LECTURE 1: Intro and States
States
● Started in Westphalia: birth of international system (1648)
● End of thirty years’ wear and eighty years’ war
○ Consequence → exclusive sovereignty
● Exclusive sovereignty → not to meddle in each other’s rights
○ Internal sovereignty (date back to roman times): state is free to decide
rules that reside within its own borders → naturally means that
other states cannot apply law in other countries
■ States make laws, provide frameworks not church or private
companies/indivs
○ External sovereignty: no outside interference in the borders within the state,
other states cannot interfere on behalf of their citizens
○ Rules become geographically limited (territories of the state)
○ Outside intervention of the state is only possible if rulers permit it
○ ⇔ state become increasingly more present in people’s lives (ex:
food safety rules → what food you can eat, electricity/fuel usage)
● Why did states survive?
○ Advantages of state (vs empires & leagues)
■ Empires lack written codes, customary proceedings, legal
climate for trade, high transaction costs → lower uncertainty,
reliability & predictability, so higher transaction costs
■ Leagues (units of smaller cities) lack territorial contiguity
(individual units are not connected to each other), lack fixed
borders, clear rules, internal hierarchy → difficulty to defend,
some cities more equal to others to conduct business and
function of cities
● States in international politics
○ Preferences of actors within state become state preferences
○ No higher authority than the state when there is internal sovereignty
● Anarchy
○ Main and most basic assumption of the international governance
○ Difference between international and domestic society
■ Domestic society
● Clear hierarchy of rules
● Consequences to rule violations
○ Not about lack of order but about lack of higher authority
○ Leads to “911” problem → no one to call when it is about
international politics
Game theory
● Each game needs
○ Players - need at least 2 (people, companies, states)
■ Rational
● Not necessarily cost effective
● Have preferences and pursue them
, ■ Informed
● Aware of their options and actors’
○ Strategies (a choice thereof)
○ Preferences (exist and are transitive = if prefer A over B or C over D, means
that you also prefer A over D)
○ Solution (final point)
● Prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation w/ other criminal or defect to police →
cooperation game
○ Cooperation risks cheating
○ Benefits from cheating are higher than benefits from sticking
● Battle of the sexes: boxing vs opera → coordination problem
○ Induce cooperation: threat, bribe, package deal, pre-emptive action
○ Difficult to find common course
○ But no difficulty to stick to it
Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (2012). World Politics: Interests,
Interactions, Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. [Ch 2; sections
Interests and Interactions only]
Interests
● = preferences of actors over the possible outcomes that might result from their
political choices
○ Determine how actors rank the desirability of different outcomes, from most to
least preferred
● Group interests at the individual and collective level, in 3 categories
○ Power/security
■ All political actors require a degree of personal or collective security as
a prerequisite to all other goals
■ Or to desire power and ability to dominate others either as part of
human nature or essential to survival in a competitive international
environment
○ Economic/material welfare
■ Political actors presumed to desire higher standard of living defined in
terms of greater income, more consumable goods and services, or
more leisure time (less work)
○ Ideological goals
■ Actors may also desire moral, religious or other ideological goals,
including democracy, human equality and dignity
■ Ideas often play key role in shaping what actors want or believe to be
good and desirable
● Actors
○ Types of actors: states, groups within countries, international organizations,
individuals
○ State = central authority that has the ability to make and enforce laws, rules
and decisions within its territory
■ Sovereignty: expectation that states have legal and political
supremacy within their boundaries → have control over their
own policies and political processes
, ■ National interests → assume that states are motivated by
interest in security (from external and internal threats) and
power (accumulate to ensure security)
Interactions
● = ways in which choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes
○ When outcomes are the product of an interaction, actors have to anticipate
the likely choices of others and take those choices into account when making
decisions
○ Strategic interactions: each actor’s strategy/plan of action depends on
anticipated strategy of others
● Assumptions
○ Actors are purposive, they behave w/ the intention of producing a
desired result → actors assumed to choose among available options
w/ regard for their consequences and w/ the aim of bringing abt
outcomes they prefer
○ Strategic interaction - actors adopt strategies to obtain desired
outcomes given what they believe to be interests and likely actions
of others → develop strategies that they believe are a best response
to anticipated strategies of others
● Cooperation = when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor
better off than it would otherwise be - when actors have shared interest in achieving
an outcome & must work tgt
○ Past policy combinations produced an outcome aka the status quo (q)
, ○ Any policy combination that leads to an outcome in qba would be better for
both actors that if they were under the status quo
○ Pareto frontier: downward-sloping line which shows different ways maximum
feasible income can be divided between the two actors
○ Mutual policy adjustments that move actors toward or onto the Pareto frontier,
increasing the welfare of some or all partners without diminishing welfare of
any one actor - mutual gain
● Bargaining = interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better
off at the expense of another
○ When bargaining, actors move along the frontier
○ On the frontier, any improvement in A’s welfare comes strictly at the expense
of B’s welfare
○ Zero-sum game → gains for one side perfectly match the losses of
the other
○ Bargaining is purely redistributive rather than creating additional
value (ie cooperation) → only allocates a fixed sum of value
between different actors
Spruyt, H. (2002). The origins, development, and possible decline of the modern state.
Annual Review of Political Science, 5(1), 127-149.
States
● Started in Westphalia: birth of international system (1648)
● End of thirty years’ wear and eighty years’ war
○ Consequence → exclusive sovereignty
● Exclusive sovereignty → not to meddle in each other’s rights
○ Internal sovereignty (date back to roman times): state is free to decide
rules that reside within its own borders → naturally means that
other states cannot apply law in other countries
■ States make laws, provide frameworks not church or private
companies/indivs
○ External sovereignty: no outside interference in the borders within the state,
other states cannot interfere on behalf of their citizens
○ Rules become geographically limited (territories of the state)
○ Outside intervention of the state is only possible if rulers permit it
○ ⇔ state become increasingly more present in people’s lives (ex:
food safety rules → what food you can eat, electricity/fuel usage)
● Why did states survive?
○ Advantages of state (vs empires & leagues)
■ Empires lack written codes, customary proceedings, legal
climate for trade, high transaction costs → lower uncertainty,
reliability & predictability, so higher transaction costs
■ Leagues (units of smaller cities) lack territorial contiguity
(individual units are not connected to each other), lack fixed
borders, clear rules, internal hierarchy → difficulty to defend,
some cities more equal to others to conduct business and
function of cities
● States in international politics
○ Preferences of actors within state become state preferences
○ No higher authority than the state when there is internal sovereignty
● Anarchy
○ Main and most basic assumption of the international governance
○ Difference between international and domestic society
■ Domestic society
● Clear hierarchy of rules
● Consequences to rule violations
○ Not about lack of order but about lack of higher authority
○ Leads to “911” problem → no one to call when it is about
international politics
Game theory
● Each game needs
○ Players - need at least 2 (people, companies, states)
■ Rational
● Not necessarily cost effective
● Have preferences and pursue them
, ■ Informed
● Aware of their options and actors’
○ Strategies (a choice thereof)
○ Preferences (exist and are transitive = if prefer A over B or C over D, means
that you also prefer A over D)
○ Solution (final point)
● Prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation w/ other criminal or defect to police →
cooperation game
○ Cooperation risks cheating
○ Benefits from cheating are higher than benefits from sticking
● Battle of the sexes: boxing vs opera → coordination problem
○ Induce cooperation: threat, bribe, package deal, pre-emptive action
○ Difficult to find common course
○ But no difficulty to stick to it
Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (2012). World Politics: Interests,
Interactions, Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. [Ch 2; sections
Interests and Interactions only]
Interests
● = preferences of actors over the possible outcomes that might result from their
political choices
○ Determine how actors rank the desirability of different outcomes, from most to
least preferred
● Group interests at the individual and collective level, in 3 categories
○ Power/security
■ All political actors require a degree of personal or collective security as
a prerequisite to all other goals
■ Or to desire power and ability to dominate others either as part of
human nature or essential to survival in a competitive international
environment
○ Economic/material welfare
■ Political actors presumed to desire higher standard of living defined in
terms of greater income, more consumable goods and services, or
more leisure time (less work)
○ Ideological goals
■ Actors may also desire moral, religious or other ideological goals,
including democracy, human equality and dignity
■ Ideas often play key role in shaping what actors want or believe to be
good and desirable
● Actors
○ Types of actors: states, groups within countries, international organizations,
individuals
○ State = central authority that has the ability to make and enforce laws, rules
and decisions within its territory
■ Sovereignty: expectation that states have legal and political
supremacy within their boundaries → have control over their
own policies and political processes
, ■ National interests → assume that states are motivated by
interest in security (from external and internal threats) and
power (accumulate to ensure security)
Interactions
● = ways in which choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes
○ When outcomes are the product of an interaction, actors have to anticipate
the likely choices of others and take those choices into account when making
decisions
○ Strategic interactions: each actor’s strategy/plan of action depends on
anticipated strategy of others
● Assumptions
○ Actors are purposive, they behave w/ the intention of producing a
desired result → actors assumed to choose among available options
w/ regard for their consequences and w/ the aim of bringing abt
outcomes they prefer
○ Strategic interaction - actors adopt strategies to obtain desired
outcomes given what they believe to be interests and likely actions
of others → develop strategies that they believe are a best response
to anticipated strategies of others
● Cooperation = when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor
better off than it would otherwise be - when actors have shared interest in achieving
an outcome & must work tgt
○ Past policy combinations produced an outcome aka the status quo (q)
, ○ Any policy combination that leads to an outcome in qba would be better for
both actors that if they were under the status quo
○ Pareto frontier: downward-sloping line which shows different ways maximum
feasible income can be divided between the two actors
○ Mutual policy adjustments that move actors toward or onto the Pareto frontier,
increasing the welfare of some or all partners without diminishing welfare of
any one actor - mutual gain
● Bargaining = interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better
off at the expense of another
○ When bargaining, actors move along the frontier
○ On the frontier, any improvement in A’s welfare comes strictly at the expense
of B’s welfare
○ Zero-sum game → gains for one side perfectly match the losses of
the other
○ Bargaining is purely redistributive rather than creating additional
value (ie cooperation) → only allocates a fixed sum of value
between different actors
Spruyt, H. (2002). The origins, development, and possible decline of the modern state.
Annual Review of Political Science, 5(1), 127-149.
