received by the Foreign Office in the 20 years from 1895.
- His diplomatic priorities were friendship with the USA, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance and the Anglo-French entente (lack of hostility, mutual agreement for
peace).
- He was less about securing the empire and more about maintaining the balance
of power in Europe against an increasingly dominant Germany. He sought to
prevent France and Russia from being drawn into the German orbit or allowing
them to feel they could rely on British support to challenge Germany themselves.
- Critics accused Grey of being secretive, as he didn’t inform the Cabinet as he held
talks with the French after the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, believing it was not
necessary as he had given no commitment to the French, also claiming Grey was
influenced too much by his officials. After the start of WW1, he was criticised for
not converting the ententes with France and Russia into formal alliance and for
making the agreements in the first place.
- H G Wells (21st September 1866 – 13th August 1946) “I think Grey wanted the
war, and I think he wanted it to come when it did”.
British Foreign Policy up to the 20th century
- 19th century was the ‘pax Britannica’ (peaceful period of stability).
- Allowed Victoria to secure economic strength and rule of the seas.
- Allowed for the development and consolidation of the empire.
, - ‘Splendid Isolation’ was the title given to this, as it allowed Britain to stay out
of inter-European hostilities.
- Change in direction of policy in 1894 – Franco-Russian Alliance, and by
sudden enthusiasm for imperial and naval expansion by all European powers.
These exerted new pressures on Britain, and she had to respond.
- Therefore, it has been suggested there was no real serious long-term
appetite for war, but the tone changed between 1900-1914.
British Enthusiasm for War
- Bertrand Russel (18th May 1872 – 2nd February 1970), a philosopher, recalled
how shocked he was by the happiness of the British people when war was
declared.
- He commented on Sir Edward Grey’s secretive policy making, going so far as
to say “I had noticed during previous years how carefully Sir Edward Grey lied
in order to prevent the public from knowing the methods by which he was
committing us to the support of France in the event of war”.
- Mendacious – commenting on their mendacity.
- Winston Churchill (30th November 1874 – 24th January 1965) was extremely
happy that war was approaching in the early 1900s.
- A professional army officer by training, Winston Churchill became forever
linked with the Royal Navy as a result of his service as First Lord of the
Admiralty in the early months of both world wars.
- In late July 1914, the Navy displaced their ships to the King. They were then
sent north, to Scapa Flow (north of Germany), and this was seen by the Kaiser
as a clear sign that war was on the near horizon.
- In the months prior to war breaking out, Churchill wrote to his wife
(Clementine): “Everything tends towards catastrophe and collapse. I am
interested, geared up and happy. Is it horrible to be built like that?”.
The significance of Belgium
- Britain had no formal alliance or agreement with France – Grey had achieved
this covertly.
- When it became clear that the French were going to war as Germany had
mobilised their troops, there was a need to create a reason to go and help
the French.
- In 1839 the treaty of London had pledged British support for Belgian
neutrality, so that ‘call to arms’ in 1914 hinged heavily on generating
sympathy for Belgium from the British.
- Belgium had not been neutral – when the Germans invaded, they found
stockpiles of ammunition for British canon, British army coasts and so on,
suggesting that Belgian ‘neutrality’ was not really what it seemed.
, - The enthusiasm for war which came from Grey and Churchill was not shared
by the Prime Minister (Asquith) or the Cabinet, so they had to find a way to
get the country and leadership on side.
British Propaganda
- The engine of propaganda: “the indelible memory of atrocity stories that had
taken place only in the imaginations of British propaganda agents proved to
be stronger and more persistent than any facts. The curious discovery, the
power of myths over facts, was the real legacy of the First World War”.
- Richard Milton, Best of Enemies, 2007, pg. 68.
- Additionally, the literary genre of ‘invasion literature’ was extremely popular
in Britain between 1871 and the First World War. In the Battle of Dorking
(George Tomkins Chesney, 1871), there is an account of a German invasion of
England, which put the nation on high alert to the idea that they were
vulnerable and needed to be protected.
- There is a strong argument that the British people were being conditioned to
expect and accept that war was necessary, and that investment should be
made to prepare for it.
- Barbara Tuchman wrote
The Guns of August made
it clear that Britain was
committed to war by 1911
at the latest.
- The plans that had been
contrived by Sir Henry
Wilson and the French
military leaders ‘committed us [Britain] to fight whether the Cabinet liked it
or not’.
- Since 1906 Britain’s director of military operations, Sir Henry Wilson, had
been working with the French general staff to plan a counter to any German
attack which, he had researched and believed to be true, would go through
Belgium. He knew the details of the German Schlieffen Plan and campaigned
for a decisive land based military presence in Belgium and France from the
earliest opportunity.
- Owing to the British tendency to favour the navy (island nation) over the
army, the Admiralty (under Churchill) remained fixated on the idea of
blockading enemy ports instead.
