Is Property Dualism Convincing?
Statement of Intent: Property Dualism is not convincing account of the mind. Firstly because arguments
that aim to establish property dualism fail, property dualism, specifically interactionist forms fails to
cohere with what we know empirically and most crucially despite epiphenomenalist property dualism
avoiding these issues, it has it’s own deeply concerning problems such as it being counter-intuitive and
therefore fundamentally property dualism in either forms cannot account for mental causation
RICE 1:
R: Arguments that aim to establish property dualism fail and isn’t internally coherent. The most
foundational argument (zombie argument) fails to establish it’s first premise. it isn’t conceivable and it is a
circular argument - this is because it assumes property dualism to be the case in order to assert that it is
conceivable for zombies to exist. If physicalism is the case then it is logically impossible for there to be a
functional duplicate without conciousness because if it is a physical duplicate then by definition it must
have conciousness. The only reason why it is seems conceivable because it has to reject physicalism first
which is what its conclusion is.
I: It is not a circular argument. P1 is conceivable not cause of the truth of the conclusion but due to the
conceptual distinctness claim. There is no conceptual link between truths of physics (which use
mathematical physical concept) and truths about phenomenal experiences (which use subjective
phenomenal concepts). This is why is it still conceivable that at some possible world my
physical/functional duplicate exists and does not have phenomenal properties
C: There is an issue with conceivability arguments in general in order to discover the nature of the world.
All this conceiving of a zombie in reality is just a reflection of our own epistemic limitations and shows that
neuroscience has not developed yet. Therefore the thought experiment of zombies doesn't tell us
anything significant about the nature of conciousness. From what is conceivable we cannot infer anything
about the nature of how things are. Our concepts as they are now aren’t a good guide to a reality because
we constantly change concepts as we discover more empirically. Therefore the right way to determine the
nature of conciousness is not through conceivability arguments such as the zombie argument but through
scientific investigation. Fundamentally we shouldn't let considerations about concepts determine in
advance what scientific investigations may or may not discover.
E: Ultimately it hasn’t proved that property dualism is false but rather shown that arguments for it are
unconvincing. The exchange between the physicalist and the zombie advocate ends in a stalemate.
Neither Property Dualism nor physicalism is shown to be true or false. Haven’t shows that PD is definitely
false.
RICE 2:
R: As well as facing theoretical issues, property dualism fails to cohere with what we know empirically
from neuroscience there is no evidence here for property dualism that mental properties causally interact
with physical properties. Current science indicates that the movements of body are caused by physical
events rather then mental properties and therefore empirically it is leading towards a physicalist account
of the mind
I: The property dualist can argue that there is no evidence against it from neuroscience either. Whilst
neuroscience is making decent progress we still have no clear account of the complicated causation
involved in something like making a choice. Furthermore, property dualism claims that mental properties
are fundamental in the same sense as fundamental physical properties. There is no further explanation in
other terms available anyway and that isn’t an issue because lots of other properties have the same issue.
Is Property Dualism Convincing? 1
Statement of Intent: Property Dualism is not convincing account of the mind. Firstly because arguments
that aim to establish property dualism fail, property dualism, specifically interactionist forms fails to
cohere with what we know empirically and most crucially despite epiphenomenalist property dualism
avoiding these issues, it has it’s own deeply concerning problems such as it being counter-intuitive and
therefore fundamentally property dualism in either forms cannot account for mental causation
RICE 1:
R: Arguments that aim to establish property dualism fail and isn’t internally coherent. The most
foundational argument (zombie argument) fails to establish it’s first premise. it isn’t conceivable and it is a
circular argument - this is because it assumes property dualism to be the case in order to assert that it is
conceivable for zombies to exist. If physicalism is the case then it is logically impossible for there to be a
functional duplicate without conciousness because if it is a physical duplicate then by definition it must
have conciousness. The only reason why it is seems conceivable because it has to reject physicalism first
which is what its conclusion is.
I: It is not a circular argument. P1 is conceivable not cause of the truth of the conclusion but due to the
conceptual distinctness claim. There is no conceptual link between truths of physics (which use
mathematical physical concept) and truths about phenomenal experiences (which use subjective
phenomenal concepts). This is why is it still conceivable that at some possible world my
physical/functional duplicate exists and does not have phenomenal properties
C: There is an issue with conceivability arguments in general in order to discover the nature of the world.
All this conceiving of a zombie in reality is just a reflection of our own epistemic limitations and shows that
neuroscience has not developed yet. Therefore the thought experiment of zombies doesn't tell us
anything significant about the nature of conciousness. From what is conceivable we cannot infer anything
about the nature of how things are. Our concepts as they are now aren’t a good guide to a reality because
we constantly change concepts as we discover more empirically. Therefore the right way to determine the
nature of conciousness is not through conceivability arguments such as the zombie argument but through
scientific investigation. Fundamentally we shouldn't let considerations about concepts determine in
advance what scientific investigations may or may not discover.
E: Ultimately it hasn’t proved that property dualism is false but rather shown that arguments for it are
unconvincing. The exchange between the physicalist and the zombie advocate ends in a stalemate.
Neither Property Dualism nor physicalism is shown to be true or false. Haven’t shows that PD is definitely
false.
RICE 2:
R: As well as facing theoretical issues, property dualism fails to cohere with what we know empirically
from neuroscience there is no evidence here for property dualism that mental properties causally interact
with physical properties. Current science indicates that the movements of body are caused by physical
events rather then mental properties and therefore empirically it is leading towards a physicalist account
of the mind
I: The property dualist can argue that there is no evidence against it from neuroscience either. Whilst
neuroscience is making decent progress we still have no clear account of the complicated causation
involved in something like making a choice. Furthermore, property dualism claims that mental properties
are fundamental in the same sense as fundamental physical properties. There is no further explanation in
other terms available anyway and that isn’t an issue because lots of other properties have the same issue.
Is Property Dualism Convincing? 1
