PO301 Non-Human Animals
1. Animals have “No Moral Status”
Descartes and Carruthers argue that animals have no inherent moral status, because
they are not rational agents and unable to experience pain in a conscious way. They
conclude that:
We have no direct duties to animals
Kant: We have indirect duties not to harm them insofar as it causes us to harm
other humans. The idea is, we should not hurt animals because it encourages a
propensity to hurt humans too.
This seems like a fairly weak argument, backed by something we cannot prove (animals’
lack of consciousness). There are nuanced and sophisticated arguments here that must
be considered carefully, however.
It is unclear why indirect duties have much moral weight, or are relevant at all.
e.g. Under this view, if I eat a friend’s chicken, my moral duty is to the friend (not to
eat his chicken), rather than to the chicken (not to eat it). The indirect moral status
is almost no status at all - it is very indirect.
2. Animals have “Moral Status, but no Justice Status”
Others claim that animals have inherent moral status, because they can suffer, but are not
subjects of justice, because they cannot claim rights or perceive injustice (which is a
questionable claim!). We have moral obligations towards them, but no justice
requirements. Rawls tentatively endorses this view (Theory of Justice: 448).
In this view, injustice is only possible towards creatures who:
1. can claim rights or acquire the capacity to do so;
2. have a sense of justice or can acquire it (how do we know?);
3. have a capacity for rational agency (is instinct and natural selection rational? What
do we mean by rationality here?);
4. can be part of a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage (intentionally or not?)
Different versions hold different views on the weight that should be given to the interest of
animals vs humans. This ‘common sense’ view requires a more substantial defence,
however. Simply establishing a moral hierarchy does not seem satisfactory. Perhaps this
‘on the fence’ view is incoherent, and we should either affirm or reject moral/justice rights
together? Rawls commitment to "reasonable pluralism” nevertheless has a shaky basis in
theory.
It is very unclear why we should withhold justice obligations on the basis of ignorance of a
sense of justice (Condition 2). Any rule thus generated would apply to the mentally
1. Animals have “No Moral Status”
Descartes and Carruthers argue that animals have no inherent moral status, because
they are not rational agents and unable to experience pain in a conscious way. They
conclude that:
We have no direct duties to animals
Kant: We have indirect duties not to harm them insofar as it causes us to harm
other humans. The idea is, we should not hurt animals because it encourages a
propensity to hurt humans too.
This seems like a fairly weak argument, backed by something we cannot prove (animals’
lack of consciousness). There are nuanced and sophisticated arguments here that must
be considered carefully, however.
It is unclear why indirect duties have much moral weight, or are relevant at all.
e.g. Under this view, if I eat a friend’s chicken, my moral duty is to the friend (not to
eat his chicken), rather than to the chicken (not to eat it). The indirect moral status
is almost no status at all - it is very indirect.
2. Animals have “Moral Status, but no Justice Status”
Others claim that animals have inherent moral status, because they can suffer, but are not
subjects of justice, because they cannot claim rights or perceive injustice (which is a
questionable claim!). We have moral obligations towards them, but no justice
requirements. Rawls tentatively endorses this view (Theory of Justice: 448).
In this view, injustice is only possible towards creatures who:
1. can claim rights or acquire the capacity to do so;
2. have a sense of justice or can acquire it (how do we know?);
3. have a capacity for rational agency (is instinct and natural selection rational? What
do we mean by rationality here?);
4. can be part of a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage (intentionally or not?)
Different versions hold different views on the weight that should be given to the interest of
animals vs humans. This ‘common sense’ view requires a more substantial defence,
however. Simply establishing a moral hierarchy does not seem satisfactory. Perhaps this
‘on the fence’ view is incoherent, and we should either affirm or reject moral/justice rights
together? Rawls commitment to "reasonable pluralism” nevertheless has a shaky basis in
theory.
It is very unclear why we should withhold justice obligations on the basis of ignorance of a
sense of justice (Condition 2). Any rule thus generated would apply to the mentally
