Week 1: Introduction: Historians and International Relations
Lecture: Historians and International Relations: An Unhappy Marriage?
There are five main theories: realism, with a focus on analysis, key actors,
state behavior and/or objectives, key concepts, and strengths and/or
weaknesses; liberalism, with a focus on analysis, key actors, state
behavior and/or objectives, key concepts, and strengths and/or
weaknesses; constructivism, with a focus on ideas and identity; feminism,
with a focus on gender; and Marxism, with a focus on class. But where
does history fit into this picture?
Criticism from history on IB
Historians argue that all political scientists do is make generic statements
based on "objective" figures. An example of this is the assertion by IB'ers
that states that trade with each other will never enter into conflict. On the
one hand, they were right, as evidenced by the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community, for example, but on the other hand,
they were also wrong, as evidenced by the cooperation between the
European Union and Russia (Nord Stream). Another assertion by IB'ers is
that conflicts erupt as soon as states lack access to the necessary natural
resources. Again, it is evident that on the one hand, they were right, for
example, by wars in Africa fought over access to water. On the other
hand, they were also wrong, as there are many more examples of
initiatives that actively prevent such wars. Historians therefore argue that
"generalization" is useless; rather, one should look at a concrete and
specific case; context proves essential. History is not linear; it is
contingent, not necessary. An example is women's right to vote, which
was introduced in Europe around 1920 in response to the First World War.
But did women themselves see it as a logical progression of history?
Another criticism historians have leveled at political scientists is their
presentism: the emphasis on the recent, reasoning from the present, but
also using the present to respond to the past. Lynn Hunt argues that
presentism is dangerous, as it fosters moral complacency and temporal
superiority. Hunt argues that the tension between contemporary concerns
must be acknowledged, but the past must also be respected.
Criticism from IB on history
IB'ers view history as "one damn thing after another"; history appears to
be descriptive, while cause-and-effect relationships often remain
unanswered. However, historians do use theories and make assumptions,
but these are not subsequently questioned or actively used; historians can
thus learn from IB'ers.
What is historical theory in general?
History is what happened in the past, but also the story of what happened.
In the first case, it involves philosophizing about substantive philosophy of
history (e.g., Marx); in the second case, it involves philosophizing about
analytic philosophy of history (what is a fact or a statement?). Herman
Paul posits four forms of the past: the chronological past, the past
completed, the past queer, and the present past.
,When was history born?
The birth of history as a discipline was around 1800. At the moment when
the humanities were born, three developments came together: the origin
of man, the rise of the idea of theSpiritand the historicization of the
worldview. A new way of acquiring knowledge emerged. On the one hand,
it is reasoned from nature and the object, on the other, from reason,
mind, or subject. This was connected to empiricism, observation and
inductive reasoning (from individual to generalizations), and rationalism,
deriving knowledge from unquestionable (rational) certainties, and
deductive reasoning. The latter emerged from the questionable nature of
human observations; one must always doubt what they observe.
Therefore, knowledge cannot be derived from observations—but it can be
derived from the human mind.
Immanuel Kant is an important thinker in history; he introduces a new
idea. Kant uses both empiricism and rationalism, subsequently reasoning
transcendentally. Kant approaches humanity not as full of doubt, but
rather as full of invisible knowledge (condition of possibility); human
thoughts have a pure category (causality) and many forms of perception
(for example, space and time). If one were not transcendental, they would
not know what is happening. Humanity is thus a subject (observer) as an
object (something that can be studied); humanity as a "uniobject" is
unique. Willhelm Friedrich Hegel was inspired by Kant and, like Kant, saw
the world as a product of humanity. Hegel states that "spirit' – not an
individual concept, but rather a collective spirit (for example, the spirit of
the age). Hegel states in his concept of 'spirit' also a developmental
perspective; an ever-increasing understanding of the world is emerging,
partly through thesis > antithesis > synthesis. The developmental
perspective thus provided a historicized worldview, withexperiential
spacein Expected horizon: previous experiences guaranteed the present
and the future – which is why history was studied, for example, by kings to
consolidate their power. The eighteenth century, however, brought about
a change in this view; although people had aexperiential space, but this
did not guarantee the future. History could therefore no longer serve as a
teacher, but it was still studied for interpretation: history was used to
understand the present.
History also employed its own methods; interpretation was at the heart of
these. This methodology is also called hermeneutics, coined by Friedrich
Schleiermacher with his research on the Bible. To fully understand such
research, however, one also had to understand the author; this
phenomenon (the interplay between understanding the author and the
object studied) is also called the hermeneutic circle. This historicism was
the foundation of German historiography, spearheaded by Leopold von
Ranke. Ranke wanted to present the past—which in his research was
primarily state documents, resulting in a primary emphasis on diplomacy
—in its uniqueness; the "understand' of the source itself. However,
Ranke's reasoning is questionable: can a historian even be objective?
Wilhelm von Dilthey also calls it the subject position: a historian always
,retains his prejudice; however, if one tried hard enough, they could detach
themselves from the present and empathize with the past. In addition, the
Cartesian fear arose: something had to be a 'hard' (objective) science;
subjectivity therefore had no place in scientific practice. Gadamar is more
positive about this and proposes historical situatedness as a necessary
condition for knowledge; without tradition and prejudices, one can never
engage in interpretation. Interpretation starts from that 'horizon';
historical objects also had such a 'horizon'. The dialogue between one's
own horizon and the horizon of historical objects leads, Gadamar argues,
to knowledge – theHorizon fusion.
Carr, The Historian and His Facts
(1)What, according to Carr, is the difference between a ‘basic fact’ and
a ‘historical fact’?
Carr argues that many facts about the past can be "factually true,"
but not automatically historical facts. A basic fact, in his description,
is something like: "the Battle of Hastings was in 1066," or: "Caesar
crossed the Rubicon." Such facts are important for accuracy, but
they are primarily the raw material from which historians work. They
are therefore not the final product of historiography. A historical fact
only arises when historians select a fact, give it weight, and place it
within a narrative or explanation. Carr puts this bluntly by saying
that facts do not "speak for themselves": they only speak when the
historian invokes them, and the historian decides which facts get to
speak and in what order and context. He also illustrates this with
the idea that a fact can become a "member" of the "club" of
historical facts: an event might first appear in footnotes, later in the
main text, and only when other historians find the interpretation
relevant does it become a solid "historical fact." In other words, the
label "historical fact" depends on interpretation and meaning.
(2)Why is it important to recognize the difference between these types
of facts in historiography?
According to Carr, this distinction helps us understand that
historiography isn't simply a matter of collecting disparate facts and
then writing them down "neutrally." Pretending that historical
knowledge is merely an accumulation of facts obscures the fact that
selection and interpretation always take place. Carr warns that this
quickly leads to a false dichotomy: either you create meaningless
"cut-and-paste history," or you create propaganda/fiction that uses
facts solely to embellish a preconceived narrative. His point is
precisely that good history is a constant interplay between facts and
interpretation. By recognizing this difference, you, as a reader, also
become more critical: you start to ask why these facts are central,
which alternative facts were also relevant, and what interests or
frameworks play a role in what is considered "important."
, (3)The two most divergent positions within the debate about historical
facts are positivism and relativism. How would you define these
movements (in your own words)? And where would you position Carr
within this debate?
In simple terms, you can put it this way. Positivism (in this debate) is
the belief that the past is, in principle, objectively knowable: if you
have enough sources and work carefully, you can establish "the
facts" and then almost automatically arrive at the correct history.
This resembles the idea that facts are, as it were, ready to be
grasped. Relativism is the opposite extreme: the idea that history is
primarily a product of the historian's perspective (time, values,
interests), so that there is no longer a firm boundary between "what
happened" and "how someone tells it." Carr emphatically positions
himself between these extremes. He rejects both the idea that
history is a purely objective compilation and the idea that it is
merely a subjective construction. His core formula is that the
historian constantly shapes facts according to interpretation and
interpretation according to facts; you cannot assign absolute "first
place" to either.
Craig, The Historian and the Study of IR
(1)What characterizes ‘old’ diplomatic history (according to Craig and
Malchow)?
Craig portrays "old" diplomatic history as a tradition heavily reliant
on official archives and a rather narrow view of politics: a strong
focus on great powers, ministers, embassies, treaties, and formal
negotiations. He clarifies this almost caricaturally by stating that a
standard monograph was once literally transcribed from Foreign
Office papers, with Latin phrases and extremely specialized
footnotes. Malchow describes the same "old" pattern in similar
terms: diplomacy as an elitist, top-down practice, viewed through a
state- and archive-focused lens (and thus often a national lens as
well).
(2)What characterizes ‘new’ diplomatic history (according to Craig and
Malchow)?
Craig argues that diplomatic history has actually broadened in
recent decades: historians have begun to look more closely at the
moral and intellectual assumptions behind policy, domestic factors,
bureaucratic struggles between institutions, public opinion and the
media, comparative political systems, ideology, and so on. But he
also believes this has gone too far. If everything is reduced to
domestic structures and "social" explanations, the state as an
independent actor disappears, and diplomatic history is swallowed
up by social history. Malchow connects this broadening to larger
trends (such as social history and, later, cultural turns) and sees
that this creates an opening for cross-pollination, but also creates
tension because IR often aims to generalize, while History often
aims to nuance and contextualize.
Lecture: Historians and International Relations: An Unhappy Marriage?
There are five main theories: realism, with a focus on analysis, key actors,
state behavior and/or objectives, key concepts, and strengths and/or
weaknesses; liberalism, with a focus on analysis, key actors, state
behavior and/or objectives, key concepts, and strengths and/or
weaknesses; constructivism, with a focus on ideas and identity; feminism,
with a focus on gender; and Marxism, with a focus on class. But where
does history fit into this picture?
Criticism from history on IB
Historians argue that all political scientists do is make generic statements
based on "objective" figures. An example of this is the assertion by IB'ers
that states that trade with each other will never enter into conflict. On the
one hand, they were right, as evidenced by the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community, for example, but on the other hand,
they were also wrong, as evidenced by the cooperation between the
European Union and Russia (Nord Stream). Another assertion by IB'ers is
that conflicts erupt as soon as states lack access to the necessary natural
resources. Again, it is evident that on the one hand, they were right, for
example, by wars in Africa fought over access to water. On the other
hand, they were also wrong, as there are many more examples of
initiatives that actively prevent such wars. Historians therefore argue that
"generalization" is useless; rather, one should look at a concrete and
specific case; context proves essential. History is not linear; it is
contingent, not necessary. An example is women's right to vote, which
was introduced in Europe around 1920 in response to the First World War.
But did women themselves see it as a logical progression of history?
Another criticism historians have leveled at political scientists is their
presentism: the emphasis on the recent, reasoning from the present, but
also using the present to respond to the past. Lynn Hunt argues that
presentism is dangerous, as it fosters moral complacency and temporal
superiority. Hunt argues that the tension between contemporary concerns
must be acknowledged, but the past must also be respected.
Criticism from IB on history
IB'ers view history as "one damn thing after another"; history appears to
be descriptive, while cause-and-effect relationships often remain
unanswered. However, historians do use theories and make assumptions,
but these are not subsequently questioned or actively used; historians can
thus learn from IB'ers.
What is historical theory in general?
History is what happened in the past, but also the story of what happened.
In the first case, it involves philosophizing about substantive philosophy of
history (e.g., Marx); in the second case, it involves philosophizing about
analytic philosophy of history (what is a fact or a statement?). Herman
Paul posits four forms of the past: the chronological past, the past
completed, the past queer, and the present past.
,When was history born?
The birth of history as a discipline was around 1800. At the moment when
the humanities were born, three developments came together: the origin
of man, the rise of the idea of theSpiritand the historicization of the
worldview. A new way of acquiring knowledge emerged. On the one hand,
it is reasoned from nature and the object, on the other, from reason,
mind, or subject. This was connected to empiricism, observation and
inductive reasoning (from individual to generalizations), and rationalism,
deriving knowledge from unquestionable (rational) certainties, and
deductive reasoning. The latter emerged from the questionable nature of
human observations; one must always doubt what they observe.
Therefore, knowledge cannot be derived from observations—but it can be
derived from the human mind.
Immanuel Kant is an important thinker in history; he introduces a new
idea. Kant uses both empiricism and rationalism, subsequently reasoning
transcendentally. Kant approaches humanity not as full of doubt, but
rather as full of invisible knowledge (condition of possibility); human
thoughts have a pure category (causality) and many forms of perception
(for example, space and time). If one were not transcendental, they would
not know what is happening. Humanity is thus a subject (observer) as an
object (something that can be studied); humanity as a "uniobject" is
unique. Willhelm Friedrich Hegel was inspired by Kant and, like Kant, saw
the world as a product of humanity. Hegel states that "spirit' – not an
individual concept, but rather a collective spirit (for example, the spirit of
the age). Hegel states in his concept of 'spirit' also a developmental
perspective; an ever-increasing understanding of the world is emerging,
partly through thesis > antithesis > synthesis. The developmental
perspective thus provided a historicized worldview, withexperiential
spacein Expected horizon: previous experiences guaranteed the present
and the future – which is why history was studied, for example, by kings to
consolidate their power. The eighteenth century, however, brought about
a change in this view; although people had aexperiential space, but this
did not guarantee the future. History could therefore no longer serve as a
teacher, but it was still studied for interpretation: history was used to
understand the present.
History also employed its own methods; interpretation was at the heart of
these. This methodology is also called hermeneutics, coined by Friedrich
Schleiermacher with his research on the Bible. To fully understand such
research, however, one also had to understand the author; this
phenomenon (the interplay between understanding the author and the
object studied) is also called the hermeneutic circle. This historicism was
the foundation of German historiography, spearheaded by Leopold von
Ranke. Ranke wanted to present the past—which in his research was
primarily state documents, resulting in a primary emphasis on diplomacy
—in its uniqueness; the "understand' of the source itself. However,
Ranke's reasoning is questionable: can a historian even be objective?
Wilhelm von Dilthey also calls it the subject position: a historian always
,retains his prejudice; however, if one tried hard enough, they could detach
themselves from the present and empathize with the past. In addition, the
Cartesian fear arose: something had to be a 'hard' (objective) science;
subjectivity therefore had no place in scientific practice. Gadamar is more
positive about this and proposes historical situatedness as a necessary
condition for knowledge; without tradition and prejudices, one can never
engage in interpretation. Interpretation starts from that 'horizon';
historical objects also had such a 'horizon'. The dialogue between one's
own horizon and the horizon of historical objects leads, Gadamar argues,
to knowledge – theHorizon fusion.
Carr, The Historian and His Facts
(1)What, according to Carr, is the difference between a ‘basic fact’ and
a ‘historical fact’?
Carr argues that many facts about the past can be "factually true,"
but not automatically historical facts. A basic fact, in his description,
is something like: "the Battle of Hastings was in 1066," or: "Caesar
crossed the Rubicon." Such facts are important for accuracy, but
they are primarily the raw material from which historians work. They
are therefore not the final product of historiography. A historical fact
only arises when historians select a fact, give it weight, and place it
within a narrative or explanation. Carr puts this bluntly by saying
that facts do not "speak for themselves": they only speak when the
historian invokes them, and the historian decides which facts get to
speak and in what order and context. He also illustrates this with
the idea that a fact can become a "member" of the "club" of
historical facts: an event might first appear in footnotes, later in the
main text, and only when other historians find the interpretation
relevant does it become a solid "historical fact." In other words, the
label "historical fact" depends on interpretation and meaning.
(2)Why is it important to recognize the difference between these types
of facts in historiography?
According to Carr, this distinction helps us understand that
historiography isn't simply a matter of collecting disparate facts and
then writing them down "neutrally." Pretending that historical
knowledge is merely an accumulation of facts obscures the fact that
selection and interpretation always take place. Carr warns that this
quickly leads to a false dichotomy: either you create meaningless
"cut-and-paste history," or you create propaganda/fiction that uses
facts solely to embellish a preconceived narrative. His point is
precisely that good history is a constant interplay between facts and
interpretation. By recognizing this difference, you, as a reader, also
become more critical: you start to ask why these facts are central,
which alternative facts were also relevant, and what interests or
frameworks play a role in what is considered "important."
, (3)The two most divergent positions within the debate about historical
facts are positivism and relativism. How would you define these
movements (in your own words)? And where would you position Carr
within this debate?
In simple terms, you can put it this way. Positivism (in this debate) is
the belief that the past is, in principle, objectively knowable: if you
have enough sources and work carefully, you can establish "the
facts" and then almost automatically arrive at the correct history.
This resembles the idea that facts are, as it were, ready to be
grasped. Relativism is the opposite extreme: the idea that history is
primarily a product of the historian's perspective (time, values,
interests), so that there is no longer a firm boundary between "what
happened" and "how someone tells it." Carr emphatically positions
himself between these extremes. He rejects both the idea that
history is a purely objective compilation and the idea that it is
merely a subjective construction. His core formula is that the
historian constantly shapes facts according to interpretation and
interpretation according to facts; you cannot assign absolute "first
place" to either.
Craig, The Historian and the Study of IR
(1)What characterizes ‘old’ diplomatic history (according to Craig and
Malchow)?
Craig portrays "old" diplomatic history as a tradition heavily reliant
on official archives and a rather narrow view of politics: a strong
focus on great powers, ministers, embassies, treaties, and formal
negotiations. He clarifies this almost caricaturally by stating that a
standard monograph was once literally transcribed from Foreign
Office papers, with Latin phrases and extremely specialized
footnotes. Malchow describes the same "old" pattern in similar
terms: diplomacy as an elitist, top-down practice, viewed through a
state- and archive-focused lens (and thus often a national lens as
well).
(2)What characterizes ‘new’ diplomatic history (according to Craig and
Malchow)?
Craig argues that diplomatic history has actually broadened in
recent decades: historians have begun to look more closely at the
moral and intellectual assumptions behind policy, domestic factors,
bureaucratic struggles between institutions, public opinion and the
media, comparative political systems, ideology, and so on. But he
also believes this has gone too far. If everything is reduced to
domestic structures and "social" explanations, the state as an
independent actor disappears, and diplomatic history is swallowed
up by social history. Malchow connects this broadening to larger
trends (such as social history and, later, cultural turns) and sees
that this creates an opening for cross-pollination, but also creates
tension because IR often aims to generalize, while History often
aims to nuance and contextualize.
