Independent reading – social, personality and abnormal psychology – lecture 2 pages: 423-428/ 431-433
Cooperation, competition and social dilemmas
Realistic conflict theory focuses on the relationship between people’s goals, the competitive or
cooperative nature of their behaviour and the conflicting or harmonious nature of their relations. We can
study these relationships in abstract settings by designing ‘games’ with different goal relations for two or
more people to play. The mathematician John Von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern (1944)
introduced a model for analysing situations where people are in conflict over some non-trivial outcome
(e.g. money, power). Variously called decision theory, game theory or utility theory, this initiated a
prodigious amount of research in the 1960s and 1970s.
The highly abstract nature of the research raised questions about its relevance (generalis- ability) to real-
world conflict, which contributed to its decline in the 1980s (Apfelbaum & Lubek, 1976; Nemeth, 1970).
Much of this research is concerned with interpersonal conflict (see Chapter 14). However, in its broader
context of the study of social dilemmas as crises of human trust that undermine cooperation (e.g. Van
Lange, Balliet, Parks, & Van Vugt, 2014), it has important implications for intergroup conflict: for example,
the prisoner’s dilemma, the trucking game and the commons dilemma (e.g. Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke,
1992).
The prisoner’s dilemma
Introduced by R. D. Luce and Howard Raïffa (1957; Rapoport, 1976), the prisoner’s dilemma is the most
widely researched game (Two-person game in which both parties are torn between competition and
cooperation and, depending on mutual choices, both can win or both can lose). It is based on an
anecdote. Detective’s question two obviously guilty suspects separately, with only enough evidence to
convict them of a lesser offence. The suspects are separately offered a chance to confess, knowing that if
one con- fesses but the other does not, the confessor will be granted immunity and the confession will be
used to convict the other of the more serious offence. If both confess, each will receive a moderate
sentence. If neither confesses, each will receive a very light sentence. The dilemma faced by the prisoners
can be summarised by a pay-off matrix.
Although mutual non-confession produces the best joint outcome, mutual suspicion and lack of trust
almost always encourage both to confess. This finding has been replicated in hundreds of prisoner’s
dilemma experiments, using a variety of experimental conditions and pay-off matrices (Dawes, 1991). The
prisoner’s dilemma is described as a ‘two-person, mixed motive, non-zero-sum game’. This is quite a
mouthful; but it means that two people are involved, they each experience a conflict between being
motivated to cooperate and motivated to compete, and the outcome can be that both parties gain or
both lose. In contrast, a zero-sum game is one in which one party’s gain is always the other’s loss – think
of a pie: the larger the portion I take, the smaller the portion left for you.
The trucking game
In this game, there are two trucking companies, Acme and Bolt, which transport goods from one place to
another (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960). Each company has its own private route, but there is a much faster
shared route, which has a major drawback – a one-lane section (see Figure 11.5). Clearly, the mutually
beneficial solution is for the two companies to take it in turns to use the one-lane section. Instead,
research reveals again and again that participants fight over use of the one-lane section. Typically, both
enter and meet head-on in the middle and then waste time arguing until one backs up. Again, mutual
mistrust has produced a sub- optimal joint outcome.
These games highlight detrimental consequences of lack of trust that have obvious real- world analogues.
For example, mutual distrust between Iran and Iraq fuelled their terrible conflict in the 1980s over which
, of them rightfully owned the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. When they laid down their arms in 1988 after
horrific atrocities, over a million civilian and military casualties and the devastation of their economies,
the borders remained precisely where they were when the war began eight years earlier.
Game theory rests on a rationalistic characterisation of humankind as homo œconomi- cus – a model of
human psychology that derives from Western thinking about work and industry (Cartwright, 2011;
Stroebe & Frey, 1982; see also discussion of normative models and behavioural decision theory in
Chapter 2). Possibly due to this perspective, a problem with research based on game theory is that it is
relatively asocial. For example, it often over- looks the role of direct and indirect communication. Direct
communication in two- and n-person prisoner’s dilemma games very reliably reduces conflict and
increases cooperation (Liebrand, 1984; Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2013). Interactants’ responses also
fulfil an indirect communicative function in which flexible and responsive behaviour increases
cooperation (Apfelbaum, 1974).
Similarly, people’s perceptions of the game are often overlooked. For example, the allocation or
exchange of goods or resources always raises questions of perceived fairness and justice. Typically,
people construe experimental games as competitive contexts. However, if the game is introduced in
different terms – for example, as an investigation of human inter- action or international conflict
resolution – people behave in a more cooperative manner (Abric & Vacherot, 1976; Eiser & Bhavnani,
1974). Furthermore, interactants are more confident of fair solutions, behave more cooperatively and are
more satisfied with outcomes if rules of fairness are explicitly invoked (McClintock & Van Avermaet,
1982; Mikula, 1980).
The commons dilemma
Many other social dilemmas involve a number of individuals or groups exploiting a limited resource
(Foddy, Smithson, Schneider, & Hogg, 1999; Kerr & Park, 2001). These are essentially n-person prisoner’s
dilemmas – if everyone cooperates, an optimal solution for all is reached, but if everyone competes, then
everyone loses. The commons dilemma, or ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), gets its name from
the common pasture that English villages used to have. People could graze their cattle on this land, and if
all used it in moderation, it would replenish itself and continue to benefit them all. However, imagine 100
farmers surrounding a common that could support only 100 cows. If each grazed one cow, the com- mon
would be maximally utilised and minimally taxed. However, one farmer might reason that if they grazed
an additional cow, their output would be doubled, minus a very small cost due to overgrazing – a cost
borne equally by all 100 farmers. So, this farmer adds a second cow. If all 100 farmers reasoned in this
way, they would rapidly destroy the common, thus producing the tragedy of the commons.
The commons dilemma is an example of a replenishable resource dilemma – the com- mons is a
renewable resource that will continually support many people provided that every- one shows restraint
in ‘harvesting’ the resource. Many of the world’s most pressing environmental and conservation
problems are replenishable resource dilemmas: for example, rainforests and the world’s population of
ocean fish are renewable resources if harvested appropriately (Clover, 2004) (see the third ‘What do you
think?’ question).
Another type of social dilemma is called a public goods dilemma. Public goods are provided for everyone:
for example, public health, national parks, the national road network, public radio and TV. Because public
goods are available to all, people are tempted to use them without contributing to their maintenance.
There is a free-rider effect (Gaining the benefits of group membership by avoiding costly obligations of
membership and by allowing other members to incur those costs) (Kerr, 1983; Kerr & Bruun, 1983), in
which people self-interestedly exploit a resource without caring for it.
For example, if you alone avoid paying your taxes, it only minimally impacts the provision of a police
force, an ambulance service or a functioning road system; but if everyone reasoned similarly, there would
Cooperation, competition and social dilemmas
Realistic conflict theory focuses on the relationship between people’s goals, the competitive or
cooperative nature of their behaviour and the conflicting or harmonious nature of their relations. We can
study these relationships in abstract settings by designing ‘games’ with different goal relations for two or
more people to play. The mathematician John Von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern (1944)
introduced a model for analysing situations where people are in conflict over some non-trivial outcome
(e.g. money, power). Variously called decision theory, game theory or utility theory, this initiated a
prodigious amount of research in the 1960s and 1970s.
The highly abstract nature of the research raised questions about its relevance (generalis- ability) to real-
world conflict, which contributed to its decline in the 1980s (Apfelbaum & Lubek, 1976; Nemeth, 1970).
Much of this research is concerned with interpersonal conflict (see Chapter 14). However, in its broader
context of the study of social dilemmas as crises of human trust that undermine cooperation (e.g. Van
Lange, Balliet, Parks, & Van Vugt, 2014), it has important implications for intergroup conflict: for example,
the prisoner’s dilemma, the trucking game and the commons dilemma (e.g. Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke,
1992).
The prisoner’s dilemma
Introduced by R. D. Luce and Howard Raïffa (1957; Rapoport, 1976), the prisoner’s dilemma is the most
widely researched game (Two-person game in which both parties are torn between competition and
cooperation and, depending on mutual choices, both can win or both can lose). It is based on an
anecdote. Detective’s question two obviously guilty suspects separately, with only enough evidence to
convict them of a lesser offence. The suspects are separately offered a chance to confess, knowing that if
one con- fesses but the other does not, the confessor will be granted immunity and the confession will be
used to convict the other of the more serious offence. If both confess, each will receive a moderate
sentence. If neither confesses, each will receive a very light sentence. The dilemma faced by the prisoners
can be summarised by a pay-off matrix.
Although mutual non-confession produces the best joint outcome, mutual suspicion and lack of trust
almost always encourage both to confess. This finding has been replicated in hundreds of prisoner’s
dilemma experiments, using a variety of experimental conditions and pay-off matrices (Dawes, 1991). The
prisoner’s dilemma is described as a ‘two-person, mixed motive, non-zero-sum game’. This is quite a
mouthful; but it means that two people are involved, they each experience a conflict between being
motivated to cooperate and motivated to compete, and the outcome can be that both parties gain or
both lose. In contrast, a zero-sum game is one in which one party’s gain is always the other’s loss – think
of a pie: the larger the portion I take, the smaller the portion left for you.
The trucking game
In this game, there are two trucking companies, Acme and Bolt, which transport goods from one place to
another (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960). Each company has its own private route, but there is a much faster
shared route, which has a major drawback – a one-lane section (see Figure 11.5). Clearly, the mutually
beneficial solution is for the two companies to take it in turns to use the one-lane section. Instead,
research reveals again and again that participants fight over use of the one-lane section. Typically, both
enter and meet head-on in the middle and then waste time arguing until one backs up. Again, mutual
mistrust has produced a sub- optimal joint outcome.
These games highlight detrimental consequences of lack of trust that have obvious real- world analogues.
For example, mutual distrust between Iran and Iraq fuelled their terrible conflict in the 1980s over which
, of them rightfully owned the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. When they laid down their arms in 1988 after
horrific atrocities, over a million civilian and military casualties and the devastation of their economies,
the borders remained precisely where they were when the war began eight years earlier.
Game theory rests on a rationalistic characterisation of humankind as homo œconomi- cus – a model of
human psychology that derives from Western thinking about work and industry (Cartwright, 2011;
Stroebe & Frey, 1982; see also discussion of normative models and behavioural decision theory in
Chapter 2). Possibly due to this perspective, a problem with research based on game theory is that it is
relatively asocial. For example, it often over- looks the role of direct and indirect communication. Direct
communication in two- and n-person prisoner’s dilemma games very reliably reduces conflict and
increases cooperation (Liebrand, 1984; Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2013). Interactants’ responses also
fulfil an indirect communicative function in which flexible and responsive behaviour increases
cooperation (Apfelbaum, 1974).
Similarly, people’s perceptions of the game are often overlooked. For example, the allocation or
exchange of goods or resources always raises questions of perceived fairness and justice. Typically,
people construe experimental games as competitive contexts. However, if the game is introduced in
different terms – for example, as an investigation of human inter- action or international conflict
resolution – people behave in a more cooperative manner (Abric & Vacherot, 1976; Eiser & Bhavnani,
1974). Furthermore, interactants are more confident of fair solutions, behave more cooperatively and are
more satisfied with outcomes if rules of fairness are explicitly invoked (McClintock & Van Avermaet,
1982; Mikula, 1980).
The commons dilemma
Many other social dilemmas involve a number of individuals or groups exploiting a limited resource
(Foddy, Smithson, Schneider, & Hogg, 1999; Kerr & Park, 2001). These are essentially n-person prisoner’s
dilemmas – if everyone cooperates, an optimal solution for all is reached, but if everyone competes, then
everyone loses. The commons dilemma, or ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), gets its name from
the common pasture that English villages used to have. People could graze their cattle on this land, and if
all used it in moderation, it would replenish itself and continue to benefit them all. However, imagine 100
farmers surrounding a common that could support only 100 cows. If each grazed one cow, the com- mon
would be maximally utilised and minimally taxed. However, one farmer might reason that if they grazed
an additional cow, their output would be doubled, minus a very small cost due to overgrazing – a cost
borne equally by all 100 farmers. So, this farmer adds a second cow. If all 100 farmers reasoned in this
way, they would rapidly destroy the common, thus producing the tragedy of the commons.
The commons dilemma is an example of a replenishable resource dilemma – the com- mons is a
renewable resource that will continually support many people provided that every- one shows restraint
in ‘harvesting’ the resource. Many of the world’s most pressing environmental and conservation
problems are replenishable resource dilemmas: for example, rainforests and the world’s population of
ocean fish are renewable resources if harvested appropriately (Clover, 2004) (see the third ‘What do you
think?’ question).
Another type of social dilemma is called a public goods dilemma. Public goods are provided for everyone:
for example, public health, national parks, the national road network, public radio and TV. Because public
goods are available to all, people are tempted to use them without contributing to their maintenance.
There is a free-rider effect (Gaining the benefits of group membership by avoiding costly obligations of
membership and by allowing other members to incur those costs) (Kerr, 1983; Kerr & Bruun, 1983), in
which people self-interestedly exploit a resource without caring for it.
For example, if you alone avoid paying your taxes, it only minimally impacts the provision of a police
force, an ambulance service or a functioning road system; but if everyone reasoned similarly, there would
