‘Kennedy met Communist aggression more successfully than Eisenhower’.
Assess the validity of this view.
Regardless of the differences in their presidential administrations, both Eisenhower and Kennedy
faced a sequence of victories and defeats in their foreign policy, ideologically battling against the
thrive of Communism and avoiding the alarming consequences of nuclear warfare. That said, despite
the more flexible, diplomatic nature of Kennedy’s approach, the resolute political strategies of
Eisenhower cultivated a broader range of successes and have irrevocably contributed to his
reputation of a more militant, higher-achieving president. Both faced the challenge posed by
Communist aggression, but it was undoubtedly Eisenhower who succeeded the most.
Kennedy’s main area of success was in Berlin, regarding his response to the 1961 Berlin Crisis, which
saw a surge in tensions and posed the immense threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Berlin
was a centre of espionage for West Germany and demonstrated the disparity between the prosperity
of Capitalist society and the depravation Communism inflicted; the mass exodus of skilled workers
from East to West Germany, as well as humiliating propaganda and a failure to negotiate an
agreement at the Vienna Summit meant Berlin had become a liability to the USSR, leading to the
inevitable construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As well as becoming the most tangible incarnation
of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the wall jeopardised the capacity of US power and presence in East
Germany, essentially limiting Kennedy’s options for action. However, retaliation was not
incorporated in Kennedy’s approach, who instead continued to support West Germany through his
1963 state visit and infamous ‘Ich Bin Ein Berliner’ speech, rallying support and exhibiting US
commitment to their struggle against Communist aggression. Some historians would argue that
Kennedy’s lack of action against a physical manifestation of Communist hostility was weak and gave
impetus for Soviet adventurism in Cuba, however arguably he handled the crisis with necessary
composure that helped him avoid imminent nuclear warfare. Despite also defusing the crisis,
Eisenhower’s lack of response to Khrushchev’s threats was arguably a somewhat myopic decision; he
failed to improve the situation of Berlin, meaning the possibility of it being a flashpoint increased
significantly in the Kennedy Administration.
Kennedy was also successful in tackling the rise of Communism in ‘Third World’ countries,
particularly South America. Kennedy’s awareness of the appeal and compatibility of Communism to
underdeveloped countries with diminished economies prompted the establishment of the Peace
Corps and Alliance for Progress in 1961, aiming to achieve overseas economic cooperation whilst
simultaneously deterring the allure of Communist ideals. Kennedy believed the promotion of
democracy and ameliorating the quality of life for many Latin American people was key to success –
instead of using covert operations to enforce Capitalism, Kennedy approached the precariousness of
the situation with an excellent alternative, implicitly endorsing Capitalist ideology through the
improvement of education and provision of modern resources, thus preventing a rise in Communist
aggression within such a proximity to the US coast. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates
the limitations of such movements (particularly as the Alliance for Progress movement failed),
however the existence of the Peace Corps today signifies Kennedy’s ongoing legacy of defeating
Communism using non-violent means. Instead of using a reactionary policy to prevent potential
dominoes from ‘falling’, like Eisenhower, Kennedy ensured the domino theory could not work.
However, despite the use of bureaucracy, it is undeniable that the strength of Kennedy’s foreign
policy was limited by a series of setbacks, most prominently occurring during the 1961 Bay of Pigs
invasion and the consequent 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy ordered the implementation of a
covert CIA plan inherited from Eisenhower – which was altered dramatically before its ratification –
to topple the nationalist dictator Fidel Castro, whose commercial sanctions threatened the expansion
Assess the validity of this view.
Regardless of the differences in their presidential administrations, both Eisenhower and Kennedy
faced a sequence of victories and defeats in their foreign policy, ideologically battling against the
thrive of Communism and avoiding the alarming consequences of nuclear warfare. That said, despite
the more flexible, diplomatic nature of Kennedy’s approach, the resolute political strategies of
Eisenhower cultivated a broader range of successes and have irrevocably contributed to his
reputation of a more militant, higher-achieving president. Both faced the challenge posed by
Communist aggression, but it was undoubtedly Eisenhower who succeeded the most.
Kennedy’s main area of success was in Berlin, regarding his response to the 1961 Berlin Crisis, which
saw a surge in tensions and posed the immense threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Berlin
was a centre of espionage for West Germany and demonstrated the disparity between the prosperity
of Capitalist society and the depravation Communism inflicted; the mass exodus of skilled workers
from East to West Germany, as well as humiliating propaganda and a failure to negotiate an
agreement at the Vienna Summit meant Berlin had become a liability to the USSR, leading to the
inevitable construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As well as becoming the most tangible incarnation
of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the wall jeopardised the capacity of US power and presence in East
Germany, essentially limiting Kennedy’s options for action. However, retaliation was not
incorporated in Kennedy’s approach, who instead continued to support West Germany through his
1963 state visit and infamous ‘Ich Bin Ein Berliner’ speech, rallying support and exhibiting US
commitment to their struggle against Communist aggression. Some historians would argue that
Kennedy’s lack of action against a physical manifestation of Communist hostility was weak and gave
impetus for Soviet adventurism in Cuba, however arguably he handled the crisis with necessary
composure that helped him avoid imminent nuclear warfare. Despite also defusing the crisis,
Eisenhower’s lack of response to Khrushchev’s threats was arguably a somewhat myopic decision; he
failed to improve the situation of Berlin, meaning the possibility of it being a flashpoint increased
significantly in the Kennedy Administration.
Kennedy was also successful in tackling the rise of Communism in ‘Third World’ countries,
particularly South America. Kennedy’s awareness of the appeal and compatibility of Communism to
underdeveloped countries with diminished economies prompted the establishment of the Peace
Corps and Alliance for Progress in 1961, aiming to achieve overseas economic cooperation whilst
simultaneously deterring the allure of Communist ideals. Kennedy believed the promotion of
democracy and ameliorating the quality of life for many Latin American people was key to success –
instead of using covert operations to enforce Capitalism, Kennedy approached the precariousness of
the situation with an excellent alternative, implicitly endorsing Capitalist ideology through the
improvement of education and provision of modern resources, thus preventing a rise in Communist
aggression within such a proximity to the US coast. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates
the limitations of such movements (particularly as the Alliance for Progress movement failed),
however the existence of the Peace Corps today signifies Kennedy’s ongoing legacy of defeating
Communism using non-violent means. Instead of using a reactionary policy to prevent potential
dominoes from ‘falling’, like Eisenhower, Kennedy ensured the domino theory could not work.
However, despite the use of bureaucracy, it is undeniable that the strength of Kennedy’s foreign
policy was limited by a series of setbacks, most prominently occurring during the 1961 Bay of Pigs
invasion and the consequent 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy ordered the implementation of a
covert CIA plan inherited from Eisenhower – which was altered dramatically before its ratification –
to topple the nationalist dictator Fidel Castro, whose commercial sanctions threatened the expansion
