Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
Summary of Lectures
Interim Exam 1
Fundamentals of Psychology
Inhoudsopgave
Lecture 7 – The mind-body problem – Borsboom..................................................................................2
Lecture 8: Thinking computers, subjective experience and free will......................................................7
Lecture 9 – Philosophy of science.........................................................................................................11
PA (Dutch)........................................................................................................................................16
Lecture 10 – Philosophy of Science Part 2: The revenge of the rationalists (Chapter 9).......................16
Lecture 11: Psychology and society – Denny Borsboom – Chapter 8 & 13...........................................23
Lecture 12: Criticaster, alternatives and the future – Chapter 11 & 13................................................27
Practice Exam Questions + Answers (Dutch)........................................................................................33
1
,Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
Lecture 7 – The mind-body problem – Borsboom
The mind-body problem
Thomas Hobbes: we are machines.
René Descartes: dualism.
Don’t solve the problem, it is like a maze. Philosophers showed us that if you give a
certain answer, you go in a certain direction.
What philosophers do is make -isms, it is a position you can take in this debate:
Monism (there is only one kind of things)
o Materialism: ultimately everything is material
o Idealism: ultimately is everything is mental
Dualism (there are two kind of things)
o Substance-dualism: mind and body are kinds of distinct entities
Dualism
Focus is on one particular kind of dualism, namely: substance-dualism (the one with
which Descartes came up with). Descartes views the body, but not the mind, as a
machine. Mind and body must therefore be different entities. Descartes’ reasoning
produces the mind-body problem. However, the idea that the mind is a causal director
of the body gets even more problematic. Pineal gland: the soul tells the body what to do.
Mental misery, causal effects of the mind are obscure. Great problems with dualism:
1. Interaction problem: how can a nonmaterial entity cause physical events?
2. Causal closure problem: if every physical event has a physical cause, where
does the mind enter? Is it still needed then? How about the law of conservation of
energy? The soul, if immaterial, then it use/adds energy out of nowhere?
3. Brain damage problem: why would a nonmaterial entity react to brain damage?
If there is brain damage, you namely see a change in behavior, how is this
possible if the mind and body are separate things?
The teleportation test. Do we even understand the idea of an immaterial mind? Where is
it when you’re asleep? Or suppose you’re teleported to the moon, does your mind travel
with you or not? And what if your earthly body accidentally fails to be destroyed, are
there then two of you?
Teleportation: recreate your body and destroy your old body. Thinking about mind and
body as separate entities looks easy. However, as soon as we ask the question: how
would that work? It turns out we don’t really have a decent answer. The inability to
provide a reasonable theory of mind-body interaction has led to demise of dualism in
scientific articles.
Materialism
The materialist maintains that, in the end, there is only matter. The concept of matter is
however quite flexible (so fields, states, processes, functions etc. all count as ‘material’).
Most important is that the mind, whatever it may be, is part of nature and observes the
laws of nature. This still leaves many possibilities for exactly what the mind is.
The problem of consciousness: without a mind it’s hard to explain how and why we have
conscious mental states. Three problem areas:
1. Do we have mental states (or not): thinking, dreaming
2
,Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
In daily life, mental
states (to want ice
cream, knowing
where they sell ice
cream) explain
behavior (buying
ice cream) this is
called believe-
desire
psychology, and is
part of folk
psychology, but
also scientific
psychology. This
kind of explanation
surfaces throughout
psychology (social,
clinical,
developmental) and
is called: Theory
of planned
behavior.
You will do something 1) if you want it (attitude toward the behavior), 2) if it’s not
forbidden (subjective norm) and 3) if you think you can do it (perceived behavioral
control).
But how can mental states receive a respectable place in the scientific explanation of
human behavior? If the mind does not exist as a distinct substance, then how can mental
states exist at all? Or is it all just spooky stuff and is the only good mental state an
eliminated mental state?
This is how we get from
dualism, to eliminative
materialism (see
eliminative materialism
below)
2. Is there reductionism (or not): the way the different descriptions of nature
(biological, chemical) relate (see reductive materialism below)
3. Do we have subjective experience (or not):
1. Eliminative materialism – eliminating mental states
3
, Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
One option is to deny the existence of mental states: eliminative materialism. Mental
states aren’t real, they don’t identify actual cause of behavior, they will not appear in the
ultimate description of the universe. Folk psychology is just like naïve physics: in the
end it will disappear. It is just neuroscience, it can be fascinating because it can help
explain Alzheimer’s, but on the other hand, the love you feel for someone, is just neural
chemistry. (said by the couple Churchland). Hierdoor moet je de mentale termen niet
meer gaan gebruiken.
For most people eliminative materialism is a bridge too far for most scientists. Mental
states appear too important for the explanation of behavior to dismiss them. It is also
unclear what should take the place of ordinary ‘belief-desire’ explanations of behavior,
neuroscience that can do this is currently science fiction.
2. Reductive materialism = non-eliminative materialism – materialism
with mental states
Brain states and consciousness exist, but they are reducible. They are actually reducible
to certain brain states, they are identical: identify what you’re thinking by looking at your
brain.
Non-eliminative materialism. Once can deny that the mind exists as a substance (mind is
immaterial), but there is still room for mental states. To do this, one must produce an
account of how mental states are rooted in brain states. Identity theory and functionalism
are related attempts to do this:
Identity theory: mental states are brain states. ‘To want ice cream’ = brain state
X. Identity theory was developed to keep a causal role of mental states (not to
deny it). ‘John bought an ice cream because he wanted one’ is true, but really
means: ‘John bought an ice cream because he had brain state X’. Mental states do
exists but they exists as brain states. Brain state does not produce the mental
state, it IS the mental state.
But what is identical to what?
o Type-type identity: types of mental states (wanting ice cream) are identical
to types of brain states (brain state X), across individuals and time points.
This implies one-to-one mapping of mental states to brain states. If this
holds true, then a full reduction of psychology to neuroscience is a realistic
possibility.
o Token-token identity
Reductionism is not necessarily the same as materialism: materialism (doesn’t
believe that we can attribute the content of psychology to the content of
neuroscience), a reductionist does.
A reductionist is necessarily the same as a materialist, but a materialist
is not necessarily the same as a reductionist.
David Lewis introduced the identity theory.
Reductionism:
Step 1: start with a scientific law in the higher order science (the science to
be reduced, e.g. psychology)
Step 2: establish bridge laws: one-to-one correspondence relations between
terms in the higher order science and terms in the lower order science (the
reducing science, e.g. neuroscience)
Step 3: show that the higher order law follows from laws of the reducing
science given the bridge laws.
e.g. the most famous reduction in the history of science is the reduction of the
ideal gas laws to statistical mechanics through the bridge laws: ‘temperature =
mean of kinetic energy’. This is also the only example that exists of reductionism.
4
Summary of Lectures
Interim Exam 1
Fundamentals of Psychology
Inhoudsopgave
Lecture 7 – The mind-body problem – Borsboom..................................................................................2
Lecture 8: Thinking computers, subjective experience and free will......................................................7
Lecture 9 – Philosophy of science.........................................................................................................11
PA (Dutch)........................................................................................................................................16
Lecture 10 – Philosophy of Science Part 2: The revenge of the rationalists (Chapter 9).......................16
Lecture 11: Psychology and society – Denny Borsboom – Chapter 8 & 13...........................................23
Lecture 12: Criticaster, alternatives and the future – Chapter 11 & 13................................................27
Practice Exam Questions + Answers (Dutch)........................................................................................33
1
,Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
Lecture 7 – The mind-body problem – Borsboom
The mind-body problem
Thomas Hobbes: we are machines.
René Descartes: dualism.
Don’t solve the problem, it is like a maze. Philosophers showed us that if you give a
certain answer, you go in a certain direction.
What philosophers do is make -isms, it is a position you can take in this debate:
Monism (there is only one kind of things)
o Materialism: ultimately everything is material
o Idealism: ultimately is everything is mental
Dualism (there are two kind of things)
o Substance-dualism: mind and body are kinds of distinct entities
Dualism
Focus is on one particular kind of dualism, namely: substance-dualism (the one with
which Descartes came up with). Descartes views the body, but not the mind, as a
machine. Mind and body must therefore be different entities. Descartes’ reasoning
produces the mind-body problem. However, the idea that the mind is a causal director
of the body gets even more problematic. Pineal gland: the soul tells the body what to do.
Mental misery, causal effects of the mind are obscure. Great problems with dualism:
1. Interaction problem: how can a nonmaterial entity cause physical events?
2. Causal closure problem: if every physical event has a physical cause, where
does the mind enter? Is it still needed then? How about the law of conservation of
energy? The soul, if immaterial, then it use/adds energy out of nowhere?
3. Brain damage problem: why would a nonmaterial entity react to brain damage?
If there is brain damage, you namely see a change in behavior, how is this
possible if the mind and body are separate things?
The teleportation test. Do we even understand the idea of an immaterial mind? Where is
it when you’re asleep? Or suppose you’re teleported to the moon, does your mind travel
with you or not? And what if your earthly body accidentally fails to be destroyed, are
there then two of you?
Teleportation: recreate your body and destroy your old body. Thinking about mind and
body as separate entities looks easy. However, as soon as we ask the question: how
would that work? It turns out we don’t really have a decent answer. The inability to
provide a reasonable theory of mind-body interaction has led to demise of dualism in
scientific articles.
Materialism
The materialist maintains that, in the end, there is only matter. The concept of matter is
however quite flexible (so fields, states, processes, functions etc. all count as ‘material’).
Most important is that the mind, whatever it may be, is part of nature and observes the
laws of nature. This still leaves many possibilities for exactly what the mind is.
The problem of consciousness: without a mind it’s hard to explain how and why we have
conscious mental states. Three problem areas:
1. Do we have mental states (or not): thinking, dreaming
2
,Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
In daily life, mental
states (to want ice
cream, knowing
where they sell ice
cream) explain
behavior (buying
ice cream) this is
called believe-
desire
psychology, and is
part of folk
psychology, but
also scientific
psychology. This
kind of explanation
surfaces throughout
psychology (social,
clinical,
developmental) and
is called: Theory
of planned
behavior.
You will do something 1) if you want it (attitude toward the behavior), 2) if it’s not
forbidden (subjective norm) and 3) if you think you can do it (perceived behavioral
control).
But how can mental states receive a respectable place in the scientific explanation of
human behavior? If the mind does not exist as a distinct substance, then how can mental
states exist at all? Or is it all just spooky stuff and is the only good mental state an
eliminated mental state?
This is how we get from
dualism, to eliminative
materialism (see
eliminative materialism
below)
2. Is there reductionism (or not): the way the different descriptions of nature
(biological, chemical) relate (see reductive materialism below)
3. Do we have subjective experience (or not):
1. Eliminative materialism – eliminating mental states
3
, Lectures Fundamentals of Psychology Sterre Huizer
One option is to deny the existence of mental states: eliminative materialism. Mental
states aren’t real, they don’t identify actual cause of behavior, they will not appear in the
ultimate description of the universe. Folk psychology is just like naïve physics: in the
end it will disappear. It is just neuroscience, it can be fascinating because it can help
explain Alzheimer’s, but on the other hand, the love you feel for someone, is just neural
chemistry. (said by the couple Churchland). Hierdoor moet je de mentale termen niet
meer gaan gebruiken.
For most people eliminative materialism is a bridge too far for most scientists. Mental
states appear too important for the explanation of behavior to dismiss them. It is also
unclear what should take the place of ordinary ‘belief-desire’ explanations of behavior,
neuroscience that can do this is currently science fiction.
2. Reductive materialism = non-eliminative materialism – materialism
with mental states
Brain states and consciousness exist, but they are reducible. They are actually reducible
to certain brain states, they are identical: identify what you’re thinking by looking at your
brain.
Non-eliminative materialism. Once can deny that the mind exists as a substance (mind is
immaterial), but there is still room for mental states. To do this, one must produce an
account of how mental states are rooted in brain states. Identity theory and functionalism
are related attempts to do this:
Identity theory: mental states are brain states. ‘To want ice cream’ = brain state
X. Identity theory was developed to keep a causal role of mental states (not to
deny it). ‘John bought an ice cream because he wanted one’ is true, but really
means: ‘John bought an ice cream because he had brain state X’. Mental states do
exists but they exists as brain states. Brain state does not produce the mental
state, it IS the mental state.
But what is identical to what?
o Type-type identity: types of mental states (wanting ice cream) are identical
to types of brain states (brain state X), across individuals and time points.
This implies one-to-one mapping of mental states to brain states. If this
holds true, then a full reduction of psychology to neuroscience is a realistic
possibility.
o Token-token identity
Reductionism is not necessarily the same as materialism: materialism (doesn’t
believe that we can attribute the content of psychology to the content of
neuroscience), a reductionist does.
A reductionist is necessarily the same as a materialist, but a materialist
is not necessarily the same as a reductionist.
David Lewis introduced the identity theory.
Reductionism:
Step 1: start with a scientific law in the higher order science (the science to
be reduced, e.g. psychology)
Step 2: establish bridge laws: one-to-one correspondence relations between
terms in the higher order science and terms in the lower order science (the
reducing science, e.g. neuroscience)
Step 3: show that the higher order law follows from laws of the reducing
science given the bridge laws.
e.g. the most famous reduction in the history of science is the reduction of the
ideal gas laws to statistical mechanics through the bridge laws: ‘temperature =
mean of kinetic energy’. This is also the only example that exists of reductionism.
4
