Ethics
1 Philosophy of science
1.1 Truth
2 questions:
1. What does it mean for a claim to be true?
2. How do we determine that a claim is true?
The question ”what is truth” is abstract and complicated. Some say truth is based on previous
knowledge (like an evolution of truth), others think we cannot have a true knowledge of reality,
just a representation of it.
1.2 Epistemology: methods to ascertain truth
Epistemology is the study of the nature and the origin of knowledge.
The scientific method
1. Ask a question
2. Formulate a hypothesis
3. Design an experiment
4. Test the hypothesis
5. Analyze the results
6. Draw a conclusion
While this model does describe a frequently employed method in science, it’s misleading to
think of this as the actual scientific method.
In actual practice, scientists employ a variety of methods that involve a broad range of patterns
of reasoning, both inductive and deductive:
• Deductive reasoning • Inductive reasoning
1. Theory 1. Observation
2. Hypothesis 2. Pattern
3. Observation 3. Hypothesis
4. Confirmation 4. Theory
The support for a hypothesis is often a matter of inference-to-the-best-explanation rather than
inductive generalization.
1
,1.2.1 Rationalism and empiricism
• Rationalism: knowledge is based on ideas and propositions that can be known through
pure reason.
• Empiricism: all our knowledge is ultimately acquired through sense experience. 2
philosophers: John Locke and David Hume.
John Locke (1632-1704): The mind starts off as a ”tabula rasa”, a blank slate. We are born
knowing nothing and all of our ideas have their origin in experience.
David Hume (1711-1776): 2 forms of reasoning:
• A priori reasoning: reasoning independent of experience
• A posteriori reasoning: produce understanding of relations of ideas
With induction, the argument uses a pattern of observations (or experiences) to draw a conclu-
sion about what is generally the case. Induction is a type of reasoning where a person observes
something that has always happened in the past and then predicts that the future will behave
in the same way based on these observations. Hume had an issue with this (the problem of
induction): We formed this assumption that nature is uniform; that it’s unchanging; that it
possesses a kind of regularity
1.2.2 Logical positivism
The essence of logical positivism is the belief that all problems – including social problems –
can be solved by science.
The Vienna circle was a group of philosophers and scientists that were inspired by the success
of physics, but were concerned about the emergence of non-rational philosophies at the time.
According to the logical positivists, two characteristics of science are essential: Logical reasoning
and the substantiation of knowledge by means of empirical evidence. Hence, logical positivism
is also known as logical empiricism.
The standard view of science can be further expanded
van illustrated using the empirical cycle. Note that the
standard view seems to largely par up with the scien-
tific method. Facts are supposed to be independent of
theory and the personal views of the researcher. Em-
pirical laws can then be formulated on the basis of these
facts. Laws do not explain reality, but describe it. For
explanations, we need a theory. Predictions are often
thought to be symmetrical to explanation (in time).
Hypotheses about reality can be derived from the theory, and predictions can then be based
on the hypotheses. If predictions do not come true, and this cannot be attributed to incorrect
measurements or interpretations, the theory must be modified.
Articles are not direct reports of what the scientists have done to reach their conclusions. Rather,
they are a reconstruction of research that serves as a sort of ‘recipe’ for anyone who wants to
repeat the experiment in order to check it: ‘if you do A, B and C, you will obtain results X,
Y and Z’. A scientific article is therefore not a chronological but a logical reconstruction of a
scientific experiment.
2
, 1.3 Critique on the standard view of science
1.3.1 Karl Popper’s critique
Popper has the idea of refutation and confirmation stating that we should not derive general
statements from concrete cases, but the other way around.
Popper distinguishes a scientific theory from a non-
scientific one based on the criterion of falsification. If
whatever is precluded or forbidden is observed never-
theless, the theory is apparently refuted and must be
rejected. In the opposite case, the theory holds – for
the time being at least (corroboration). Being scientific,
according to Popper, means being testable.
According to popper, observation is not a passive
recording process but requires a theory from the
start.This is why Popper speaks of theory-laden obser-
vation.
1.3.2 Thomas Kuhn’s critique
Where Popper focused on philosophical and logical premises of science, Thomas Kuhn addressed
how science evolved based on historical material about scientific developments. In other words,
instead of a normative approach (as seen with empiricism), Kuhn performed a descriptive anal-
ysis of ‘truth-seeking’ in science. He argued that one cannot use empirical evidence to treat a
theory without committing oneself to that very theory. To describe this commitment, Kuhn
introduced the term paradigm. The paradigm is the framework within which a scientific com-
munity thinks and works on the structure of the theory with the help of the internal standards,
and progress is made when the puzzle is solved. This framework is analogous to Popper’s
theory-laden observation, but Kuhn calls this normal science.
The implication is that although measurements that fundamentally alter a set of present theories
could be made, they are observed within an already created framework of expectations and
biases that conform results and measurements to fit the already existing theories.This changes
when a so-called crisis leads to a transition to a new paradigm. A crisis emerges when new and
unexpected phenomena are repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories
have repeatedly been invented by scientists due to the failure of existing theories to solve the
problems defined by that theory. All crises close in one of three ways
• Normal science proves able to handle the problem which led to the crisis and the paradigm
remains in place.
• The problem resists, but it is perceived as resulting from the lack of necessary tools with
which to solve it, and so scientists set it aside for a future generation to solve.
• A new candidate for a paradigm emerges, and a battle over its acceptance ensues.
The important part of Kuhn’s view is that he regards paradigm shifts as non-rational. For
Kuhn, a change of paradigm is a scientific revolution
3
1 Philosophy of science
1.1 Truth
2 questions:
1. What does it mean for a claim to be true?
2. How do we determine that a claim is true?
The question ”what is truth” is abstract and complicated. Some say truth is based on previous
knowledge (like an evolution of truth), others think we cannot have a true knowledge of reality,
just a representation of it.
1.2 Epistemology: methods to ascertain truth
Epistemology is the study of the nature and the origin of knowledge.
The scientific method
1. Ask a question
2. Formulate a hypothesis
3. Design an experiment
4. Test the hypothesis
5. Analyze the results
6. Draw a conclusion
While this model does describe a frequently employed method in science, it’s misleading to
think of this as the actual scientific method.
In actual practice, scientists employ a variety of methods that involve a broad range of patterns
of reasoning, both inductive and deductive:
• Deductive reasoning • Inductive reasoning
1. Theory 1. Observation
2. Hypothesis 2. Pattern
3. Observation 3. Hypothesis
4. Confirmation 4. Theory
The support for a hypothesis is often a matter of inference-to-the-best-explanation rather than
inductive generalization.
1
,1.2.1 Rationalism and empiricism
• Rationalism: knowledge is based on ideas and propositions that can be known through
pure reason.
• Empiricism: all our knowledge is ultimately acquired through sense experience. 2
philosophers: John Locke and David Hume.
John Locke (1632-1704): The mind starts off as a ”tabula rasa”, a blank slate. We are born
knowing nothing and all of our ideas have their origin in experience.
David Hume (1711-1776): 2 forms of reasoning:
• A priori reasoning: reasoning independent of experience
• A posteriori reasoning: produce understanding of relations of ideas
With induction, the argument uses a pattern of observations (or experiences) to draw a conclu-
sion about what is generally the case. Induction is a type of reasoning where a person observes
something that has always happened in the past and then predicts that the future will behave
in the same way based on these observations. Hume had an issue with this (the problem of
induction): We formed this assumption that nature is uniform; that it’s unchanging; that it
possesses a kind of regularity
1.2.2 Logical positivism
The essence of logical positivism is the belief that all problems – including social problems –
can be solved by science.
The Vienna circle was a group of philosophers and scientists that were inspired by the success
of physics, but were concerned about the emergence of non-rational philosophies at the time.
According to the logical positivists, two characteristics of science are essential: Logical reasoning
and the substantiation of knowledge by means of empirical evidence. Hence, logical positivism
is also known as logical empiricism.
The standard view of science can be further expanded
van illustrated using the empirical cycle. Note that the
standard view seems to largely par up with the scien-
tific method. Facts are supposed to be independent of
theory and the personal views of the researcher. Em-
pirical laws can then be formulated on the basis of these
facts. Laws do not explain reality, but describe it. For
explanations, we need a theory. Predictions are often
thought to be symmetrical to explanation (in time).
Hypotheses about reality can be derived from the theory, and predictions can then be based
on the hypotheses. If predictions do not come true, and this cannot be attributed to incorrect
measurements or interpretations, the theory must be modified.
Articles are not direct reports of what the scientists have done to reach their conclusions. Rather,
they are a reconstruction of research that serves as a sort of ‘recipe’ for anyone who wants to
repeat the experiment in order to check it: ‘if you do A, B and C, you will obtain results X,
Y and Z’. A scientific article is therefore not a chronological but a logical reconstruction of a
scientific experiment.
2
, 1.3 Critique on the standard view of science
1.3.1 Karl Popper’s critique
Popper has the idea of refutation and confirmation stating that we should not derive general
statements from concrete cases, but the other way around.
Popper distinguishes a scientific theory from a non-
scientific one based on the criterion of falsification. If
whatever is precluded or forbidden is observed never-
theless, the theory is apparently refuted and must be
rejected. In the opposite case, the theory holds – for
the time being at least (corroboration). Being scientific,
according to Popper, means being testable.
According to popper, observation is not a passive
recording process but requires a theory from the
start.This is why Popper speaks of theory-laden obser-
vation.
1.3.2 Thomas Kuhn’s critique
Where Popper focused on philosophical and logical premises of science, Thomas Kuhn addressed
how science evolved based on historical material about scientific developments. In other words,
instead of a normative approach (as seen with empiricism), Kuhn performed a descriptive anal-
ysis of ‘truth-seeking’ in science. He argued that one cannot use empirical evidence to treat a
theory without committing oneself to that very theory. To describe this commitment, Kuhn
introduced the term paradigm. The paradigm is the framework within which a scientific com-
munity thinks and works on the structure of the theory with the help of the internal standards,
and progress is made when the puzzle is solved. This framework is analogous to Popper’s
theory-laden observation, but Kuhn calls this normal science.
The implication is that although measurements that fundamentally alter a set of present theories
could be made, they are observed within an already created framework of expectations and
biases that conform results and measurements to fit the already existing theories.This changes
when a so-called crisis leads to a transition to a new paradigm. A crisis emerges when new and
unexpected phenomena are repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical new theories
have repeatedly been invented by scientists due to the failure of existing theories to solve the
problems defined by that theory. All crises close in one of three ways
• Normal science proves able to handle the problem which led to the crisis and the paradigm
remains in place.
• The problem resists, but it is perceived as resulting from the lack of necessary tools with
which to solve it, and so scientists set it aside for a future generation to solve.
• A new candidate for a paradigm emerges, and a battle over its acceptance ensues.
The important part of Kuhn’s view is that he regards paradigm shifts as non-rational. For
Kuhn, a change of paradigm is a scientific revolution
3
