International Relations
Exam 1
Literature
Lecture 1 Lecture 5 Lecture 9
Lecture 2 Lecture 6 Lecture 10
Lecture 3 Lecture 7 Lecture 11
Lecture 4 Lecture 8
Lecture 1 – Introduction and Perennial Debates
*Dutkiewicz, J., & Smolenski, J. (2023). Epistemic superimposition: The war in Ukraine
and the poverty of expertise in International Relations theory
Concerning the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and in 2022. Scholars have offered
explanations for the invasion and about the conflict, all considered experts of international
relations theory, but they have little knowledge of the region, history or politics.
-These scholars are of the realist school
-specific attention to the scholar John Mearscheimer
-realist theory fails to empirically test in Ukraine – criticqued by scholars of Ukraine (realist
commentary seems to be divorced from reality)
-realists scholars gave same explanations for the Invasion of 2014 and 2022, showing no more
familiarity with the region
Ø claiming expertise about the conflict based on theoretical rather than empirical
expertise and reading empirics selectively to match theoretical claims is an error.
,Epistemic superimposition = the methodological error of overlaying abstract theories onto
unique historical and political contexts, which can lead to poor engagement with empirical
evidence or to ignoring empirical evidence altogether
-giving primacy to theoretical assumptions in analyzing political current events
Article outline
1 examine claims of causes of Russia’s invasion by John Mearsheimer and other realists and
challenge them
2 describe the concept of epistemic superimposition
3 examine role of theory as a marker of expertise within the field of international relations
John Mearsheimer
-blames the West for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022
-because of the triple-package of policies (NATO enlargement, EU expansion and
democracy promotion) was perceived as a threat by Russia as a great power, thereby forcing
them to attack
-argument in line with offensive realism = a structuralist, descriptive theory of state behavior
-predicted that Putin would not invade Ukraine in 2014 if Ukraine would be a neutral buffer,
but was wronged after the invasion of 2014 and 2022 > he still argued the same after even
though he was proven wrong
-often relies on thin or selective sources to make empirical claims
-most of his arguments are unsubstantiated, incomplete or decontextualized (or even
misleading)
-a lot of his writing are references to Ukraine domestic policies or public opinion, but shows
no engagement with scholars familiar with Ukraine
,-acusses scholars with different explanations for Russia’s invasion of offering no evidence
Realist ontology = aggressive state behavior is the result of anarchic nature of international
system. International politics is a zero-sum game. Decisions on how to act, especially great
powers or those powerful enough to theoretically achieve hegemony, make strategic
assessments about their capacity to survive, defend their strategic interests and expand their
power.
-state action is overdetermined by fear of external threats resulting from insecurity
-great powers have the incentive to pursue policies that tilt their balance of power in their
favor (e.g. pacifying their immediate surroundings through military presence or alliances to
ensure that their great power competitors do not enter their sphere of influence
Russia’s invasion – realist explanation
1 The admission of Eastern European and Baltic countries to NATO in 1999 and 2004 made
the “open door policy” towards Ukraine and Georgia announced at the 2008 Bucharest
conference look like an attempt to turn these two countries into Western bulwarks on Russia’s
south-western border. When the West openly sided with the anti-Yanukovych protesters
during the 2013–2014 Euromaidan, the threat became too real and pushed Russia to occupy
Donbass and Crimea.
2 Given that this attack did not deter the collective West from continuing to pull Ukraine
toward its sphere of influence, Russia again invaded in 2022 to head off its rival hegemon(s).
In short: a great power, threatened, made the rational decision to act offensively and the West
is to blame for ignoring Russia’s security concerns.
Ø The United States should abandon plan to westernize Ukraine and make it a neutral
buffer between NATO and Russia (2014)
, The case of Russia and Ukraine
-since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia did not want to relinquish its special powers as a
guarantee for peace and stability in the region of the former union
-Russia used ethnic conflicts as a threat to Russian-speaking populations as excuse to
intervene politically and militarily
-Ukraine has been subject to Russia’s coercion since the dissolution of the USSR, never
signed border treaty with Ukraine
-Russia actively interfered with Ukraine’s elections, foreign- domestic policy and economy
Ø The invasion of 2014 was the result of failed efforts of Russia to control Ukrainian
politics through economic means
Ø Three days before Russian invasion of 2022 Putin proclaimed Russia was responsible
for Ukraine’s modern state
Public Sphere in Ukraine
-within Ukraine citizens were ambivalent about joining the NATO until after the occupation
of 2014
-after failed invasion of 2014 the Kremlin changed their message from uniting Russian-
speaking people to claims about threat of NATO to Russia
> Mearscheimer was wrong > Ukraine was already a buffer state (support for joining NATO
were the result of the invasion of 2014) > Mearscheimer can use argument that Russia acted
out of fear, but one cannot disregard other internal developments and claim you know how
states feel
Correct explanation - The ambitions of Russian leadership to reestablish “political control
over the effective sovereignty” of Moscow’s former possessions, aggrieved by the West’s
Exam 1
Literature
Lecture 1 Lecture 5 Lecture 9
Lecture 2 Lecture 6 Lecture 10
Lecture 3 Lecture 7 Lecture 11
Lecture 4 Lecture 8
Lecture 1 – Introduction and Perennial Debates
*Dutkiewicz, J., & Smolenski, J. (2023). Epistemic superimposition: The war in Ukraine
and the poverty of expertise in International Relations theory
Concerning the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and in 2022. Scholars have offered
explanations for the invasion and about the conflict, all considered experts of international
relations theory, but they have little knowledge of the region, history or politics.
-These scholars are of the realist school
-specific attention to the scholar John Mearscheimer
-realist theory fails to empirically test in Ukraine – criticqued by scholars of Ukraine (realist
commentary seems to be divorced from reality)
-realists scholars gave same explanations for the Invasion of 2014 and 2022, showing no more
familiarity with the region
Ø claiming expertise about the conflict based on theoretical rather than empirical
expertise and reading empirics selectively to match theoretical claims is an error.
,Epistemic superimposition = the methodological error of overlaying abstract theories onto
unique historical and political contexts, which can lead to poor engagement with empirical
evidence or to ignoring empirical evidence altogether
-giving primacy to theoretical assumptions in analyzing political current events
Article outline
1 examine claims of causes of Russia’s invasion by John Mearsheimer and other realists and
challenge them
2 describe the concept of epistemic superimposition
3 examine role of theory as a marker of expertise within the field of international relations
John Mearsheimer
-blames the West for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022
-because of the triple-package of policies (NATO enlargement, EU expansion and
democracy promotion) was perceived as a threat by Russia as a great power, thereby forcing
them to attack
-argument in line with offensive realism = a structuralist, descriptive theory of state behavior
-predicted that Putin would not invade Ukraine in 2014 if Ukraine would be a neutral buffer,
but was wronged after the invasion of 2014 and 2022 > he still argued the same after even
though he was proven wrong
-often relies on thin or selective sources to make empirical claims
-most of his arguments are unsubstantiated, incomplete or decontextualized (or even
misleading)
-a lot of his writing are references to Ukraine domestic policies or public opinion, but shows
no engagement with scholars familiar with Ukraine
,-acusses scholars with different explanations for Russia’s invasion of offering no evidence
Realist ontology = aggressive state behavior is the result of anarchic nature of international
system. International politics is a zero-sum game. Decisions on how to act, especially great
powers or those powerful enough to theoretically achieve hegemony, make strategic
assessments about their capacity to survive, defend their strategic interests and expand their
power.
-state action is overdetermined by fear of external threats resulting from insecurity
-great powers have the incentive to pursue policies that tilt their balance of power in their
favor (e.g. pacifying their immediate surroundings through military presence or alliances to
ensure that their great power competitors do not enter their sphere of influence
Russia’s invasion – realist explanation
1 The admission of Eastern European and Baltic countries to NATO in 1999 and 2004 made
the “open door policy” towards Ukraine and Georgia announced at the 2008 Bucharest
conference look like an attempt to turn these two countries into Western bulwarks on Russia’s
south-western border. When the West openly sided with the anti-Yanukovych protesters
during the 2013–2014 Euromaidan, the threat became too real and pushed Russia to occupy
Donbass and Crimea.
2 Given that this attack did not deter the collective West from continuing to pull Ukraine
toward its sphere of influence, Russia again invaded in 2022 to head off its rival hegemon(s).
In short: a great power, threatened, made the rational decision to act offensively and the West
is to blame for ignoring Russia’s security concerns.
Ø The United States should abandon plan to westernize Ukraine and make it a neutral
buffer between NATO and Russia (2014)
, The case of Russia and Ukraine
-since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia did not want to relinquish its special powers as a
guarantee for peace and stability in the region of the former union
-Russia used ethnic conflicts as a threat to Russian-speaking populations as excuse to
intervene politically and militarily
-Ukraine has been subject to Russia’s coercion since the dissolution of the USSR, never
signed border treaty with Ukraine
-Russia actively interfered with Ukraine’s elections, foreign- domestic policy and economy
Ø The invasion of 2014 was the result of failed efforts of Russia to control Ukrainian
politics through economic means
Ø Three days before Russian invasion of 2022 Putin proclaimed Russia was responsible
for Ukraine’s modern state
Public Sphere in Ukraine
-within Ukraine citizens were ambivalent about joining the NATO until after the occupation
of 2014
-after failed invasion of 2014 the Kremlin changed their message from uniting Russian-
speaking people to claims about threat of NATO to Russia
> Mearscheimer was wrong > Ukraine was already a buffer state (support for joining NATO
were the result of the invasion of 2014) > Mearscheimer can use argument that Russia acted
out of fear, but one cannot disregard other internal developments and claim you know how
states feel
Correct explanation - The ambitions of Russian leadership to reestablish “political control
over the effective sovereignty” of Moscow’s former possessions, aggrieved by the West’s
