Exam prep · Year 2 Concordia style · intermediate level
9 problems
micro, macro, s
tatistics
Concordia
Year 2 practice Full solutions
every step worked o
ut
Intermediate micro, intermediate macro and probability: choice, strategy,
growth, policy and inference.
Unofficial practice based on public course descriptions for this level. Not affiliated with or
endorsed by Concordia University.
, Micro · Problems 1 to 3 Concordia · Year 2 style
Market power and strategy
Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3
Monopoly Cournot duopoly A pricing game
Demand: P = 100 − 2Q P = 120 − (q1 + q2) Payoffs (A, B):
MC = 20 (constant) MC = 30 for both firms High, High: (10, 10)
High, Low: (2, 14)
1. Monopoly Q, P and profit? 1. Firm 1's best response?
Low, High: (14, 2)
2. Competitive quantity? 2. Equilibrium quantities, price, profits?
Low, Low: (5, 5)
3. Deadweight loss? 3. Compare with a monopoly.
1. Dominant strategies?
2. Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient?
Unofficial practice · Solutions on the next page · Concordia Year 2 style · 02
9 problems
micro, macro, s
tatistics
Concordia
Year 2 practice Full solutions
every step worked o
ut
Intermediate micro, intermediate macro and probability: choice, strategy,
growth, policy and inference.
Unofficial practice based on public course descriptions for this level. Not affiliated with or
endorsed by Concordia University.
, Micro · Problems 1 to 3 Concordia · Year 2 style
Market power and strategy
Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3
Monopoly Cournot duopoly A pricing game
Demand: P = 100 − 2Q P = 120 − (q1 + q2) Payoffs (A, B):
MC = 20 (constant) MC = 30 for both firms High, High: (10, 10)
High, Low: (2, 14)
1. Monopoly Q, P and profit? 1. Firm 1's best response?
Low, High: (14, 2)
2. Competitive quantity? 2. Equilibrium quantities, price, profits?
Low, Low: (5, 5)
3. Deadweight loss? 3. Compare with a monopoly.
1. Dominant strategies?
2. Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient?
Unofficial practice · Solutions on the next page · Concordia Year 2 style · 02
