Lecture 1
Policy output: policies adopted by government, including goals that policies aim to achieve.
Policy outcome: consequences of policies might be different from goals intended with policy
not only driven by policy itself, also external factors influential.
Constraint hypothesis: globalisation international markets pervade domestic economy
economic success depends on non-withdrawal of foreign capital & trade relations competition for
capital parties lost autonomy impacts citizens’ perceptions of government’s room to
manoeuvre (directly) or polarisation in party system/policies (indirectly) lower turnout. Also:
greater exposure to the world economy reduces electoral accountability. Citizens do not longer think
that outcomes are result of government policies, but also global actors responsible don’t vote for
same party.
Globalisation of ownership: more mobile/sensitive to changes in government policy more
powerful constraint on politicians. Withdrawal of foreign capital economic costs can
harm voters. Increases with dependence on foreign capital. Stronger effect on turnout.
Globalisation of trade: policy constraints less sensitive because trade flows are less mobile &
sensitive to government policy & less consequential for domestic economy.
Compensation hypothesis: globalisation increases demands for social protection governments
recognise social costs of globalisation rise in government spending to compensation
globalisation’s losers elections more salient higher turnout. More competition among
voters/group leaders with different preferences over compensation distributional conflict could
stimulate turnout among winners or loser from increased spending matters which party is in
government. Also: exposure to world markets extract information about how politicians act
governments accountable. Adopted policies economic growth reward government vote for
same party.
Convergence hypothesis: economic globalisation states compete for capital constrain
governments national policies converge uncertain future for independent national policies.
Divergence hypothesis: due to variety of domestic factors (history institutions/partisanship)
national policy makers room to manoeuvre in global economy. National government control over
outputs/outcomes. Established institutions difficult to change restrict ability of political actors to
adopt policies. Governments do not want to face consequences for abolishing institutions.
Retrospective voting: voters hold governments accountable for economic performance. Economic
openness alters voters’ perception of politicians’ competence & to what extent they hold politicians
accountable for national economic performance. If citizens believe that globalisation reduces
governments’ influence over economy less likely to reward/punish politicians for economic
performance. Also: government signals claiming credit for success & avoiding blame for failure.
Closed economy: difficult to escape blame. Open economy: more actors no clarity of responsibility
tool to blame economic performance on factors beyond control.
Critical view:
Do not discuss what happens on political level assume that parties are empty shells that
do what global actors want them to do. However: parties want to be re-elected (office-
seeking) & have specific policy preferences (policy-seeking) adjust their behaviour
accordingly.
, Assume one-directional relation from citizens to parties. Citizens perceive what is happening
at party level, but they do not examine how parties affect citizens’ behaviour with strategies.
Citizens perceive constraints, but are there actual constraints?
Do not examine confounders. Citizens may find other issues important (e.g. immigration).
Median voter theorem: parties motivated to win elections, focus on group of voters that is majority
(ones in the middle). Parties shape policies to attract median voter to win elections. Thus: when
parties take position, they take median voter into account. However: depends on country in some
country median voter more left/right median ≠ moderate.
Globalisation hypothesis: globalisation conditions responsiveness. Responsiveness of parties to
preferences of median voter weaker as national economies are more exposed to world markets:
More actors that parties should take into account besides voters. Attention of parties split
between demands of markets & demands of voters. More actors to satisfy.
Different preferences: discrepancy in ideological preferences between median voter (left) &
market actors (right) channelling voter expression becomes more difficult. Thus: position
taking strategies before elections.
Governing experience hypothesis: mechanisms (more actors/different preferences) for experienced
parties. Effect of globalisation on responsiveness different for different parties more effect for
parties with governing experience. Small/new parties appeal to narrow segment of electorate
not responsible for making policy factors that could influence policy less likely to play role in their
strategies. More salient for parties who have been responsible/in government proven to be
competent. After position of leadership, party understands need to balance preferences of electorate
with those of other actors. Have to consider long-term effects of policies (responsibility) rather than
short-term voter preferences (responsiveness).
Issue ownership: parties with experience the ones in charge of their countries opening up to
external markets their responsibility.
Critical view:
Do not look at content of policy (political behaviour). Focusses on positions parties take just
before elections (position-taking).
Economic left-right as main dimension in political competition may no longer be relevant
for voters to consider.
Median voter: one dimension? Parties maybe responsive to electorate but not median voter.
Mechanisms behind the effect of party experience not discussed.
Lecture 2
Conceptualising welfare policies:
Policy outputs vs. policy outcomes.
Expenditure (government spending) vs. entitlements (level of protection people get for
different risks in life course e.g. sickness leave, unemployment benefits, etc.).
o However: citizens do not care how much government spends, they care about how
they will be protected do not demand increased spending, but increased
protection. Thus: entitlement more important than expenditure. Also: expenditure
outcome variable spending does not happen because policies change, but
because societal change (more people in need).
Welfare retrenchment: cutbacks in entitlements vs. institutional changes (arrangement of
welfare system who protects you). Changes on institutional level do not necessarily mean
Policy output: policies adopted by government, including goals that policies aim to achieve.
Policy outcome: consequences of policies might be different from goals intended with policy
not only driven by policy itself, also external factors influential.
Constraint hypothesis: globalisation international markets pervade domestic economy
economic success depends on non-withdrawal of foreign capital & trade relations competition for
capital parties lost autonomy impacts citizens’ perceptions of government’s room to
manoeuvre (directly) or polarisation in party system/policies (indirectly) lower turnout. Also:
greater exposure to the world economy reduces electoral accountability. Citizens do not longer think
that outcomes are result of government policies, but also global actors responsible don’t vote for
same party.
Globalisation of ownership: more mobile/sensitive to changes in government policy more
powerful constraint on politicians. Withdrawal of foreign capital economic costs can
harm voters. Increases with dependence on foreign capital. Stronger effect on turnout.
Globalisation of trade: policy constraints less sensitive because trade flows are less mobile &
sensitive to government policy & less consequential for domestic economy.
Compensation hypothesis: globalisation increases demands for social protection governments
recognise social costs of globalisation rise in government spending to compensation
globalisation’s losers elections more salient higher turnout. More competition among
voters/group leaders with different preferences over compensation distributional conflict could
stimulate turnout among winners or loser from increased spending matters which party is in
government. Also: exposure to world markets extract information about how politicians act
governments accountable. Adopted policies economic growth reward government vote for
same party.
Convergence hypothesis: economic globalisation states compete for capital constrain
governments national policies converge uncertain future for independent national policies.
Divergence hypothesis: due to variety of domestic factors (history institutions/partisanship)
national policy makers room to manoeuvre in global economy. National government control over
outputs/outcomes. Established institutions difficult to change restrict ability of political actors to
adopt policies. Governments do not want to face consequences for abolishing institutions.
Retrospective voting: voters hold governments accountable for economic performance. Economic
openness alters voters’ perception of politicians’ competence & to what extent they hold politicians
accountable for national economic performance. If citizens believe that globalisation reduces
governments’ influence over economy less likely to reward/punish politicians for economic
performance. Also: government signals claiming credit for success & avoiding blame for failure.
Closed economy: difficult to escape blame. Open economy: more actors no clarity of responsibility
tool to blame economic performance on factors beyond control.
Critical view:
Do not discuss what happens on political level assume that parties are empty shells that
do what global actors want them to do. However: parties want to be re-elected (office-
seeking) & have specific policy preferences (policy-seeking) adjust their behaviour
accordingly.
, Assume one-directional relation from citizens to parties. Citizens perceive what is happening
at party level, but they do not examine how parties affect citizens’ behaviour with strategies.
Citizens perceive constraints, but are there actual constraints?
Do not examine confounders. Citizens may find other issues important (e.g. immigration).
Median voter theorem: parties motivated to win elections, focus on group of voters that is majority
(ones in the middle). Parties shape policies to attract median voter to win elections. Thus: when
parties take position, they take median voter into account. However: depends on country in some
country median voter more left/right median ≠ moderate.
Globalisation hypothesis: globalisation conditions responsiveness. Responsiveness of parties to
preferences of median voter weaker as national economies are more exposed to world markets:
More actors that parties should take into account besides voters. Attention of parties split
between demands of markets & demands of voters. More actors to satisfy.
Different preferences: discrepancy in ideological preferences between median voter (left) &
market actors (right) channelling voter expression becomes more difficult. Thus: position
taking strategies before elections.
Governing experience hypothesis: mechanisms (more actors/different preferences) for experienced
parties. Effect of globalisation on responsiveness different for different parties more effect for
parties with governing experience. Small/new parties appeal to narrow segment of electorate
not responsible for making policy factors that could influence policy less likely to play role in their
strategies. More salient for parties who have been responsible/in government proven to be
competent. After position of leadership, party understands need to balance preferences of electorate
with those of other actors. Have to consider long-term effects of policies (responsibility) rather than
short-term voter preferences (responsiveness).
Issue ownership: parties with experience the ones in charge of their countries opening up to
external markets their responsibility.
Critical view:
Do not look at content of policy (political behaviour). Focusses on positions parties take just
before elections (position-taking).
Economic left-right as main dimension in political competition may no longer be relevant
for voters to consider.
Median voter: one dimension? Parties maybe responsive to electorate but not median voter.
Mechanisms behind the effect of party experience not discussed.
Lecture 2
Conceptualising welfare policies:
Policy outputs vs. policy outcomes.
Expenditure (government spending) vs. entitlements (level of protection people get for
different risks in life course e.g. sickness leave, unemployment benefits, etc.).
o However: citizens do not care how much government spends, they care about how
they will be protected do not demand increased spending, but increased
protection. Thus: entitlement more important than expenditure. Also: expenditure
outcome variable spending does not happen because policies change, but
because societal change (more people in need).
Welfare retrenchment: cutbacks in entitlements vs. institutional changes (arrangement of
welfare system who protects you). Changes on institutional level do not necessarily mean
