Thought Experiments
FW-WB3927
2021-2022
,Table of Contents
Week I.......................................................................................................................................................................2
An analysis of analysis.........................................................................................................................................3
Types of thought experiments...............................................................................................................................3
Week II.....................................................................................................................................................................3
The traditional analysis........................................................................................................................................3
Gettier-style cases................................................................................................................................................4
Week III....................................................................................................................................................................4
Cartesian scepticism............................................................................................................................................4
Three ways...........................................................................................................................................................5
Knowledge in context...........................................................................................................................................6
Week IV....................................................................................................................................................................6
Varieties of dualism..............................................................................................................................................6
Logical behaviourism & identity theory..............................................................................................................7
Supervenience and qualia....................................................................................................................................8
Week V.....................................................................................................................................................................9
Arguments for consequence theories...................................................................................................................9
Hierarchical compatibilism...............................................................................................................................10
Week VI..................................................................................................................................................................11
Identity and change............................................................................................................................................11
Memory theory and its critics............................................................................................................................12
Quasi-memory theory and its critics..................................................................................................................13
Week VII................................................................................................................................................................14
Intentions and consequences..............................................................................................................................14
Duties and Virtues..............................................................................................................................................15
The naturalistic fallacy......................................................................................................................................16
Week VIII...............................................................................................................................................................17
Powers and limits of utopia................................................................................................................................17
Social contract theories......................................................................................................................................18
The veil of ignorance..........................................................................................................................................18
Week I
2
, Conceptual analysis: trying to sort out what the concepts of philosophy are about by doing
thought experiments.
An analysis of analysis
What kind of answers of are we looking for when asking ‘What is X?’
Our aim in conceptual analysis is not a lexical definition of an object, an ostensive definition
or a stipulative definition. There should first be made a distinction between the intention and
extension of an object.
We now realise that Socrates defines ‘X’ by giving examples of X, rather than definitions. He
is not looking for an extensional definition (lists all the things to which X applies), but rather
an intentional definition of X (in terms of individually necessary definitions) such that X
applies to all things listing the definitions, and to nothing else.
- If we define a pet extensionally, we will list: your cat, my dog etc.
- If we define a pet intentionally: ‘something is a pet, if and only if it is a domesticated
mammal.’
o These two conditions are individually necessary and should be jointly
sufficient to meet the definition of the object.
Counterexamples can reject the definition of an object X. Conditions should therefore not be
too narrow or strict, but also not too broad to apply to many more objects.
We are aiming for a conceptual analysis that is immune to real world and imaginary
counterexamples.
Types of thought experiments
Counterfactual thought experiments flourish both in science and philosophy. A counterfactual
thought experiment asks a ‘what if’ question if an imaginary antecedent were to obtain. Most
thought experiments are conceptual: the question is not ‘what if’, but the design of a
conceptual thought experiment stipulates exactly what will happen in the imaginary scenario.
First, we must differentiate between theoretical and practical philosophy. Within theoretical
philosophy, the subdomains epistemology and metaphysics occur, which deal with the
knowledge and the external world. The two main domains of practical philosophy are ethics
and moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy. A third type of thought
experiments are evaluative thought experiments: they pose the question ‘what should an
agent do in the imaginary scenario (often counterfactual)?’ The fourth thought experiment is
abductive: in which the thought experimenter imagines what could explain one or more
experiences.
If there is a gap between theoretical and practical philosophy, it can be bridged by
philosophical anthropology: the main question here is ‘what is a human being, independent by
culture?’. In this MOOC, it will be related to ‘what is moral responsibility?’.
Week II
The traditional analysis
Necessary conditions
Epistemic subjects: people who claim to know something about objects. P will be used for the
proposition that this ES knows. The first necessary condition of knowledge is the belief
condition: ES knows that P, if and only if ES believes that P. It is possible that ES believe
certain P’s, but not know it, because it is simply not true. Therefore, knowledge must also
have a truth condition: ES knows that P, only if P is true, or it is a fact.
3
FW-WB3927
2021-2022
,Table of Contents
Week I.......................................................................................................................................................................2
An analysis of analysis.........................................................................................................................................3
Types of thought experiments...............................................................................................................................3
Week II.....................................................................................................................................................................3
The traditional analysis........................................................................................................................................3
Gettier-style cases................................................................................................................................................4
Week III....................................................................................................................................................................4
Cartesian scepticism............................................................................................................................................4
Three ways...........................................................................................................................................................5
Knowledge in context...........................................................................................................................................6
Week IV....................................................................................................................................................................6
Varieties of dualism..............................................................................................................................................6
Logical behaviourism & identity theory..............................................................................................................7
Supervenience and qualia....................................................................................................................................8
Week V.....................................................................................................................................................................9
Arguments for consequence theories...................................................................................................................9
Hierarchical compatibilism...............................................................................................................................10
Week VI..................................................................................................................................................................11
Identity and change............................................................................................................................................11
Memory theory and its critics............................................................................................................................12
Quasi-memory theory and its critics..................................................................................................................13
Week VII................................................................................................................................................................14
Intentions and consequences..............................................................................................................................14
Duties and Virtues..............................................................................................................................................15
The naturalistic fallacy......................................................................................................................................16
Week VIII...............................................................................................................................................................17
Powers and limits of utopia................................................................................................................................17
Social contract theories......................................................................................................................................18
The veil of ignorance..........................................................................................................................................18
Week I
2
, Conceptual analysis: trying to sort out what the concepts of philosophy are about by doing
thought experiments.
An analysis of analysis
What kind of answers of are we looking for when asking ‘What is X?’
Our aim in conceptual analysis is not a lexical definition of an object, an ostensive definition
or a stipulative definition. There should first be made a distinction between the intention and
extension of an object.
We now realise that Socrates defines ‘X’ by giving examples of X, rather than definitions. He
is not looking for an extensional definition (lists all the things to which X applies), but rather
an intentional definition of X (in terms of individually necessary definitions) such that X
applies to all things listing the definitions, and to nothing else.
- If we define a pet extensionally, we will list: your cat, my dog etc.
- If we define a pet intentionally: ‘something is a pet, if and only if it is a domesticated
mammal.’
o These two conditions are individually necessary and should be jointly
sufficient to meet the definition of the object.
Counterexamples can reject the definition of an object X. Conditions should therefore not be
too narrow or strict, but also not too broad to apply to many more objects.
We are aiming for a conceptual analysis that is immune to real world and imaginary
counterexamples.
Types of thought experiments
Counterfactual thought experiments flourish both in science and philosophy. A counterfactual
thought experiment asks a ‘what if’ question if an imaginary antecedent were to obtain. Most
thought experiments are conceptual: the question is not ‘what if’, but the design of a
conceptual thought experiment stipulates exactly what will happen in the imaginary scenario.
First, we must differentiate between theoretical and practical philosophy. Within theoretical
philosophy, the subdomains epistemology and metaphysics occur, which deal with the
knowledge and the external world. The two main domains of practical philosophy are ethics
and moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy. A third type of thought
experiments are evaluative thought experiments: they pose the question ‘what should an
agent do in the imaginary scenario (often counterfactual)?’ The fourth thought experiment is
abductive: in which the thought experimenter imagines what could explain one or more
experiences.
If there is a gap between theoretical and practical philosophy, it can be bridged by
philosophical anthropology: the main question here is ‘what is a human being, independent by
culture?’. In this MOOC, it will be related to ‘what is moral responsibility?’.
Week II
The traditional analysis
Necessary conditions
Epistemic subjects: people who claim to know something about objects. P will be used for the
proposition that this ES knows. The first necessary condition of knowledge is the belief
condition: ES knows that P, if and only if ES believes that P. It is possible that ES believe
certain P’s, but not know it, because it is simply not true. Therefore, knowledge must also
have a truth condition: ES knows that P, only if P is true, or it is a fact.
3
