Topic 1. Attlee
Why did Labour win the 1945 election?
Context: The Labour party achieved a landslide victory in the 1945 general election,
winning 393 seats to the Conservative’s 197. Labour’s share of the vote increased from
38% in 1935 to 49.7% in 1945.
FPTP: Labour’s landslide victory was, above all else, a consequence of Britain’s
electoral system. The Conservatives still managed to gather 39.8 per cent of votes and,
when looking at all potential votes from those enfranchised, Labour won just over a
third. The FPTP electoral system exaggerated Labour’s dominance, converting a modest
lead in the popular vote into an overwhelming parliamentary majority.
This may be true, but what explains the 11.7% swing from the Conservatives to Labour?
Anti-Conservative:
Contemporary surveys of popular attitudes reveal a clear anti-Conservative consensus
which emerged after 1940. One reason for this was the administration’s response to the
Beveridge Report, published in December 1942, which recommended fundamental
changes to social security in Britain. The attitude of Conservative ministers during the
House of Commons debate on the report convinced many that the Government was not
serious about post-war social reform, and there were certainly few outspoken
advocates of social reform among the Conservative party leadership.
Tory hostility to the Beveridge report and the unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s
meant that the electorate had little faith in the Conservative’s desire to implement
social reform, nor in their ability to achieve it. As early as 1943, contemporaries
described Labour as the beneficiary of a ‘negative enthusiasm.’
Churchill: Supremely popular as he was in 1944, with approval ratings rarely ever
dropping below 80 per cent, Winston Churchill was seen by many as a war leader who
should resign as a popular hero. The public did not view him as a ‘man of peace,
domestic policy or human detail’ (Harrisson, 1944), and by February 1944, 62% of
survey respondents were explicitly against Churchill being post-war Prime Minister.
Campaigns and practical issues:
Housing: From the summer of 1944 onwards, opinion polling consistently confirmed
that housing was viewed as the most urgent-post war problem (unsurprising given that
German bombing had destroyed or damaged roughly two in seven between 1940-1945).
Social security and full employment were the next two most salient issues.
However, instead of focusing on these topics, the Conservative campaign placed an
unwarranted focus on less salient issues such as the completion of the war against
,Japan, demobilization and the re-starting of industry. They particularly underestimated
the importance of housing, merely promising to build 220,000 new homes within two
years which was seen as inadequate response to the problem. Labour, on the other
hand, made much of these issues – particularly housing – with Bevin making the
staggering claim that labour would build over four million houses if elected.
To the British electorate, victory in war merited a rich reward - in the shape of free
welfare and secure jobs. This was the basic message of the Labour manifesto which
asserted that people ‘deserved and must be assured a happier future’ and did so, in the
words of Barnett Correlli, ‘to the relative neglect of discussing investment in industry
and infrastructure.’ The Tory manifesto, with its emphasis on sound finance, was
unfashionable and out of line with the public mood.
Popular attitudes to specific policies suggest that Labour’s victory was not solely the
product of anti-Conservative sentiment. Following the publication of the Beveridge
Report in 1942, public enthusiasm for post-war social security was evident and unlike
the Conservatives, Labour’s support for welfare reform appeared genuine. From 1944
onwards, the nationalisation of the coal industry, the railways and the land consistently
received majority approval, and 68 per cent of those questioned in June 1944 agreed
that post-war reconstruction should be conducted mainly under state control.
Liberals: Finally, the Liberal party contested less than half of the available seats in
1945. Therefore, rather than any strong feeling that Labour was preferable, it was
perhaps a disbelief in the Liberal’s ability to win or the absence of their candidates
which directed the anti-Conservative vote towards Labour.
Therefore, whilst the war produced widespread dissatisfaction with the Conservative
party, it did not conversely provide Labour with a large body of positive support. Instead,
they came to power on the back of, what Eatwell (1945) described as, a ‘rejecting
consensus.’
What role did socialism play in Labour’s 1945 victory?
Socialism:
Francis Williams described Labour’s victory in 1945 as the result of a ‘genuine increase
over many years of popular support for socialist policies, and the Economist declared in
1945 that ‘Beyond any possibility of mistake, the country wants a Labour Government
and a Socialist programme.’
Why were people suddenly voting for socialism?
The war had vindicated socialism:
World War II appeared to vindicate pre-war socialist ideology. It provided evidence of
the bankruptcy of capitalism and the need for social and economic change, and the war
,economy itself demonstrated the efficacy of physical planning. According to J.L.
Hobson in 1944, all the myths surrounding socialism had been dispelled.
In the last year of peace, there had been more than a million unemployed in Britain but,
from 1940 onwards, the economy was planned to ensure all-out productivity and deal
with the wartime manpower shortage. Full employment was achieved in Britain for the
first time, and heavy taxation accompanied by food-rationing meant that fewer people
were going hungry.
As such, there was no longer any excuse for unemployment, slums or underfeeding
given the country had demonstrated its ability to address these issues during the war.
Further, if Britain could produce tanks, aircraft, battleships and harbours, the Mirror
pointed out in 1945, there was no reason why it could not do the same for housing.
Misplaced optimism about the war-effort:
However, in 'The Audit of War', Correlli Barnett argues that public support for Labour in
1945 was partly rooted in an overly optimistic view of Britain's wartime performance:
the war economy was artificially sustained by Lend-Lease and Sterling Area credit, and
operated in a sheltered environment, with no competitive pressure, guaranteed profits,
and little incentive for cost-cutting, efficiency or productivity. Further, despite popular
thought, Britain's actual industrial record was underwhelming - German manufacturing
output rose 32% during the war compared to Britain's 4.6%. Hence, the widely
celebrated image of Britain’s wartime industrial strength was more myth than reality.
They didn’t actually campaign on the basis of socialism:
Simply put, ordinary citizens were not interested in socialism. Nor were they really
interested in any talk of abstract, ideological issues or wider questions about the
country’s future; neither public ownership nor private enterprise ever really came up
when voters were interviewed about their motivations.
Instead, the public simply shared a desire for normalcy after the disruption caused by
the war. The priority was to re-establish ordinary home and work life as quickly as
possible. Writing in 1943, G.D.H Cole commented on how few Britons were interested in
public affairs or politics. Instead, they were purely concerned with private worries: food
on the table, a secure job, and a roof above their head.
Therefore, Labour portrayed itself as the party of practical solutions. There was no point
defending policies such as nationalisation or planning on the basis that they accorded
with Labour party, or socialist, principles. They were means rather than ends to the
public, and so the Labour manifesto was largely concerned with defending such
policies in terms of their practical, rather than ethical, justifications. The ideological
aspect of nationalisation, for example, was deliberately played down and was defended
, on the grounds of efficiency, not because public ownership would extend working-class
power.
Consensus
Paul Addison argued that World War II gave rise to a new political consensus which
dominated Britain for decades to come.
From May 1940 to May 1945, the three main parties were in coalition under the
leadership of Winston Churchill. Addison points out that it was under this coalition that
many major reforms – associated with Attlee’s Labour party - were first set in motion.
Social security reform, educational reform, a National Health service, full employment
policies, town and country planning, closer relations between the state industry – these
developments had all begun by the spring of 1943.
This may all be true. However, Addison is wrong to then label the Labour’s party’s
strategy in 1945 as ‘essentially a conservative one’ due to the way it consolidated and
extended the consensus achieved under the coalition. It was Labour figures, such as
Attlee and Greenwood in the War Cabinet, and Bevin as Minister of Labour and National
Service, who initiated and pushed for these reforms in the first place.
Furthermore, as the end of the war approached, any political consensus between the
Labour and Conservative parties had evidently broken down. Labour increasingly
advocated for socialist change while the Conservatives sought a return to free-market
capitalism, and this divergence was evident in policy debates. Given that Labour had
the option to remain in coalition after the War, and that the Conservatives were far more
likely to win any election if the coalition split up, it emphasises just how little consensus
there was in the coalition – at least by the end -that Labour chose to leave and contest
the 1945 election on their own programme.
Furthermore, Addison is right that all three parties went to the polls in 1945 committed
to social and economic reconstruction. However, it needs pointing out, that their
prescriptions were entirely different.
The Conservatives believed that entrepreneurial spirit, rather than state action, would
lead to prosperity. Therefore, the main duty of an incoming government was to cut red
tape and official bureaucracy. Labour, on the other hand, believed that private
enterprise had failed during the 1930s and could not be trusted in the future. Instead,
the state would have to be closely involved in solving the nation’s problems through
economic planning. As a result, Labour advocated for the continuation of wartime
controls and the establishment of a National Investment Board which presented a clear
contrast to the Conservative’s support for a more laissez-faire approach.
From 1947 onwards, however, a much better case can be made for the existence of a
political consensus. When the Conservatives won the 1951 election, R.A Butler was
Why did Labour win the 1945 election?
Context: The Labour party achieved a landslide victory in the 1945 general election,
winning 393 seats to the Conservative’s 197. Labour’s share of the vote increased from
38% in 1935 to 49.7% in 1945.
FPTP: Labour’s landslide victory was, above all else, a consequence of Britain’s
electoral system. The Conservatives still managed to gather 39.8 per cent of votes and,
when looking at all potential votes from those enfranchised, Labour won just over a
third. The FPTP electoral system exaggerated Labour’s dominance, converting a modest
lead in the popular vote into an overwhelming parliamentary majority.
This may be true, but what explains the 11.7% swing from the Conservatives to Labour?
Anti-Conservative:
Contemporary surveys of popular attitudes reveal a clear anti-Conservative consensus
which emerged after 1940. One reason for this was the administration’s response to the
Beveridge Report, published in December 1942, which recommended fundamental
changes to social security in Britain. The attitude of Conservative ministers during the
House of Commons debate on the report convinced many that the Government was not
serious about post-war social reform, and there were certainly few outspoken
advocates of social reform among the Conservative party leadership.
Tory hostility to the Beveridge report and the unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s
meant that the electorate had little faith in the Conservative’s desire to implement
social reform, nor in their ability to achieve it. As early as 1943, contemporaries
described Labour as the beneficiary of a ‘negative enthusiasm.’
Churchill: Supremely popular as he was in 1944, with approval ratings rarely ever
dropping below 80 per cent, Winston Churchill was seen by many as a war leader who
should resign as a popular hero. The public did not view him as a ‘man of peace,
domestic policy or human detail’ (Harrisson, 1944), and by February 1944, 62% of
survey respondents were explicitly against Churchill being post-war Prime Minister.
Campaigns and practical issues:
Housing: From the summer of 1944 onwards, opinion polling consistently confirmed
that housing was viewed as the most urgent-post war problem (unsurprising given that
German bombing had destroyed or damaged roughly two in seven between 1940-1945).
Social security and full employment were the next two most salient issues.
However, instead of focusing on these topics, the Conservative campaign placed an
unwarranted focus on less salient issues such as the completion of the war against
,Japan, demobilization and the re-starting of industry. They particularly underestimated
the importance of housing, merely promising to build 220,000 new homes within two
years which was seen as inadequate response to the problem. Labour, on the other
hand, made much of these issues – particularly housing – with Bevin making the
staggering claim that labour would build over four million houses if elected.
To the British electorate, victory in war merited a rich reward - in the shape of free
welfare and secure jobs. This was the basic message of the Labour manifesto which
asserted that people ‘deserved and must be assured a happier future’ and did so, in the
words of Barnett Correlli, ‘to the relative neglect of discussing investment in industry
and infrastructure.’ The Tory manifesto, with its emphasis on sound finance, was
unfashionable and out of line with the public mood.
Popular attitudes to specific policies suggest that Labour’s victory was not solely the
product of anti-Conservative sentiment. Following the publication of the Beveridge
Report in 1942, public enthusiasm for post-war social security was evident and unlike
the Conservatives, Labour’s support for welfare reform appeared genuine. From 1944
onwards, the nationalisation of the coal industry, the railways and the land consistently
received majority approval, and 68 per cent of those questioned in June 1944 agreed
that post-war reconstruction should be conducted mainly under state control.
Liberals: Finally, the Liberal party contested less than half of the available seats in
1945. Therefore, rather than any strong feeling that Labour was preferable, it was
perhaps a disbelief in the Liberal’s ability to win or the absence of their candidates
which directed the anti-Conservative vote towards Labour.
Therefore, whilst the war produced widespread dissatisfaction with the Conservative
party, it did not conversely provide Labour with a large body of positive support. Instead,
they came to power on the back of, what Eatwell (1945) described as, a ‘rejecting
consensus.’
What role did socialism play in Labour’s 1945 victory?
Socialism:
Francis Williams described Labour’s victory in 1945 as the result of a ‘genuine increase
over many years of popular support for socialist policies, and the Economist declared in
1945 that ‘Beyond any possibility of mistake, the country wants a Labour Government
and a Socialist programme.’
Why were people suddenly voting for socialism?
The war had vindicated socialism:
World War II appeared to vindicate pre-war socialist ideology. It provided evidence of
the bankruptcy of capitalism and the need for social and economic change, and the war
,economy itself demonstrated the efficacy of physical planning. According to J.L.
Hobson in 1944, all the myths surrounding socialism had been dispelled.
In the last year of peace, there had been more than a million unemployed in Britain but,
from 1940 onwards, the economy was planned to ensure all-out productivity and deal
with the wartime manpower shortage. Full employment was achieved in Britain for the
first time, and heavy taxation accompanied by food-rationing meant that fewer people
were going hungry.
As such, there was no longer any excuse for unemployment, slums or underfeeding
given the country had demonstrated its ability to address these issues during the war.
Further, if Britain could produce tanks, aircraft, battleships and harbours, the Mirror
pointed out in 1945, there was no reason why it could not do the same for housing.
Misplaced optimism about the war-effort:
However, in 'The Audit of War', Correlli Barnett argues that public support for Labour in
1945 was partly rooted in an overly optimistic view of Britain's wartime performance:
the war economy was artificially sustained by Lend-Lease and Sterling Area credit, and
operated in a sheltered environment, with no competitive pressure, guaranteed profits,
and little incentive for cost-cutting, efficiency or productivity. Further, despite popular
thought, Britain's actual industrial record was underwhelming - German manufacturing
output rose 32% during the war compared to Britain's 4.6%. Hence, the widely
celebrated image of Britain’s wartime industrial strength was more myth than reality.
They didn’t actually campaign on the basis of socialism:
Simply put, ordinary citizens were not interested in socialism. Nor were they really
interested in any talk of abstract, ideological issues or wider questions about the
country’s future; neither public ownership nor private enterprise ever really came up
when voters were interviewed about their motivations.
Instead, the public simply shared a desire for normalcy after the disruption caused by
the war. The priority was to re-establish ordinary home and work life as quickly as
possible. Writing in 1943, G.D.H Cole commented on how few Britons were interested in
public affairs or politics. Instead, they were purely concerned with private worries: food
on the table, a secure job, and a roof above their head.
Therefore, Labour portrayed itself as the party of practical solutions. There was no point
defending policies such as nationalisation or planning on the basis that they accorded
with Labour party, or socialist, principles. They were means rather than ends to the
public, and so the Labour manifesto was largely concerned with defending such
policies in terms of their practical, rather than ethical, justifications. The ideological
aspect of nationalisation, for example, was deliberately played down and was defended
, on the grounds of efficiency, not because public ownership would extend working-class
power.
Consensus
Paul Addison argued that World War II gave rise to a new political consensus which
dominated Britain for decades to come.
From May 1940 to May 1945, the three main parties were in coalition under the
leadership of Winston Churchill. Addison points out that it was under this coalition that
many major reforms – associated with Attlee’s Labour party - were first set in motion.
Social security reform, educational reform, a National Health service, full employment
policies, town and country planning, closer relations between the state industry – these
developments had all begun by the spring of 1943.
This may all be true. However, Addison is wrong to then label the Labour’s party’s
strategy in 1945 as ‘essentially a conservative one’ due to the way it consolidated and
extended the consensus achieved under the coalition. It was Labour figures, such as
Attlee and Greenwood in the War Cabinet, and Bevin as Minister of Labour and National
Service, who initiated and pushed for these reforms in the first place.
Furthermore, as the end of the war approached, any political consensus between the
Labour and Conservative parties had evidently broken down. Labour increasingly
advocated for socialist change while the Conservatives sought a return to free-market
capitalism, and this divergence was evident in policy debates. Given that Labour had
the option to remain in coalition after the War, and that the Conservatives were far more
likely to win any election if the coalition split up, it emphasises just how little consensus
there was in the coalition – at least by the end -that Labour chose to leave and contest
the 1945 election on their own programme.
Furthermore, Addison is right that all three parties went to the polls in 1945 committed
to social and economic reconstruction. However, it needs pointing out, that their
prescriptions were entirely different.
The Conservatives believed that entrepreneurial spirit, rather than state action, would
lead to prosperity. Therefore, the main duty of an incoming government was to cut red
tape and official bureaucracy. Labour, on the other hand, believed that private
enterprise had failed during the 1930s and could not be trusted in the future. Instead,
the state would have to be closely involved in solving the nation’s problems through
economic planning. As a result, Labour advocated for the continuation of wartime
controls and the establishment of a National Investment Board which presented a clear
contrast to the Conservative’s support for a more laissez-faire approach.
From 1947 onwards, however, a much better case can be made for the existence of a
political consensus. When the Conservatives won the 1951 election, R.A Butler was
