COALITION THEORY
Author: Riker (1962)
“As a result of proportional representation in consensus democracies, coalitions often form through
formal agreements between parties, wherein they provide and discuss manifestos and objectives for
government. Thus, for over half a century, political scientists have tried to develop a unified theory to
predict and explain which parties will coalesce. The earliest incarnation of this theory was presented
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) with their minimal-winning hypothesis, later modified by
Riker (1962) to apply specifically to government formation. It is my assertion that coalition theory,
which is inherently agency-based, cannot accurately predict coalition outcomes the majority of the
time. I intend to show that in addition to agency, structural factors affect the pre-government formation
bargaining environment. Originally, the assumption was that politicians were office-seeking and thus
would seek to maximize the spoils of office for their party. As such, the ‘gaining of the office is a fixed
prize to be divided among the members of the “winning coalition”’ (Riker, 1962). This approach lends
itself to the idea of minimal winning coalitions, wherein enough players are involved in government to
consider the coalition a majority but not anymore than is absolutely necessary. Axelrod (1984)
developed this theory to suggest that only parties connected on an ideological spectrum would
coalesce and hence form minimal connected winning coalitions. This was based on the theory that
politicians are interested in influencing policy just as much as they are interested in seeking power.”
Does coalition theory work?
o Germany: in the 2009 election, a minimal-connected winning coalition formed between
CDC/CSU and FDP
o Finland: in the 1995 election, a rainbow coalition (surplus majority government) was formed
including SDP, Kik, SFP, VAS, Vihr
o Denmark: in the 2007, 2011, 2015 election formed a minority government. In the most recent
one it was made up of just Venstre.
Reasons why:
1. Investiture vote – strict constitutional investiture rule (article 63) must win support absolute
majority of parliament members (GERMANY)
2. Anti-pacts – which are informal institutions explicitly stating which parties will not agree to
coalesce, played a role in coalition bargaining of 2005, 2013, left alliance wouldn’t go into
power with two largest parties (GERMANY)
3. Investiture vote and motion of no confidence – positive parliamentarianism, first used in 1995.
The need for majority support in parliament = more parties in coalition. A motion of no
confidence only requires relative majority, combination of strict investiture vote and easy
parliamentary dissolution (FINLAND)
4. Lack of power in opposition – as inability to influence policy from the opposition increases, so
does the willingness of parties to take part in government (Strom, 1990). Small policy seeking
parties (Green party) want to be in govt to influence (FINLAND)
5. Negative parliamentarianism – stems from formal institution of Constitution, lack of investiture
vote. Vote of no confidence only requires relative majority but a parliament wont face a vote
straight after formation as this defeats purpose of no investiture vote.
6. Party fractionalisation – Facts hard to remember for essay.
7. Strength in opposition – in 2007 election, the V and KF too into account the views of parties
outside government. Strong history of informally binding
legislative coalitions (forlig) (Pederson and Christiansen, 1. How can we explain the formation of
2008). Can also easily form standing committees in and minority governments?
out of government 2. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of coalition governments?
3. Are the votes of confidence useful
Impossible to understand coalition without a detailed knowledge of special mechanisms of government
features of the political system in question (Laver and Schofield). Game accountability?
theory is at best crude and impossible to create a one-size-fits-all theory 4. ‘Who gets what’ in coalition
governments?
encompassing all factors. Trade-off between specificity and applicability.
Author: Riker (1962)
“As a result of proportional representation in consensus democracies, coalitions often form through
formal agreements between parties, wherein they provide and discuss manifestos and objectives for
government. Thus, for over half a century, political scientists have tried to develop a unified theory to
predict and explain which parties will coalesce. The earliest incarnation of this theory was presented
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) with their minimal-winning hypothesis, later modified by
Riker (1962) to apply specifically to government formation. It is my assertion that coalition theory,
which is inherently agency-based, cannot accurately predict coalition outcomes the majority of the
time. I intend to show that in addition to agency, structural factors affect the pre-government formation
bargaining environment. Originally, the assumption was that politicians were office-seeking and thus
would seek to maximize the spoils of office for their party. As such, the ‘gaining of the office is a fixed
prize to be divided among the members of the “winning coalition”’ (Riker, 1962). This approach lends
itself to the idea of minimal winning coalitions, wherein enough players are involved in government to
consider the coalition a majority but not anymore than is absolutely necessary. Axelrod (1984)
developed this theory to suggest that only parties connected on an ideological spectrum would
coalesce and hence form minimal connected winning coalitions. This was based on the theory that
politicians are interested in influencing policy just as much as they are interested in seeking power.”
Does coalition theory work?
o Germany: in the 2009 election, a minimal-connected winning coalition formed between
CDC/CSU and FDP
o Finland: in the 1995 election, a rainbow coalition (surplus majority government) was formed
including SDP, Kik, SFP, VAS, Vihr
o Denmark: in the 2007, 2011, 2015 election formed a minority government. In the most recent
one it was made up of just Venstre.
Reasons why:
1. Investiture vote – strict constitutional investiture rule (article 63) must win support absolute
majority of parliament members (GERMANY)
2. Anti-pacts – which are informal institutions explicitly stating which parties will not agree to
coalesce, played a role in coalition bargaining of 2005, 2013, left alliance wouldn’t go into
power with two largest parties (GERMANY)
3. Investiture vote and motion of no confidence – positive parliamentarianism, first used in 1995.
The need for majority support in parliament = more parties in coalition. A motion of no
confidence only requires relative majority, combination of strict investiture vote and easy
parliamentary dissolution (FINLAND)
4. Lack of power in opposition – as inability to influence policy from the opposition increases, so
does the willingness of parties to take part in government (Strom, 1990). Small policy seeking
parties (Green party) want to be in govt to influence (FINLAND)
5. Negative parliamentarianism – stems from formal institution of Constitution, lack of investiture
vote. Vote of no confidence only requires relative majority but a parliament wont face a vote
straight after formation as this defeats purpose of no investiture vote.
6. Party fractionalisation – Facts hard to remember for essay.
7. Strength in opposition – in 2007 election, the V and KF too into account the views of parties
outside government. Strong history of informally binding
legislative coalitions (forlig) (Pederson and Christiansen, 1. How can we explain the formation of
2008). Can also easily form standing committees in and minority governments?
out of government 2. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of coalition governments?
3. Are the votes of confidence useful
Impossible to understand coalition without a detailed knowledge of special mechanisms of government
features of the political system in question (Laver and Schofield). Game accountability?
theory is at best crude and impossible to create a one-size-fits-all theory 4. ‘Who gets what’ in coalition
governments?
encompassing all factors. Trade-off between specificity and applicability.
