Meta-ethics is the field in philosophy which attempts to answer the question of ‘what goodness is’.
When answering this question, we should take into account two main aspects: the metaphysical
aspect of ‘what is the nature of goodness’, and the linguistic aspect of ‘what is the meaning of ethical
language’.
Moral realism is the metaphysical view that moral properties/facts do exist in reality as mind-
independent properties/fact.
The two moral realist views - moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism - are also cognitivist theories
regarding the linguist aspect of meta-ethics, i.e. they hold that ethical language expresses beliefs
about reality, which can therefore be true or false.
Throughout this essay I will show how an ethical non-naturalist, realist position answers the best the
metaphysical aspect of meta-ethical debate.
Moral Naturalism argues that the goodness is something real in the natural world - typically a natural
property, i.e. a trait or feature that a natural thing has (such as temperature). Its linguistic claim is that
ethical language is cognitive, s it functions no differently to expression of any other type of belief about
reality. For example, saying ‘the table is brown’ according to naturalism is no different from saying
‘stealing is bad’.
This view is held by Utilitarianism and Aristotle’s virtue ethics:
Bentham’s utilitarianism claims that goodness is pleasure. Pleasure is a natural property of natural
creatures.
Goodness for Aristotle meant living a good life, the good for human beings is Eudaimonia, which
means flourishing. And if his function argument is correct, then he has identify what makes humans
flourish - using their reason well. In that case, since human are natural beings and truths about us are
factual truths, goodness is a matter of fact, so a natural property.
This meta-ethical position is however argued to be illogical by the philosopher Moore.
He says that it is an open question, i.e. one where in principle there could be more than one answer,
whether ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ are the same things.
But, if goodness and pleasure were the same thing - as a naturalist position such as utilitarianism
claims - it would be a closed question to ask ‘is pleasure good?’.
In other words, he argues that if ‘goodness’ and ‘pleasure’ really were meaning the same thing, it
wouldn’t make sense to ask ‘is pleasure good?’ because it would be like asking ‘is pleasure
pleasure?’.
Therefore, we shall look at the other realist position, non-naturalism.
According to moral non-naturalism, moral judgements are beliefs that are intended to be true or false
(cognitivist position) and that moral properties exist (realist position) but are non-natural properties.
This view is held by Moore, who argued for ‘Intuitionism’.
He holds that when we observe or reflect on a moral citation, such as someone stealing, our intuition
gives us the proposition ‘stealing is wrong’ depending on the consequences. However, this isn’t
reducing morality to a matter of subjective feelings.
Just as all humans have no choice but to perceive the colour yellow when looking at a yellow thing,
Moore thinks that humans have no choice but to apprehend the truth or falsity of a moral proposition
when observing or reflecting on the relevant moral situation.
A major issue for naturalism is proposed by the argument about the ‘is-ought’ gap by Hume.
The philosopher claimed that philosophers talk about the way things are, and then jump with no
apparent justification to a claim about how things ought to be.
Hume argues that moral ‘ought’ statements (value judgements about what should be the case) are a
completely different kind of thing to a factual ‘is’ statement (factual claims about what is the case).
Statements are classified as either one or the other, they cannot be both at the same time.
Yet, moral realism claims that a moral property is the same as a natural property, which means that
the same proposition is an ‘is’ and an ‘ought’ statement, which is impossible.
When answering this question, we should take into account two main aspects: the metaphysical
aspect of ‘what is the nature of goodness’, and the linguistic aspect of ‘what is the meaning of ethical
language’.
Moral realism is the metaphysical view that moral properties/facts do exist in reality as mind-
independent properties/fact.
The two moral realist views - moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism - are also cognitivist theories
regarding the linguist aspect of meta-ethics, i.e. they hold that ethical language expresses beliefs
about reality, which can therefore be true or false.
Throughout this essay I will show how an ethical non-naturalist, realist position answers the best the
metaphysical aspect of meta-ethical debate.
Moral Naturalism argues that the goodness is something real in the natural world - typically a natural
property, i.e. a trait or feature that a natural thing has (such as temperature). Its linguistic claim is that
ethical language is cognitive, s it functions no differently to expression of any other type of belief about
reality. For example, saying ‘the table is brown’ according to naturalism is no different from saying
‘stealing is bad’.
This view is held by Utilitarianism and Aristotle’s virtue ethics:
Bentham’s utilitarianism claims that goodness is pleasure. Pleasure is a natural property of natural
creatures.
Goodness for Aristotle meant living a good life, the good for human beings is Eudaimonia, which
means flourishing. And if his function argument is correct, then he has identify what makes humans
flourish - using their reason well. In that case, since human are natural beings and truths about us are
factual truths, goodness is a matter of fact, so a natural property.
This meta-ethical position is however argued to be illogical by the philosopher Moore.
He says that it is an open question, i.e. one where in principle there could be more than one answer,
whether ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ are the same things.
But, if goodness and pleasure were the same thing - as a naturalist position such as utilitarianism
claims - it would be a closed question to ask ‘is pleasure good?’.
In other words, he argues that if ‘goodness’ and ‘pleasure’ really were meaning the same thing, it
wouldn’t make sense to ask ‘is pleasure good?’ because it would be like asking ‘is pleasure
pleasure?’.
Therefore, we shall look at the other realist position, non-naturalism.
According to moral non-naturalism, moral judgements are beliefs that are intended to be true or false
(cognitivist position) and that moral properties exist (realist position) but are non-natural properties.
This view is held by Moore, who argued for ‘Intuitionism’.
He holds that when we observe or reflect on a moral citation, such as someone stealing, our intuition
gives us the proposition ‘stealing is wrong’ depending on the consequences. However, this isn’t
reducing morality to a matter of subjective feelings.
Just as all humans have no choice but to perceive the colour yellow when looking at a yellow thing,
Moore thinks that humans have no choice but to apprehend the truth or falsity of a moral proposition
when observing or reflecting on the relevant moral situation.
A major issue for naturalism is proposed by the argument about the ‘is-ought’ gap by Hume.
The philosopher claimed that philosophers talk about the way things are, and then jump with no
apparent justification to a claim about how things ought to be.
Hume argues that moral ‘ought’ statements (value judgements about what should be the case) are a
completely different kind of thing to a factual ‘is’ statement (factual claims about what is the case).
Statements are classified as either one or the other, they cannot be both at the same time.
Yet, moral realism claims that a moral property is the same as a natural property, which means that
the same proposition is an ‘is’ and an ‘ought’ statement, which is impossible.
