Simon Blackburn - The Individual Strikes Back
● Introduction: is Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein correct? What is the significance of
the thesis, irrespective of this?
○ Wittgenstein’s scepticism is not designed to promote a conclusion about
knowledge/certainty, but to force a reconsideration of the metaphysics of the issue
● There are two parts to Wittgenstein’s argument: attacking the old conception and
producing a replacement
○ if successful, his positive part will produce a conception on which public
rule following is possible, whereas private rule-following is not
Sceptical Solutions
● Long ground laying section that I don’t understand
The Critique of Rule-Following
● We are chasing a normative judgement - that something is correct or incorrect
○ this fact is difficult to find, and its normative nature is the problem
● Exposition of Kripke
○ this argument corresponds to the negative point in Wittgenstein, that we
get no nearer to the fact we are looking for by embarking on a potential regress of
interpretations
■ the positive point, that the fact is exhibited in obeying a
rule, must wait
● Kripke rejects a dispositional account of rule following, partly because he claims
dispositions are finite
○ this is not clear - perhaps we offer the answer we would give by
reiterating procedures we are disposed to use
● We may imagine two machines, one that is ‘supposed’ to compute addition, but because it
is faulty computes a bent function, and another that is designed to compute the bent function
○ the two may be identical - this suggests that the notion of the rule must
be external
The Community and the Individual
● The individual has a hard time against Kripke’s sceptic
○ he can’t make the sceptic appreciate what kind of fact it was that showed
he was being faithful to a principle, following a rule or previous intention
■ so the sceptic claims that there is no fact as to whether
the bent rule or the natural rule was intended, and given this, there is no fact of
the matter that any principle at all was in force
○ the individual can turn to the community, and claim that his inculcation
in a public practice proves his rule-following
■ but why shouldn’t the public ‘rule’ be subject to the
same bent/natural problem?
■ the community supposedly has justification conditions
for seeing or dignifying someone as a rule follower - that his practice must
accord with the community practice
● Introduction: is Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein correct? What is the significance of
the thesis, irrespective of this?
○ Wittgenstein’s scepticism is not designed to promote a conclusion about
knowledge/certainty, but to force a reconsideration of the metaphysics of the issue
● There are two parts to Wittgenstein’s argument: attacking the old conception and
producing a replacement
○ if successful, his positive part will produce a conception on which public
rule following is possible, whereas private rule-following is not
Sceptical Solutions
● Long ground laying section that I don’t understand
The Critique of Rule-Following
● We are chasing a normative judgement - that something is correct or incorrect
○ this fact is difficult to find, and its normative nature is the problem
● Exposition of Kripke
○ this argument corresponds to the negative point in Wittgenstein, that we
get no nearer to the fact we are looking for by embarking on a potential regress of
interpretations
■ the positive point, that the fact is exhibited in obeying a
rule, must wait
● Kripke rejects a dispositional account of rule following, partly because he claims
dispositions are finite
○ this is not clear - perhaps we offer the answer we would give by
reiterating procedures we are disposed to use
● We may imagine two machines, one that is ‘supposed’ to compute addition, but because it
is faulty computes a bent function, and another that is designed to compute the bent function
○ the two may be identical - this suggests that the notion of the rule must
be external
The Community and the Individual
● The individual has a hard time against Kripke’s sceptic
○ he can’t make the sceptic appreciate what kind of fact it was that showed
he was being faithful to a principle, following a rule or previous intention
■ so the sceptic claims that there is no fact as to whether
the bent rule or the natural rule was intended, and given this, there is no fact of
the matter that any principle at all was in force
○ the individual can turn to the community, and claim that his inculcation
in a public practice proves his rule-following
■ but why shouldn’t the public ‘rule’ be subject to the
same bent/natural problem?
■ the community supposedly has justification conditions
for seeing or dignifying someone as a rule follower - that his practice must
accord with the community practice
