Week 2
Europe began as a myth. The continent was named after the myth
surrounding Princess Europa, to create a boundary between the "West"
and Asia, as Princess Europa was brought from Istanbul (the "border"
between the European continent and Asia) to Crete by Zeus. This leads to
the conclusion that borders are not natural and that they change over
time to reflect the desired political situation (for example, the question of
whether Russia is part of Europe). Europe's imagery was primarily used
politically from the Renaissance onward. For example, the League of
Cambrai (League of Cambrai) against Venice: Venice wanted to conquer
large parts of the country, and Europe had to offer "protection." This
battle is depicted in "The Allegory of the League of Cambrai" (1590,
Jacopo Palma the Younger).
Before the continent was called Europe, it was primarily described
as the "Christian realm" (or Christianity); the Pope was the primary ruler,
both religious and secular. However, calling Europe entirely Christian was
a generalization; Islamic groups dominated in other areas, such as Spain.
There were several reasons why the continent came to be called Europe,
including external threats, including the Ottoman invasions; the concept
of "Europe" was introduced in 1453 with the fall of Constantinople and in
1530 by Erasmus; the discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus
in 1492, which created a new continent in the West, against which Europe
had to distinguish itself; the internal conflicts of the sixteenth century,
including the rise of Protestantism and the subsequent religious rebellion:
Christianity was under attack, making Europe as a collective group a more
appropriate term—William of Orange therefore also named the old
European liberties in his struggle for independence. In the eighteenth
century, "Europe" became increasingly centralized; The term was
primarily used to separate itself from the rest of the world. Thus, Europe
was seen as "better," and its development was assumed to be unheard of
anywhere else in the world. Roland Barthes,Mythologies(1957) argues that
myths are not only of ancient times but are also important in
contemporary culture. Words and objects, partly due to their ideological
connotations, can become "myths" and symbols; thus, subjective values
can transcend facts.
There are several "myths" surrounding Europe. First, the myth of
centrality. In the fifteenth century, Asia, rather than Europe, was
considered the most important continent. When Europe was called
"Europe," the associated self-perception changed; in the following
(sixteenth) century, Europe was designated as a central location (center,
top) by mapmakers. This acquired cultural importance and fostered,
among other things, sea routes and the invention of the compass. Second,
the myth of hierarchy. Europe was a princess, with which the idea of
royalty ("the world is at her feet") emerged within the continent of Europe
and its ideology. Maps therefore portray Europe as royal, Africa as naked
and inferior; Asia is somewhere in between. Third, the myth of
international relations. The general idea persisted that Europe was
unique, as it managed to overcome its internal conflicts, for example, the
post-Reformation riots, including the Beeldenstorm (1566) and the St.
,Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572). and the Thirty Years' War (1618-
1648), with approximately five million civilian deaths and 1.8 million
soldiers – twenty percent of the pre-war population. By comparison, this
figure was six percent during World War II. This war also resulted in
disastrous destruction and the outbreak of plagues. A significant event in
international relations was the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which granted
sovereignty to the Netherlands and Switzerland. German kingdoms also
gained autonomy; other regions thus had no say in decision-making. This
ended the Pope's secular power; he lost his position as "unifier of nations."
The Westphalian system was used to accept and respect the differences
between European countries, enabling them to overcome internal conflicts
and thus maintain freedom within their continent.
The Westphalian system signified a "new Europe." Schroeder also
describes it as "the rules and understandings underlying the practice of
international politics" (Transformations of the European Politics, 1763-
1848, xii). This system is based on a balance of power, with mutual
respect; therefore, one state cannot take over another. This balance of
power, however, was never incorporated into legitimate treaties (an
exception is the Union of Utrecht, 1713); nevertheless, it could be found in
statistics, for example, the statistics of soldier numbers that increased
simultaneously. It was therefore a ‘zero-sum game’: if someone else gains
an advantage, it means your loss – also introduced by Daniel Defoe
(1704). Nevertheless, this did not mean long-lasting ‘peace’; it was
therefore not long before wars broke out. Reasons for this were the ‘drive
for compensation’: the seizure of territory was not possible without a
unanimous takeover or monetary compensation; compensation for aid,
which was often not provided; and the ‘raison d’état’, the continued
existence of a state – essential for this was the preservation of honour; if
this was compromised, wars were waged. The overall goal was "the
security of individual states, or of most states, or of at least the most
important ones" (Schroeder, 9). An example of this was the erosion of
Polish sovereignty with the First Partition of Poland (1772). In this
partition, Poland was divided among three powers, thus "conforming" to
the system—which only offered advantages to larger powers, treating
Poland as an internal colony rather than a European state. This partition
also prevented further wars; it was thus a diplomatic compromise. This
system was only applicable to European states; outside Europe, princes
and princesses were not respected. An important way in which this idea
was legitimized, for example in America, was through "terra nullius" (the
"inferior peoples did not know how to use land efficiently"). Private
warfare was a third party interested in maintaining this system, for
example, the overseas trade monopoly granted to the VOC. An example of
this was Sri Lanka, the major producer of cinnamon, in which the VOC was
interested. The Portuguese had already established themselves and tried
to monopolize the cinnamon trade. The king refused to hear of this,
invited the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and tried to use them to
defeat the Portuguese—in payment, they received one percent of the
cinnamon production. However, cinnamon production was lower than
expected, causing the VOC to seize more land ("we must be
,compensated," as the Westphalian system stated); this led to a series of
wars. A new peace treaty was concluded, but it was less advantageous for
the local population—coastal areas were seized, and Sri Lanka was
prohibited from trading with others. Consequently, the king was
recognized, but not respected. This was also reflected in the
disappearance of local customs, such as the honoring of the local king by
Europeans. A clear distinction emerged between Europeans and non-
Europeans: Europeans were civilized, non-Europeans were not; therefore,
Europeans did not have to adhere to previously established rules.
Articles
Burke, "Did Europe exist before 1700?"
Peter Burke argues that Europe is not so much a place as an idea or a
subjective reality, a form of collective consciousness, since it has had no
clear natural boundaries, economic or political unity, or even a fully
shared culture (such as Christianity). The history of this idea is traced
through the "repertoire" of concepts used to express group identity.
In ancient Greek texts, "Europe" occasionally appeared as a term to
distinguish "Us" (the Greeks) from "Them" (the Asians, barbarians, or
Persians), often creating a contrast between the despotic East and the
freedom-loving West. For the Romans, "Europe" meant little, as the
Roman Empire stretched across three continents; the important
distinction was between Romans and barbarians. In the Early Middle Ages,
the term appeared sporadically, often in military contexts, such as
theEuropeanswho supported Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732.
Charlemagne was described around 800 asFather of EuropeThe word
"Europe" only began to appear frequently in texts in the thirteenth
century, a period coinciding with new invasions from the east (the
Mongols). During the Middle Ages, the central distinction between "Us"
and "Them" was between pagans and Christians; "Europe" then occupied
a relatively minor place in the repertoire of identity concepts.
From the late fifteenth century onward, the term "Europe" became
more seriously taken, particularly with the rise of the Ottoman (Turkish)
threat. This threat, which lasted longer than previous eastern attacks,
fostered a sense of collective identity and solidarity among Westerners. It
defined "European" as Christian and free (in contrast to Turkish despotism
and barbarism). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term was
increasingly used by writers such as Erasmus, Machiavelli, Montaigne, and
Shakespeare. Histories of Europe were even written, beginning with
Pierfrancesco Giambullari's Historia dell'Europa in 1566. European self-
awareness developed in three main contexts:
- As described above, the common enemy forced a sense of
solidarity, leading to plans for an association of Christian princes
to repel the Turks;
- The invasion of other cultures (such as America) made Europeans
aware of their own identity, defined in contrast to the 'savages'
of Brazil (naked, without reason, cannibalistic);
- In the seventeenth century, a third context emerged: political
conflicts within Europe itself. Opposition to ambitious monarchs
, (such as the Habsburgs or later Louis XIV) led to discussions
about the 'balance of Europe' and 'European freedom'.
By 1700, the consciousness of being European had become a
significant social and political fact. There is fragmentary evidence that the
term "Europe" also became popular among ordinary city dwellers during
this period, for example, through street ballads. Nevertheless, the concept
of "Christenheid" (Christendom) remained in use, even in political
contexts. More importantly, people's identities were often local or regional
(e.g., Florentine or Gascon), even among the upper classes. This suggests
that, although the term emerged frequently, European consciousness was
still weak by 1700.
Schroeder, "The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848"
The author argues that the fundamental cause of this instability lay in the
flaws of the 18th-century balance-of-power system itself. This balance-of-
power system was based on unwritten rules that states accepted as
necessary:
- The rules of compensation (keeping pace with rivals) and
indemnities (payments for services or losses, or 'nothing for
nothing') promoted a competitive dynamic even in legal
territorial expansion;
- Alliances were flexible and limited in duration and purpose, often
aimed at accumulating power and expanding. Betrayal of an ally
was considered normal if it served the perceived general
balance;
- The actions of states were motivated by raison d'état, aimed at
promoting the power, security, wealth and honour (prestige) of
the monarch/dynasty, regardless of population or nationality;
- Although it was believed that competition between states would
automatically maintain a general equilibrium and prevent a
European empire, this was an illusion. The rules actually fostered
conflict, and the system's structure led to hegemony for one or
two flanking powers (Great Britain and Russia) at the expense of
the rest.
The period was characterised by dominant flank powers (Britain and
Russia), whose geographical invulnerability allowed them to extend their
advantage, and a vulnerable centre (France, Austria, and states such as
Poland).
Russia exploited the crippling rivalry between Austria and Prussia to
expand its influence. The First Partition of Poland (1772) was a direct
consequence of the balance of power system, in which Austria, Prussia,
and Russia enriched themselves at the expense of a "helpless third party"
(Poland) to prevent a larger war and limit Russia's expansionism. Russia
was the ultimate victor in Eastern Europe and also expanded at the
expense of the Ottoman Empire (Peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji, 1774).
The Habsburg Monarchy found itself trapped. As a Hausmacht
(patrimonial state based on tradition and law), Austria needed stability
and the protection of buffer states (Poland, Turkey). But to counter
aggression from Prussia and Russia, it was forced to play the rules of
Europe began as a myth. The continent was named after the myth
surrounding Princess Europa, to create a boundary between the "West"
and Asia, as Princess Europa was brought from Istanbul (the "border"
between the European continent and Asia) to Crete by Zeus. This leads to
the conclusion that borders are not natural and that they change over
time to reflect the desired political situation (for example, the question of
whether Russia is part of Europe). Europe's imagery was primarily used
politically from the Renaissance onward. For example, the League of
Cambrai (League of Cambrai) against Venice: Venice wanted to conquer
large parts of the country, and Europe had to offer "protection." This
battle is depicted in "The Allegory of the League of Cambrai" (1590,
Jacopo Palma the Younger).
Before the continent was called Europe, it was primarily described
as the "Christian realm" (or Christianity); the Pope was the primary ruler,
both religious and secular. However, calling Europe entirely Christian was
a generalization; Islamic groups dominated in other areas, such as Spain.
There were several reasons why the continent came to be called Europe,
including external threats, including the Ottoman invasions; the concept
of "Europe" was introduced in 1453 with the fall of Constantinople and in
1530 by Erasmus; the discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus
in 1492, which created a new continent in the West, against which Europe
had to distinguish itself; the internal conflicts of the sixteenth century,
including the rise of Protestantism and the subsequent religious rebellion:
Christianity was under attack, making Europe as a collective group a more
appropriate term—William of Orange therefore also named the old
European liberties in his struggle for independence. In the eighteenth
century, "Europe" became increasingly centralized; The term was
primarily used to separate itself from the rest of the world. Thus, Europe
was seen as "better," and its development was assumed to be unheard of
anywhere else in the world. Roland Barthes,Mythologies(1957) argues that
myths are not only of ancient times but are also important in
contemporary culture. Words and objects, partly due to their ideological
connotations, can become "myths" and symbols; thus, subjective values
can transcend facts.
There are several "myths" surrounding Europe. First, the myth of
centrality. In the fifteenth century, Asia, rather than Europe, was
considered the most important continent. When Europe was called
"Europe," the associated self-perception changed; in the following
(sixteenth) century, Europe was designated as a central location (center,
top) by mapmakers. This acquired cultural importance and fostered,
among other things, sea routes and the invention of the compass. Second,
the myth of hierarchy. Europe was a princess, with which the idea of
royalty ("the world is at her feet") emerged within the continent of Europe
and its ideology. Maps therefore portray Europe as royal, Africa as naked
and inferior; Asia is somewhere in between. Third, the myth of
international relations. The general idea persisted that Europe was
unique, as it managed to overcome its internal conflicts, for example, the
post-Reformation riots, including the Beeldenstorm (1566) and the St.
,Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572). and the Thirty Years' War (1618-
1648), with approximately five million civilian deaths and 1.8 million
soldiers – twenty percent of the pre-war population. By comparison, this
figure was six percent during World War II. This war also resulted in
disastrous destruction and the outbreak of plagues. A significant event in
international relations was the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which granted
sovereignty to the Netherlands and Switzerland. German kingdoms also
gained autonomy; other regions thus had no say in decision-making. This
ended the Pope's secular power; he lost his position as "unifier of nations."
The Westphalian system was used to accept and respect the differences
between European countries, enabling them to overcome internal conflicts
and thus maintain freedom within their continent.
The Westphalian system signified a "new Europe." Schroeder also
describes it as "the rules and understandings underlying the practice of
international politics" (Transformations of the European Politics, 1763-
1848, xii). This system is based on a balance of power, with mutual
respect; therefore, one state cannot take over another. This balance of
power, however, was never incorporated into legitimate treaties (an
exception is the Union of Utrecht, 1713); nevertheless, it could be found in
statistics, for example, the statistics of soldier numbers that increased
simultaneously. It was therefore a ‘zero-sum game’: if someone else gains
an advantage, it means your loss – also introduced by Daniel Defoe
(1704). Nevertheless, this did not mean long-lasting ‘peace’; it was
therefore not long before wars broke out. Reasons for this were the ‘drive
for compensation’: the seizure of territory was not possible without a
unanimous takeover or monetary compensation; compensation for aid,
which was often not provided; and the ‘raison d’état’, the continued
existence of a state – essential for this was the preservation of honour; if
this was compromised, wars were waged. The overall goal was "the
security of individual states, or of most states, or of at least the most
important ones" (Schroeder, 9). An example of this was the erosion of
Polish sovereignty with the First Partition of Poland (1772). In this
partition, Poland was divided among three powers, thus "conforming" to
the system—which only offered advantages to larger powers, treating
Poland as an internal colony rather than a European state. This partition
also prevented further wars; it was thus a diplomatic compromise. This
system was only applicable to European states; outside Europe, princes
and princesses were not respected. An important way in which this idea
was legitimized, for example in America, was through "terra nullius" (the
"inferior peoples did not know how to use land efficiently"). Private
warfare was a third party interested in maintaining this system, for
example, the overseas trade monopoly granted to the VOC. An example of
this was Sri Lanka, the major producer of cinnamon, in which the VOC was
interested. The Portuguese had already established themselves and tried
to monopolize the cinnamon trade. The king refused to hear of this,
invited the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and tried to use them to
defeat the Portuguese—in payment, they received one percent of the
cinnamon production. However, cinnamon production was lower than
expected, causing the VOC to seize more land ("we must be
,compensated," as the Westphalian system stated); this led to a series of
wars. A new peace treaty was concluded, but it was less advantageous for
the local population—coastal areas were seized, and Sri Lanka was
prohibited from trading with others. Consequently, the king was
recognized, but not respected. This was also reflected in the
disappearance of local customs, such as the honoring of the local king by
Europeans. A clear distinction emerged between Europeans and non-
Europeans: Europeans were civilized, non-Europeans were not; therefore,
Europeans did not have to adhere to previously established rules.
Articles
Burke, "Did Europe exist before 1700?"
Peter Burke argues that Europe is not so much a place as an idea or a
subjective reality, a form of collective consciousness, since it has had no
clear natural boundaries, economic or political unity, or even a fully
shared culture (such as Christianity). The history of this idea is traced
through the "repertoire" of concepts used to express group identity.
In ancient Greek texts, "Europe" occasionally appeared as a term to
distinguish "Us" (the Greeks) from "Them" (the Asians, barbarians, or
Persians), often creating a contrast between the despotic East and the
freedom-loving West. For the Romans, "Europe" meant little, as the
Roman Empire stretched across three continents; the important
distinction was between Romans and barbarians. In the Early Middle Ages,
the term appeared sporadically, often in military contexts, such as
theEuropeanswho supported Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732.
Charlemagne was described around 800 asFather of EuropeThe word
"Europe" only began to appear frequently in texts in the thirteenth
century, a period coinciding with new invasions from the east (the
Mongols). During the Middle Ages, the central distinction between "Us"
and "Them" was between pagans and Christians; "Europe" then occupied
a relatively minor place in the repertoire of identity concepts.
From the late fifteenth century onward, the term "Europe" became
more seriously taken, particularly with the rise of the Ottoman (Turkish)
threat. This threat, which lasted longer than previous eastern attacks,
fostered a sense of collective identity and solidarity among Westerners. It
defined "European" as Christian and free (in contrast to Turkish despotism
and barbarism). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term was
increasingly used by writers such as Erasmus, Machiavelli, Montaigne, and
Shakespeare. Histories of Europe were even written, beginning with
Pierfrancesco Giambullari's Historia dell'Europa in 1566. European self-
awareness developed in three main contexts:
- As described above, the common enemy forced a sense of
solidarity, leading to plans for an association of Christian princes
to repel the Turks;
- The invasion of other cultures (such as America) made Europeans
aware of their own identity, defined in contrast to the 'savages'
of Brazil (naked, without reason, cannibalistic);
- In the seventeenth century, a third context emerged: political
conflicts within Europe itself. Opposition to ambitious monarchs
, (such as the Habsburgs or later Louis XIV) led to discussions
about the 'balance of Europe' and 'European freedom'.
By 1700, the consciousness of being European had become a
significant social and political fact. There is fragmentary evidence that the
term "Europe" also became popular among ordinary city dwellers during
this period, for example, through street ballads. Nevertheless, the concept
of "Christenheid" (Christendom) remained in use, even in political
contexts. More importantly, people's identities were often local or regional
(e.g., Florentine or Gascon), even among the upper classes. This suggests
that, although the term emerged frequently, European consciousness was
still weak by 1700.
Schroeder, "The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848"
The author argues that the fundamental cause of this instability lay in the
flaws of the 18th-century balance-of-power system itself. This balance-of-
power system was based on unwritten rules that states accepted as
necessary:
- The rules of compensation (keeping pace with rivals) and
indemnities (payments for services or losses, or 'nothing for
nothing') promoted a competitive dynamic even in legal
territorial expansion;
- Alliances were flexible and limited in duration and purpose, often
aimed at accumulating power and expanding. Betrayal of an ally
was considered normal if it served the perceived general
balance;
- The actions of states were motivated by raison d'état, aimed at
promoting the power, security, wealth and honour (prestige) of
the monarch/dynasty, regardless of population or nationality;
- Although it was believed that competition between states would
automatically maintain a general equilibrium and prevent a
European empire, this was an illusion. The rules actually fostered
conflict, and the system's structure led to hegemony for one or
two flanking powers (Great Britain and Russia) at the expense of
the rest.
The period was characterised by dominant flank powers (Britain and
Russia), whose geographical invulnerability allowed them to extend their
advantage, and a vulnerable centre (France, Austria, and states such as
Poland).
Russia exploited the crippling rivalry between Austria and Prussia to
expand its influence. The First Partition of Poland (1772) was a direct
consequence of the balance of power system, in which Austria, Prussia,
and Russia enriched themselves at the expense of a "helpless third party"
(Poland) to prevent a larger war and limit Russia's expansionism. Russia
was the ultimate victor in Eastern Europe and also expanded at the
expense of the Ottoman Empire (Peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji, 1774).
The Habsburg Monarchy found itself trapped. As a Hausmacht
(patrimonial state based on tradition and law), Austria needed stability
and the protection of buffer states (Poland, Turkey). But to counter
aggression from Prussia and Russia, it was forced to play the rules of
