Lecture 1 Introduction
Cold War as starting point of the course International Relations.
How changes in global politics may encourage us to think differently about how to approach
international relations and world politics theoretically.
Global politics and international relations since the Cold War (post-
1991)
An interdisciplinary course on international politics, from different disciplinary angles and traditions
(history, political science, IR) and area specializations.
Linkages between:
1. Global, regional and national developments.
2. Theoretical approaches and real-world issues and policies.
3. Western and non-western perspectives on global politics.
4. International Relations and International Studies.
The transformation of global politics
The changing nature of global politics – An introduction
Order (power), actors, issues and ideas are the essential features.
In one sentence: A challenging mix of power shifts, normative competition (ideas), and a confusing
variety of new and old actors (states, IO’s, NGOs, individuals), issues (environment, health, cyber),
and the paradoxes of globalization or the challenges of connectivity in world politics. (Boyle, ‘The
Coming Illiberal Order’; Duncombe et al., ‘After liberal World Order …’)
Power transition and the changing nature of ‘world order’.
The paradoxes of globalization.
New / old actors, ideas, and issues.
Power transition and global ‘order’
Read Duncombe, ‘ After Liberal World Order’ and Boyle ‘The Coming Illiberal Order’ for the notion of
‘order’ in IR (‘the coming together of power and legitimate social purpose’), for a nuanced discussion
on the merits and the future of liberal order (how it relates to imperialism, Westernism,
humanitarianism), and how IR theories interpret this…
Always combination between material power and legitimate purpose.
Preliminary observations:
The nexus between power relations and international ‘order’ is complex: from bipolarity
(example: Cold War) to unipolarity (US hegemony), to multipolarity – but order is always
‘multi-layered’, perhaps especially future orders: issue-specific coalitions rather than global
institutions; ‘diminished’, ‘pragmatic’, ‘competitive’, ‘a la carte’, ‘networked multilateralism’
(state, business, society*), etc.
o Order is more than the absence of conflict.
o Today a return of bipolarity?
o Rise of China. US hegemony is threatened.
o Multilateralism: states cooperation (example: NATO).
, The scope of the liberal order varied across time, space and domain, was never universally
liberal, ‘ordered’ or global, so what is at stake: the fate of neoliberalism, liberal
internationalism, the ‘Global liberal order’, a rules-based world, multilateralism, etc.?
Lessons from history? Pre-World War I strategic landscape: competition, conflict, and
concert.
o It is the most similar situation with today. If there is a historical parallel it is probably
pre-WWI.
From the ‘post-Cold War’ to the ‘post-post-Cold War’?
‘The post-Cold War order is unravelling, and while not perfect, it will be missed’. (Richar N. Haass,
‘The Unraveling. How to Respond to a Disordered World, Foreign Affairs, November / December
2014)
It will be missed because politics was easier to ‘control’, to predict.
The paradoxes of globalization: convergence and divergence
From ‘convergence’ (see Heywood on ‘globalization, pp.8-13) , universalism and the ‘End of History’,
to increasing ‘divergence’ and the growth of ideological, political and economic diversity, and the
‘Return of History’.
Globalization is both convergence and divergence (the paradox).
Fukuyama did not foresee the very deep divisions in today’s world; ideological and material.
He underestimated the power of ideas and identity.
Nowadays, the world has moved towards increasing divergence. Before, there were the
years of universalism, of convergence. More interdependence today than we have ever been
before. But more connectivity has not led, necessarily, to more peace. Led to conflict and
division.
Connectivity as a catalyst for division and conflict?
Globalization going wild: neoliberalism; financial crisis of 2007-2008; Eurozone Crisis (from
2009), and its discontents (polarization).
Differences between and within countries increase and emphasized, shaped by a large
variety of ideological, cultural, national developments: migration, the rise of nationalism,
‘ethnic’ and ‘identity politics’, varieties of democracy, of authoritarianism, of capitalism.
,Global poverty reduction
And the major reason why …
Global poverty has reduced because of China (red line). If China changes, the world changes.
Inequality within countries
, Inequality between countries has reduced, inequality within countries has increased.
New / old actors, issues and ideas
Actors: the state, non-state actors / NGO’s (‘global civil society’), international organizations;
transnational corporations, sub-state, supra-state (regionalization) and global governance.
UN Security Council is representable as a ‘world government’.
Power diffusion: from states to non-state actors (from the public to the private sphere).
States share the global stage with evermore other actors.
o Power transition: geographical shift of power; from one country to another.
From the ‘withdrawal’ or ‘crisis’ of the state (1990s) to its resurgence of the state (Russia,
China, USA: state capitalism, protectionism, and the EU: Euroscepticism) and the weakness
or absence of the state (Ukraine, Middle East, central and Horn of Africa).
o It was believed during the 90s that the state would be less important (example:
European Union). Non-state actors are important, but the state is still there.
The future of global and regional institutions (multilateralism).
New / old issues in international relations: technology, climate, health
Emerging, interconnected and cascading/strengthening transnational challenges: health, climate
change, and technological change redefine traditional notions as power, sovereignty, security, etc.
Health (pandemic):
The decisive criteria was not regime-type (democracies vs. authoritarian governments), but
the level of social trust, state capacity, and leadership (Fukuyama, ‘The Pandemic and
Political Order’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020).
Consequences: emphasizing existing rather than creating new issues; national rather than
international consequences (or mutually strengthening).
Climate and international relations
Interconnected consequences within and between communities and countries:
Cold War as starting point of the course International Relations.
How changes in global politics may encourage us to think differently about how to approach
international relations and world politics theoretically.
Global politics and international relations since the Cold War (post-
1991)
An interdisciplinary course on international politics, from different disciplinary angles and traditions
(history, political science, IR) and area specializations.
Linkages between:
1. Global, regional and national developments.
2. Theoretical approaches and real-world issues and policies.
3. Western and non-western perspectives on global politics.
4. International Relations and International Studies.
The transformation of global politics
The changing nature of global politics – An introduction
Order (power), actors, issues and ideas are the essential features.
In one sentence: A challenging mix of power shifts, normative competition (ideas), and a confusing
variety of new and old actors (states, IO’s, NGOs, individuals), issues (environment, health, cyber),
and the paradoxes of globalization or the challenges of connectivity in world politics. (Boyle, ‘The
Coming Illiberal Order’; Duncombe et al., ‘After liberal World Order …’)
Power transition and the changing nature of ‘world order’.
The paradoxes of globalization.
New / old actors, ideas, and issues.
Power transition and global ‘order’
Read Duncombe, ‘ After Liberal World Order’ and Boyle ‘The Coming Illiberal Order’ for the notion of
‘order’ in IR (‘the coming together of power and legitimate social purpose’), for a nuanced discussion
on the merits and the future of liberal order (how it relates to imperialism, Westernism,
humanitarianism), and how IR theories interpret this…
Always combination between material power and legitimate purpose.
Preliminary observations:
The nexus between power relations and international ‘order’ is complex: from bipolarity
(example: Cold War) to unipolarity (US hegemony), to multipolarity – but order is always
‘multi-layered’, perhaps especially future orders: issue-specific coalitions rather than global
institutions; ‘diminished’, ‘pragmatic’, ‘competitive’, ‘a la carte’, ‘networked multilateralism’
(state, business, society*), etc.
o Order is more than the absence of conflict.
o Today a return of bipolarity?
o Rise of China. US hegemony is threatened.
o Multilateralism: states cooperation (example: NATO).
, The scope of the liberal order varied across time, space and domain, was never universally
liberal, ‘ordered’ or global, so what is at stake: the fate of neoliberalism, liberal
internationalism, the ‘Global liberal order’, a rules-based world, multilateralism, etc.?
Lessons from history? Pre-World War I strategic landscape: competition, conflict, and
concert.
o It is the most similar situation with today. If there is a historical parallel it is probably
pre-WWI.
From the ‘post-Cold War’ to the ‘post-post-Cold War’?
‘The post-Cold War order is unravelling, and while not perfect, it will be missed’. (Richar N. Haass,
‘The Unraveling. How to Respond to a Disordered World, Foreign Affairs, November / December
2014)
It will be missed because politics was easier to ‘control’, to predict.
The paradoxes of globalization: convergence and divergence
From ‘convergence’ (see Heywood on ‘globalization, pp.8-13) , universalism and the ‘End of History’,
to increasing ‘divergence’ and the growth of ideological, political and economic diversity, and the
‘Return of History’.
Globalization is both convergence and divergence (the paradox).
Fukuyama did not foresee the very deep divisions in today’s world; ideological and material.
He underestimated the power of ideas and identity.
Nowadays, the world has moved towards increasing divergence. Before, there were the
years of universalism, of convergence. More interdependence today than we have ever been
before. But more connectivity has not led, necessarily, to more peace. Led to conflict and
division.
Connectivity as a catalyst for division and conflict?
Globalization going wild: neoliberalism; financial crisis of 2007-2008; Eurozone Crisis (from
2009), and its discontents (polarization).
Differences between and within countries increase and emphasized, shaped by a large
variety of ideological, cultural, national developments: migration, the rise of nationalism,
‘ethnic’ and ‘identity politics’, varieties of democracy, of authoritarianism, of capitalism.
,Global poverty reduction
And the major reason why …
Global poverty has reduced because of China (red line). If China changes, the world changes.
Inequality within countries
, Inequality between countries has reduced, inequality within countries has increased.
New / old actors, issues and ideas
Actors: the state, non-state actors / NGO’s (‘global civil society’), international organizations;
transnational corporations, sub-state, supra-state (regionalization) and global governance.
UN Security Council is representable as a ‘world government’.
Power diffusion: from states to non-state actors (from the public to the private sphere).
States share the global stage with evermore other actors.
o Power transition: geographical shift of power; from one country to another.
From the ‘withdrawal’ or ‘crisis’ of the state (1990s) to its resurgence of the state (Russia,
China, USA: state capitalism, protectionism, and the EU: Euroscepticism) and the weakness
or absence of the state (Ukraine, Middle East, central and Horn of Africa).
o It was believed during the 90s that the state would be less important (example:
European Union). Non-state actors are important, but the state is still there.
The future of global and regional institutions (multilateralism).
New / old issues in international relations: technology, climate, health
Emerging, interconnected and cascading/strengthening transnational challenges: health, climate
change, and technological change redefine traditional notions as power, sovereignty, security, etc.
Health (pandemic):
The decisive criteria was not regime-type (democracies vs. authoritarian governments), but
the level of social trust, state capacity, and leadership (Fukuyama, ‘The Pandemic and
Political Order’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020).
Consequences: emphasizing existing rather than creating new issues; national rather than
international consequences (or mutually strengthening).
Climate and international relations
Interconnected consequences within and between communities and countries:
