Nederlandse politiek en kwalitatieve methoden
Alle artikelen samengevat:
L1: Lijphart – Patterns of democracy (1-45)
L3: Krouwel – Party systems (249-269)
L4: Renders – De biografische methode (39-42)
L4: Roberts – Biographical Research (1-17)
L5: De Lange & Rooduijn – Een populistische tijdgeest in Nederland? (319-334)
L6: Van den Berg – Discourse-analyse (29-39)
L7: Krouwel & Koedam – NL: investiture behind closed doors (253-274)
L8: Van Hulst – Quite an experience using ethnography to study local governance (143-153)
L9: De Haan & Groenhart – Geven, nemen en keiharde voorwaarden (45-65)
L10: Leruth & Krouwel – Does the information source mater? Attitudes towards the EU (95-120)
L11: Beyens – The life and death of new political parties in the low countries (257-277)
L12: Mahoney – After KKV: the new methodology of qualitative research (120-147)
L1: Lijphart – Patterns of democracy (1-45)
Ten differences with regard to the most important democratic institutions and rules can be deduced
from the majoritarian and consensus principles. Previous research has largely confirmed these
expectations—with one major exception: the variables cluster in two clearly separate dimensions. The
five differences on the executives-parties dimension are as follows:
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing
in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative
balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and
“corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.
The five differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the following:
1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power
between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can
be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation
versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or
constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.
These scholars maintain that federalism has primary and secondary meanings. Its primary definition is:
a guaranteed division of power between the central government and regional governments. The
secondary characteristics are strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review.
Their argument is that the guarantee of a federal division of power can work well only if (1) both the
guarantee and the exact lines of the division of power are clearly stated in the constitution and this
guarantee cannot be changed unilaterally at either the central or regional level—hence the need for a
rigid constitution, (2) there is a neutral arbiter who can resolve conflicts concerning the division of
power between the two levels of government— hence the need for judicial review, and (3) there is a
federal chamber in the national legislature in which the regions have strong representation—hence the
need for strong bicameralism; moreover, (4) the main purpose of federalism is to promote and protect
a decentralized system of government. As stated earlier, this dimension is therefore called the federal-
unitary dimension.
The Westminister model
In UK/New Zealand/ Barbados:
1. Concentration of executive power in one-party and bare majority cabinets. The most powerful organ
of British government is the cabinet.
, 2. Cabinet dominance. The United Kingdom has a parliamentary system of government, which means
that the cabinet is dependent on the confidence of Parliament.
3. Two-party system. British politics is dominated by two large parties: the Conservative party and the
Labour party.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional system of elections. The House of Commons is a large legislative
body with a membership.
5. Interest group pluralism. By concentrating power in the hands of the majority, the Westminster
model of democracy sets up a government-versus-opposition pattern that is competitive and
adversarial.
6. Unitary and centralized government. The United Kingdom is a unitary and centralized state.
7. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature.
8. Constitutional flexibility. Britain has a constitution that is “unwritten” in the sense that there is not
one written document that specifies the composition and powers of the governmental institutions and
the rights of citizens.
9. Absence of judicial review. The other important implication of an unwritten constitution is the
absence of judicial review: there is no written constitutional document with the status of “higher law”
against which the courts can test the constitutionality of regular legislation.
10. A central bank controlled by the executive
The consensus model of democracy
In Zwitserland/Belgium:
1. Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets. In contrast to the Westminster model’s
tendency to concentrate executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets, the consensus
principle is to let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition.
2. Executive-legislative balance of power. The Swiss political system is neither parliamentary nor
presidential.
3. Multiparty system.
4. Proportional representation.
5. Interest group corporatism.
6. Federal and decentralized government.
7. Strong bicameralism
8. Constitutional rigidity.
9. Judicial review.
10. Central bank independence.
L3: Krouwel – Party systems (249-269)
Characteristic Elite caucus Mass party Catch-all, Cartel party Business-firm
s or cadre party electoralist
party
Period 1860-1950 1950-present 1950-present 1950-present 1990-present
Origin Parliamentary Extra Originates Fusion of Originates
origin parliamentary from mass parliamentary from the
origin parties, parties and the private
linking or state initiative of
merging apparatus political
themselves entrepeneurs
with interest
groups
Electoral Limited Appeal to Appeal to ‘regular ‘electoral
appeal and electore of specific broad middle clientele’ that market’ with a
social support upper social social, class, beyond provides high level of
strata via religious or core group of support in volatility.
personal ethnic group support exchange for Voters as
contacts on the basis of favourable consumers.
social policies
Alle artikelen samengevat:
L1: Lijphart – Patterns of democracy (1-45)
L3: Krouwel – Party systems (249-269)
L4: Renders – De biografische methode (39-42)
L4: Roberts – Biographical Research (1-17)
L5: De Lange & Rooduijn – Een populistische tijdgeest in Nederland? (319-334)
L6: Van den Berg – Discourse-analyse (29-39)
L7: Krouwel & Koedam – NL: investiture behind closed doors (253-274)
L8: Van Hulst – Quite an experience using ethnography to study local governance (143-153)
L9: De Haan & Groenhart – Geven, nemen en keiharde voorwaarden (45-65)
L10: Leruth & Krouwel – Does the information source mater? Attitudes towards the EU (95-120)
L11: Beyens – The life and death of new political parties in the low countries (257-277)
L12: Mahoney – After KKV: the new methodology of qualitative research (120-147)
L1: Lijphart – Patterns of democracy (1-45)
Ten differences with regard to the most important democratic institutions and rules can be deduced
from the majoritarian and consensus principles. Previous research has largely confirmed these
expectations—with one major exception: the variables cluster in two clearly separate dimensions. The
five differences on the executives-parties dimension are as follows:
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing
in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative
balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and
“corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.
The five differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the following:
1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power
between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can
be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation
versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or
constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.
These scholars maintain that federalism has primary and secondary meanings. Its primary definition is:
a guaranteed division of power between the central government and regional governments. The
secondary characteristics are strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review.
Their argument is that the guarantee of a federal division of power can work well only if (1) both the
guarantee and the exact lines of the division of power are clearly stated in the constitution and this
guarantee cannot be changed unilaterally at either the central or regional level—hence the need for a
rigid constitution, (2) there is a neutral arbiter who can resolve conflicts concerning the division of
power between the two levels of government— hence the need for judicial review, and (3) there is a
federal chamber in the national legislature in which the regions have strong representation—hence the
need for strong bicameralism; moreover, (4) the main purpose of federalism is to promote and protect
a decentralized system of government. As stated earlier, this dimension is therefore called the federal-
unitary dimension.
The Westminister model
In UK/New Zealand/ Barbados:
1. Concentration of executive power in one-party and bare majority cabinets. The most powerful organ
of British government is the cabinet.
, 2. Cabinet dominance. The United Kingdom has a parliamentary system of government, which means
that the cabinet is dependent on the confidence of Parliament.
3. Two-party system. British politics is dominated by two large parties: the Conservative party and the
Labour party.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional system of elections. The House of Commons is a large legislative
body with a membership.
5. Interest group pluralism. By concentrating power in the hands of the majority, the Westminster
model of democracy sets up a government-versus-opposition pattern that is competitive and
adversarial.
6. Unitary and centralized government. The United Kingdom is a unitary and centralized state.
7. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature.
8. Constitutional flexibility. Britain has a constitution that is “unwritten” in the sense that there is not
one written document that specifies the composition and powers of the governmental institutions and
the rights of citizens.
9. Absence of judicial review. The other important implication of an unwritten constitution is the
absence of judicial review: there is no written constitutional document with the status of “higher law”
against which the courts can test the constitutionality of regular legislation.
10. A central bank controlled by the executive
The consensus model of democracy
In Zwitserland/Belgium:
1. Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets. In contrast to the Westminster model’s
tendency to concentrate executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets, the consensus
principle is to let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition.
2. Executive-legislative balance of power. The Swiss political system is neither parliamentary nor
presidential.
3. Multiparty system.
4. Proportional representation.
5. Interest group corporatism.
6. Federal and decentralized government.
7. Strong bicameralism
8. Constitutional rigidity.
9. Judicial review.
10. Central bank independence.
L3: Krouwel – Party systems (249-269)
Characteristic Elite caucus Mass party Catch-all, Cartel party Business-firm
s or cadre party electoralist
party
Period 1860-1950 1950-present 1950-present 1950-present 1990-present
Origin Parliamentary Extra Originates Fusion of Originates
origin parliamentary from mass parliamentary from the
origin parties, parties and the private
linking or state initiative of
merging apparatus political
themselves entrepeneurs
with interest
groups
Electoral Limited Appeal to Appeal to ‘regular ‘electoral
appeal and electore of specific broad middle clientele’ that market’ with a
social support upper social social, class, beyond provides high level of
strata via religious or core group of support in volatility.
personal ethnic group support exchange for Voters as
contacts on the basis of favourable consumers.
social policies
