SOLUTIONS MANUAL
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 13TH EDITION ROSS,
WESTERFIELD, AND JORDAN
,CHAPTER 1 c
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE c c
FINANCE
c
Answers cto cConcepts cReview cand cCritical cThinking cQuestions
1. Capital cbudgeting c(deciding cwhether cto cexpand ca cmanufacturing cplant), ccapital cstructure
c(deciding cwhether cto cissue cnew cequity cand cuse cthe cproceeds cto cretire coutstanding cdebt), cand
cworking ccapital cmanagement c(modifying cthe cfirm‘s ccredit ccollection cpolicy cwith cits
ccustomers).
2. Disadvantages: cunlimited cliability, climited clife, cdifficulty cin ctransferring cownership, cdifficulty
cin craising ccapital cfunds. cSome cadvantages: csimpler, cless cregulation, cthe cowners care calso cthe
cmanagers, csometimes cpersonal ctax crates care cbetter cthan ccorporate ctax crates.
3. The cprimary cdisadvantage cof cthe ccorporate cform cis cthe cdouble ctaxation cto cshareholders cof
cdistributed cearnings cand cdividends. cSome cadvantages cinclude: climited cliability, cease cof
ctransferability, cability cto craise ccapital, cand cunlimited clife.
4. In cresponse cto cSarbanes-Oxley, csmall cfirms chave celected cto cgo cdark cbecause cof cthe ccosts cof
ccompliance. cThe ccosts cto ccomply cwith cSarbox ccan cbe cseveral cmillion cdollars, cwhich ccan cbe
ca clarge cpercentage cof ca csmall cfirm‘s cprofits. cA cmajor ccost cof cgoing cdark cis cless caccess cto
ccapital. cSince cthe cfirm cis cno clonger cpublicly ctraded, cit ccan cno clonger craise cmoney cin cthe
cpublic cmarket. cAlthough cthe ccompany cwill cstill chave caccess cto cbank cloans cand cthe cprivate
cequity cmarket, cthe ccosts cassociated cwith craising cfunds cin cthese cmarkets care cusually chigher
cthan cthe ccosts cof craising cfunds cin cthe cpublic cmarket.
5. The ctreasurer‘s coffice cand cthe ccontroller‘s coffice care cthe ctwo cprimary corganizational cgroups
cthat c report cdirectly cto cthe cchief cfinancial cofficer. cThe ccontroller‘s coffice chandles ccost cand
cfinancial caccounting, ctax cmanagement, cand cmanagement cinformation csystems, cwhile cthe
ctreasurer‘s coffice cis cresponsible cfor ccash cand ccredit cmanagement, ccapital cbudgeting, cand
cfinancial cplanning. cTherefore, c the cstudy cof ccorporate cfinance cis cconcentrated cwithin cthe
ctreasury cgroup‘s cfunctions.
6. To cmaximize cthe ccurrent cmarket cvalue c(share cprice) cof cthe cequity cof cthe cfirm c(whether cit‘s
cpublicly ctraded cor cnot).
7. In cthe ccorporate cform cof cownership, cthe cshareholders care cthe cowners cof cthe cfirm. cThe
cshareholders celect cthe cdirectors cof cthe ccorporation, cwho cin cturn cappoint cthe cfirm‘s
cmanagement. cThis cseparation cof cownership cfrom ccontrol cin cthe ccorporate cform cof
corganization cis cwhat ccauses cagency cproblems cto cexist. cManagement cmay cact cin cits cown cor
csomeone celse‘s cbest cinterests, crather cthan cthose cof cthe cshareholders. cIf csuch cevents coccur,
cthey cmay ccontradict cthe cgoal cof cmaximizing cthe cshare cprice cof cthe cequity cof cthe cfirm.
8. A cprimary cmarket ctransaction.
,2 c SOLUTIONS cMANUAL
9. In cauction cmarkets clike cthe cNYSE, cbrokers cand cagents cmeet cat ca cphysical clocation c(the
cexchange) cto cmatch cbuyers cand csellers cof cassets. cDealer cmarkets clike cNASDAQ cconsist cof
cdealers coperating cat cdispersed clocales cwho cbuy cand csell cassets cthemselves, ccommunicating
cwith cother cdealers ceither celectronically cor cliterally cover-the-counter.
10. Such corganizations cfrequently cpursue csocial cor cpolitical cmissions, cso cmany cdifferent cgoals care
cconceivable. cOne cgoal cthat cis coften ccited cis crevenue cminimization; cthat cis, cprovide cwhatever
cgoods c and cservices care coffered cat cthe clowest cpossible ccost cto csociety. cA cbetter capproach
cmight cbe cto cobserve cthat ceven ca cnot-for-profit cbusiness chas cequity. cThus, cone canswer cis cthat
cthe cappropriate cgoal cis cto cmaximize cthe cvalue cof cthe cequity.
11. Presumably, cthe ccurrent cstock cvalue creflects cthe crisk, ctiming, cand cmagnitude cof call cfuture
ccash cflows, cboth cshort-term cand clong-term. cIf cthis cis ccorrect, cthen cthe cstatement cis cfalse.
12. An cargument ccan cbe cmade ceither cway. cAt cthe cone cextreme, cwe ccould cargue cthat cin ca cmarket
ceconomy, call cof cthese cthings care cpriced. cThere cis cthus can coptimal clevel cof, cfor cexample,
cethical cand/or cillegal cbehavior, cand cthe cframework cof cstock cvaluation cexplicitly cincludes
cthese. cAt cthe cother cextreme, cwe ccould cargue cthat cthese care cnoneconomic cphenomena cand care
cbest chandled cthrough cthe cpolitical cprocess. cA cclassic c(and chighly crelevant) cthought cquestion
cthat cillustrates cthis cdebate cgoes csomething clike cthis: c―A cfirm chas cestimated cthat cthe ccost cof
cimproving cthe csafety cof cone cof cits cproducts cis c$30 cmillion. cHowever, cthe cfirm cbelieves cthat
cimproving cthe csafety cof cthe cproduct cwill conly csave c$20 cmillion cin cproduct cliability cclaims.
cWhat cshould cthe cfirm cdo?‖
13. The cgoal cwill cbe cthe csame, cbut cthe cbest ccourse cof caction ctoward cthat cgoal cmay cbe cdifferent
cbecause cof cdiffering csocial, cpolitical, cand ceconomic cinstitutions.
14. The cgoal cof cmanagement cshould cbe cto cmaximize cthe cshare cprice cfor cthe ccurrent cshareholders.
cIf cmanagement cbelieves cthat cit ccan cimprove cthe cprofitability cof cthe cfirm cso cthat cthe cshare
cprice cwill cexceed c$35, cthen cthey cshould cfight cthe coffer cfrom cthe coutside ccompany. cIf
cmanagement cbelieves cthat cthis cbidder cor cother cunidentified cbidders cwill cactually cpay cmore
cthan c$35 cper cshare cto cacquire cthe ccompany, cthen cthey cshould cstill cfight cthe coffer. cHowever,
cif cthe ccurrent cmanagement ccannot cincrease cthe cvalue cof cthe cfirm cbeyond cthe cbid cprice, cand
cno cother chigher cbids ccome cin, cthen cmanagement cis cnot cacting cin cthe cinterests cof cthe
cshareholders cby cfighting cthe coffer. cSince ccurrent cmanagers coften close ctheir cjobs cwhen cthe
ccorporation cis cacquired, cpoorly cmonitored cmanagers chave can cincentive cto cfight ccorporate
ctakeovers cin csituations csuch cas cthis.
15. We cwould cexpect cagency cproblems cto cbe cless csevere cin ccountries cwith ca crelatively csmall
cpercentage c of cindividual cownership. cFewer cindividual cowners cshould creduce cthe cnumber cof
cdiverse copinions cconcerning ccorporate cgoals. cThe chigh cpercentage cof cinstitutional cownership
cmight clead cto ca chigher cdegree cof cagreement cbetween cowners cand cmanagers con cdecisions
cconcerning crisky cprojects. cIn caddition, cinstitutions cmay cbe cbetter cable cto cimplement ceffective
cmonitoring cmechanisms con cmanagers cthan ccan cindividual cowners, cbased con cthe cinstitutions‘
cdeeper cresources cand cexperiences cwith ctheir cown cmanagement. cThe cincrease cin cinstitutional
cownership cof cstock cin cthe cUnited cStates cand cthe cgrowing cactivism cof cthese clarge cshareholder
cgroups cmay clead cto ca creduction cin cagency cproblems cfor
U.S. ccorporations cand ca cmore cefficient cmarket cfor ccorporate ccontrol.
, CHAPTER c2 c- c
3
16. How cmuch cis ctoo cmuch? cWho cis cworth cmore, cMark cParker cor cLeBron cJames? cThe csimplest
canswer cis cthat cthere cis ca cmarket cfor cexecutives cjust cas cthere cis cfor call ctypes cof clabor.
cExecutive ccompensation cis cthe cprice cthat cclears cthe cmarket. cThe csame cis ctrue cfor cathletes
cand cperformers. cHaving csaid cthat, cone caspect cof cexecutive ccompensation cdeserves ccomment.
cA cprimary creason cexecutive ccompensation chas cgrown cso cdramatically cis cthat ccompanies chave
cincreasingly cmoved cto cstock-based ccompensation. c Such cmovement cis cobviously cconsistent
cwith cthe cattempt cto cbetter calign cstockholder cand cmanagement cinterests. cIn crecent cyears, cstock
cprices chave csoared, cso cmanagement chas ccleaned cup. cIt cis csometimes cargued cthat cmuch cof
cthis creward cis cdue cto crising cstock cprices cin cgeneral, cnot cmanagerial cperformance. cPerhaps cin
cthe cfuture, cexecutive ccompensation cwill cbe cdesigned cto creward conly cdifferential cperformance,
cthat cis, cstock cprice cincreases cin cexcess cof cgeneral cmarket cincreases.
CHAPTER 2 c
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, TAXES, AND c c c
CASH FLOW
c c
Answers cto cConcepts cReview cand cCritical cThinking cQuestions
1. Liquidity cmeasures chow cquickly cand ceasily can casset ccan cbe cconverted cto ccash cwithout
csignificant closs cin cvalue. cIt‘s cdesirable cfor cfirms cto chave chigh cliquidity cso cthat cthey chave ca
clarge cfactor cof csafety cin cmeeting cshort-term ccreditor cdemands. cHowever, csince cliquidity calso
chas can copportunity ccost cassociated cwith cit—namely cthat chigher creturns ccan cgenerally cbe
cfound cby cinvesting cthe ccash cinto cproductive cassets—low cliquidity clevels care calso cdesirable cto
cthe cfirm. cIt‘s cup cto cthe cfirm‘s cfinancial cmanagement cstaff cto cfind ca creasonable ccompromise
cbetween cthese copposing cneeds.
2. The crecognition cand cmatching cprinciples cin cfinancial caccounting ccall cfor crevenues, cand cthe
ccosts cassociated cwith cproducing cthose crevenues, cto cbe c―booked‖ cwhen cthe crevenue cprocess
cis cessentially ccomplete, cnot cnecessarily cwhen cthe ccash cis ccollected cor cbills care cpaid. cNote
cthat cthis cway cis cnot cnecessarily ccorrect; cit‘s cthe cway caccountants chave cchosen cto cdo cit.
3. Historical ccosts ccan cbe cobjectively cand cprecisely cmeasured cwhereas cmarket cvalues ccan cbe
cdifficult cto cestimate, cand cdifferent canalysts cwould ccome cup cwith cdifferent cnumbers. cThus,
cthere cis ca ctrade-off cbetween crelevance c(market cvalues) cand cobjectivity c(book cvalues).
4. Depreciation cis ca cnoncash cdeduction cthat creflects cadjustments cmade cin casset cbook cvalues cin
caccordance cwith cthe cmatching cprinciple cin cfinancial caccounting. cInterest cexpense cis ca ccash
coutlay, cbut cit‘s ca cfinancing ccost, cnot can coperating ccost.
5. Market cvalues ccan cnever cbe cnegative. cImagine ca cshare cof cstock cselling cfor c–$20. cThis cwould
cmean c that cif cyou cplaced can corder cfor c100 cshares, cyou cwould cget cthe cstock calong cwith ca
ccheck cfor c$2,000. cHow cmany cshares cdo cyou cwant cto cbuy? cMore cgenerally, cbecause cof
ccorporate cand cindividual cbankruptcy claws, cnet cworth cfor ca cperson cor ca ccorporation ccannot
cbe cnegative, cimplying cthat cliabilities ccannot cexceed cassets cin cmarket cvalue.
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 13TH EDITION ROSS,
WESTERFIELD, AND JORDAN
,CHAPTER 1 c
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE c c
FINANCE
c
Answers cto cConcepts cReview cand cCritical cThinking cQuestions
1. Capital cbudgeting c(deciding cwhether cto cexpand ca cmanufacturing cplant), ccapital cstructure
c(deciding cwhether cto cissue cnew cequity cand cuse cthe cproceeds cto cretire coutstanding cdebt), cand
cworking ccapital cmanagement c(modifying cthe cfirm‘s ccredit ccollection cpolicy cwith cits
ccustomers).
2. Disadvantages: cunlimited cliability, climited clife, cdifficulty cin ctransferring cownership, cdifficulty
cin craising ccapital cfunds. cSome cadvantages: csimpler, cless cregulation, cthe cowners care calso cthe
cmanagers, csometimes cpersonal ctax crates care cbetter cthan ccorporate ctax crates.
3. The cprimary cdisadvantage cof cthe ccorporate cform cis cthe cdouble ctaxation cto cshareholders cof
cdistributed cearnings cand cdividends. cSome cadvantages cinclude: climited cliability, cease cof
ctransferability, cability cto craise ccapital, cand cunlimited clife.
4. In cresponse cto cSarbanes-Oxley, csmall cfirms chave celected cto cgo cdark cbecause cof cthe ccosts cof
ccompliance. cThe ccosts cto ccomply cwith cSarbox ccan cbe cseveral cmillion cdollars, cwhich ccan cbe
ca clarge cpercentage cof ca csmall cfirm‘s cprofits. cA cmajor ccost cof cgoing cdark cis cless caccess cto
ccapital. cSince cthe cfirm cis cno clonger cpublicly ctraded, cit ccan cno clonger craise cmoney cin cthe
cpublic cmarket. cAlthough cthe ccompany cwill cstill chave caccess cto cbank cloans cand cthe cprivate
cequity cmarket, cthe ccosts cassociated cwith craising cfunds cin cthese cmarkets care cusually chigher
cthan cthe ccosts cof craising cfunds cin cthe cpublic cmarket.
5. The ctreasurer‘s coffice cand cthe ccontroller‘s coffice care cthe ctwo cprimary corganizational cgroups
cthat c report cdirectly cto cthe cchief cfinancial cofficer. cThe ccontroller‘s coffice chandles ccost cand
cfinancial caccounting, ctax cmanagement, cand cmanagement cinformation csystems, cwhile cthe
ctreasurer‘s coffice cis cresponsible cfor ccash cand ccredit cmanagement, ccapital cbudgeting, cand
cfinancial cplanning. cTherefore, c the cstudy cof ccorporate cfinance cis cconcentrated cwithin cthe
ctreasury cgroup‘s cfunctions.
6. To cmaximize cthe ccurrent cmarket cvalue c(share cprice) cof cthe cequity cof cthe cfirm c(whether cit‘s
cpublicly ctraded cor cnot).
7. In cthe ccorporate cform cof cownership, cthe cshareholders care cthe cowners cof cthe cfirm. cThe
cshareholders celect cthe cdirectors cof cthe ccorporation, cwho cin cturn cappoint cthe cfirm‘s
cmanagement. cThis cseparation cof cownership cfrom ccontrol cin cthe ccorporate cform cof
corganization cis cwhat ccauses cagency cproblems cto cexist. cManagement cmay cact cin cits cown cor
csomeone celse‘s cbest cinterests, crather cthan cthose cof cthe cshareholders. cIf csuch cevents coccur,
cthey cmay ccontradict cthe cgoal cof cmaximizing cthe cshare cprice cof cthe cequity cof cthe cfirm.
8. A cprimary cmarket ctransaction.
,2 c SOLUTIONS cMANUAL
9. In cauction cmarkets clike cthe cNYSE, cbrokers cand cagents cmeet cat ca cphysical clocation c(the
cexchange) cto cmatch cbuyers cand csellers cof cassets. cDealer cmarkets clike cNASDAQ cconsist cof
cdealers coperating cat cdispersed clocales cwho cbuy cand csell cassets cthemselves, ccommunicating
cwith cother cdealers ceither celectronically cor cliterally cover-the-counter.
10. Such corganizations cfrequently cpursue csocial cor cpolitical cmissions, cso cmany cdifferent cgoals care
cconceivable. cOne cgoal cthat cis coften ccited cis crevenue cminimization; cthat cis, cprovide cwhatever
cgoods c and cservices care coffered cat cthe clowest cpossible ccost cto csociety. cA cbetter capproach
cmight cbe cto cobserve cthat ceven ca cnot-for-profit cbusiness chas cequity. cThus, cone canswer cis cthat
cthe cappropriate cgoal cis cto cmaximize cthe cvalue cof cthe cequity.
11. Presumably, cthe ccurrent cstock cvalue creflects cthe crisk, ctiming, cand cmagnitude cof call cfuture
ccash cflows, cboth cshort-term cand clong-term. cIf cthis cis ccorrect, cthen cthe cstatement cis cfalse.
12. An cargument ccan cbe cmade ceither cway. cAt cthe cone cextreme, cwe ccould cargue cthat cin ca cmarket
ceconomy, call cof cthese cthings care cpriced. cThere cis cthus can coptimal clevel cof, cfor cexample,
cethical cand/or cillegal cbehavior, cand cthe cframework cof cstock cvaluation cexplicitly cincludes
cthese. cAt cthe cother cextreme, cwe ccould cargue cthat cthese care cnoneconomic cphenomena cand care
cbest chandled cthrough cthe cpolitical cprocess. cA cclassic c(and chighly crelevant) cthought cquestion
cthat cillustrates cthis cdebate cgoes csomething clike cthis: c―A cfirm chas cestimated cthat cthe ccost cof
cimproving cthe csafety cof cone cof cits cproducts cis c$30 cmillion. cHowever, cthe cfirm cbelieves cthat
cimproving cthe csafety cof cthe cproduct cwill conly csave c$20 cmillion cin cproduct cliability cclaims.
cWhat cshould cthe cfirm cdo?‖
13. The cgoal cwill cbe cthe csame, cbut cthe cbest ccourse cof caction ctoward cthat cgoal cmay cbe cdifferent
cbecause cof cdiffering csocial, cpolitical, cand ceconomic cinstitutions.
14. The cgoal cof cmanagement cshould cbe cto cmaximize cthe cshare cprice cfor cthe ccurrent cshareholders.
cIf cmanagement cbelieves cthat cit ccan cimprove cthe cprofitability cof cthe cfirm cso cthat cthe cshare
cprice cwill cexceed c$35, cthen cthey cshould cfight cthe coffer cfrom cthe coutside ccompany. cIf
cmanagement cbelieves cthat cthis cbidder cor cother cunidentified cbidders cwill cactually cpay cmore
cthan c$35 cper cshare cto cacquire cthe ccompany, cthen cthey cshould cstill cfight cthe coffer. cHowever,
cif cthe ccurrent cmanagement ccannot cincrease cthe cvalue cof cthe cfirm cbeyond cthe cbid cprice, cand
cno cother chigher cbids ccome cin, cthen cmanagement cis cnot cacting cin cthe cinterests cof cthe
cshareholders cby cfighting cthe coffer. cSince ccurrent cmanagers coften close ctheir cjobs cwhen cthe
ccorporation cis cacquired, cpoorly cmonitored cmanagers chave can cincentive cto cfight ccorporate
ctakeovers cin csituations csuch cas cthis.
15. We cwould cexpect cagency cproblems cto cbe cless csevere cin ccountries cwith ca crelatively csmall
cpercentage c of cindividual cownership. cFewer cindividual cowners cshould creduce cthe cnumber cof
cdiverse copinions cconcerning ccorporate cgoals. cThe chigh cpercentage cof cinstitutional cownership
cmight clead cto ca chigher cdegree cof cagreement cbetween cowners cand cmanagers con cdecisions
cconcerning crisky cprojects. cIn caddition, cinstitutions cmay cbe cbetter cable cto cimplement ceffective
cmonitoring cmechanisms con cmanagers cthan ccan cindividual cowners, cbased con cthe cinstitutions‘
cdeeper cresources cand cexperiences cwith ctheir cown cmanagement. cThe cincrease cin cinstitutional
cownership cof cstock cin cthe cUnited cStates cand cthe cgrowing cactivism cof cthese clarge cshareholder
cgroups cmay clead cto ca creduction cin cagency cproblems cfor
U.S. ccorporations cand ca cmore cefficient cmarket cfor ccorporate ccontrol.
, CHAPTER c2 c- c
3
16. How cmuch cis ctoo cmuch? cWho cis cworth cmore, cMark cParker cor cLeBron cJames? cThe csimplest
canswer cis cthat cthere cis ca cmarket cfor cexecutives cjust cas cthere cis cfor call ctypes cof clabor.
cExecutive ccompensation cis cthe cprice cthat cclears cthe cmarket. cThe csame cis ctrue cfor cathletes
cand cperformers. cHaving csaid cthat, cone caspect cof cexecutive ccompensation cdeserves ccomment.
cA cprimary creason cexecutive ccompensation chas cgrown cso cdramatically cis cthat ccompanies chave
cincreasingly cmoved cto cstock-based ccompensation. c Such cmovement cis cobviously cconsistent
cwith cthe cattempt cto cbetter calign cstockholder cand cmanagement cinterests. cIn crecent cyears, cstock
cprices chave csoared, cso cmanagement chas ccleaned cup. cIt cis csometimes cargued cthat cmuch cof
cthis creward cis cdue cto crising cstock cprices cin cgeneral, cnot cmanagerial cperformance. cPerhaps cin
cthe cfuture, cexecutive ccompensation cwill cbe cdesigned cto creward conly cdifferential cperformance,
cthat cis, cstock cprice cincreases cin cexcess cof cgeneral cmarket cincreases.
CHAPTER 2 c
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, TAXES, AND c c c
CASH FLOW
c c
Answers cto cConcepts cReview cand cCritical cThinking cQuestions
1. Liquidity cmeasures chow cquickly cand ceasily can casset ccan cbe cconverted cto ccash cwithout
csignificant closs cin cvalue. cIt‘s cdesirable cfor cfirms cto chave chigh cliquidity cso cthat cthey chave ca
clarge cfactor cof csafety cin cmeeting cshort-term ccreditor cdemands. cHowever, csince cliquidity calso
chas can copportunity ccost cassociated cwith cit—namely cthat chigher creturns ccan cgenerally cbe
cfound cby cinvesting cthe ccash cinto cproductive cassets—low cliquidity clevels care calso cdesirable cto
cthe cfirm. cIt‘s cup cto cthe cfirm‘s cfinancial cmanagement cstaff cto cfind ca creasonable ccompromise
cbetween cthese copposing cneeds.
2. The crecognition cand cmatching cprinciples cin cfinancial caccounting ccall cfor crevenues, cand cthe
ccosts cassociated cwith cproducing cthose crevenues, cto cbe c―booked‖ cwhen cthe crevenue cprocess
cis cessentially ccomplete, cnot cnecessarily cwhen cthe ccash cis ccollected cor cbills care cpaid. cNote
cthat cthis cway cis cnot cnecessarily ccorrect; cit‘s cthe cway caccountants chave cchosen cto cdo cit.
3. Historical ccosts ccan cbe cobjectively cand cprecisely cmeasured cwhereas cmarket cvalues ccan cbe
cdifficult cto cestimate, cand cdifferent canalysts cwould ccome cup cwith cdifferent cnumbers. cThus,
cthere cis ca ctrade-off cbetween crelevance c(market cvalues) cand cobjectivity c(book cvalues).
4. Depreciation cis ca cnoncash cdeduction cthat creflects cadjustments cmade cin casset cbook cvalues cin
caccordance cwith cthe cmatching cprinciple cin cfinancial caccounting. cInterest cexpense cis ca ccash
coutlay, cbut cit‘s ca cfinancing ccost, cnot can coperating ccost.
5. Market cvalues ccan cnever cbe cnegative. cImagine ca cshare cof cstock cselling cfor c–$20. cThis cwould
cmean c that cif cyou cplaced can corder cfor c100 cshares, cyou cwould cget cthe cstock calong cwith ca
ccheck cfor c$2,000. cHow cmany cshares cdo cyou cwant cto cbuy? cMore cgenerally, cbecause cof
ccorporate cand cindividual cbankruptcy claws, cnet cworth cfor ca cperson cor ca ccorporation ccannot
cbe cnegative, cimplying cthat cliabilities ccannot cexceed cassets cin cmarket cvalue.
