B I O E T H I C S · E X A M P R E P A R AT I O N
Model Essay Answers
All 20 exam questions — essay format, grounded in course theories and principles
PA RT I — F O U N D AT I O N S
QUESTION 01
What is meant by an 'ethico-onto-epistemology'?
The term 'ethico-onto-epistemology' signals that three philosophical domains — ethics, ontology, and
epistemology — are deeply and inextricably entangled, such that they cannot be studied or practised in
isolation from one another. To appreciate why this matters, each component must first be understood on its
own terms.
Ontology concerns how the world is — it asks what entities, processes, and relationships make up reality.
Epistemology concerns how we know things — it investigates the nature, sources, and limits of scientific and
everyday knowledge. Ethics concerns what we should do — it reflects on the principles and values that
ought to guide action. Taken separately, these three disciplines already raise profound questions. But the
insight captured by the compound term is that none of these questions can be answered without implicitly
engaging the other two.
Consider the concept of 'disease'. From a purely ontological perspective, one might define disease as any
deviation from statistically normal physiology. But this definition already relies on an epistemological choice
— the decision to privilege measurable biomarkers over the subjective experience of a patient who feels ill
but falls within the normal range. And both the ontological definition and the epistemological approach carry
ethical consequences: if disease is purely statistical, then conditions experienced by minorities may be
classified as abnormal not because they are harmful but merely because they are rare, which has direct
ethical implications for resource allocation and medical intervention.
The philosopher-scientist Karen Barad coined the term 'ethico-onto-epistemology' to argue precisely this: the
way we conceptualise what exists, the methods we use to generate knowledge about it, and the values we
bring to that enterprise are not three separate stages but one continuous entangled practice. Thomas Kuhn's
notion of paradigm shifts illustrates this well: when a new scientific framework emerges, it does not merely
revise our knowledge but transforms what counts as a fact, what counts as a phenomenon worth studying,
and what obligations scientists have toward their objects of inquiry.
A counterargument might hold that conflating these three domains risks compromising the objectivity of
science: if ethical commitments bleed into epistemology, do we not risk motivated reasoning? This objection
has force. However, the concept of inductive risk — the acknowledgement that scientists must weigh
,consequences when deciding how to treat false positives and false negatives in drug trials — shows that
value-neutrality is itself a myth. The 'standpoint epistemology' developed by feminist philosophers makes the
same point: objectivity is best served by acknowledging one's position rather than pretending to have none.
In conclusion, an ethico-onto-epistemological approach is not a call to abandon rigour but to practise it
honestly. It invites scientists and ethicists alike to recognise that the questions they ask, the methods they
trust, and the ends they pursue are always already connected — and that good scholarship requires attending
to all three dimensions simultaneously.
QUESTION 02
What do Thomas Hobbes and Frans de Waal say about the origins of morality?
The question of where morality comes from is one of the oldest in philosophy, and two thinkers offer
strikingly different yet ultimately complementary accounts: Thomas Hobbes grounds morality in rational
self-interest, while Frans de Waal grounds it in evolutionary biology and the emotional lives of animals.
For Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, the starting point is a thought experiment: imagine the 'state
of nature', a condition in which there is no political authority. In this state, competition over scarce resources
makes life, as he famously put it, 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. Morality, on this account, is not
innate — it is a product of egoistic prudence: rational individuals, recognising that mutual destruction serves
no one's interests, contract with one another to abide by a shared set of norms. These norms are then
institutionalised in laws and enforced by the state. Morality, for Hobbes, is thus essentially a social
technology — a calculated solution to the collective action problem posed by competing individuals.
Frans de Waal, the primatologist, challenges this picture from an empirical angle. His extensive research on
primates demonstrates that behaviours we associate with morality, such as fairness, empathy, and altruism,
are present in non-human animals. In famous experiments, capuchin monkeys refused unequal rewards even
when accepting a lesser reward was in their individual interest. De Waal argues that moral sensibility has
deep evolutionary roots: it did not arise solely from rational calculation but from social emotions and
relational bonds that emerged over millions of years of evolution. Morality is not merely a contract but a
biological inheritance.
One might object that what De Waal observes is not 'morality' but merely adaptive social behaviour that
mimics moral reasoning without genuine normative judgment. Hobbes might agree: for him, true morality
requires reason and the capacity to enter contracts. De Waal, however, would respond that the distinction
between 'true' morality and its emotional precursors is less sharp than we assume — and that human morality
is built on, not separate from, these earlier evolutionary foundations. The role of religion, taboo, and abstract
principle in human moral life adds layers absent in other animals, but it does not erase the underlying
emotional architecture.
, In conclusion, Hobbes and De Waal offer complementary rather than mutually exclusive accounts. Hobbes
explains why individuals agree to moral norms — it is in their rational interest. De Waal explains why those
individuals are not purely self-interested to begin with — evolution has furnished them with empathy, a
sense of fairness, and social bonds. Together, they suggest that morality has both a rational and an emotional-
biological foundation, and that neither alone is sufficient to explain the full phenomenon.
PA RT I I — M O R A L T H E O R I E S
QUESTION 03
Key Concepts — Definitions
Utilitarianism Deontology
The view that the right action is the one that maximises Ethics grounded in duties and rights, holding that some
overall good (utility) for all affected parties. actions are right or wrong regardless of consequences.
Theory of Justice Virtue Ethics
Principles governing fair distribution of goods, burdens, Ethics centred on character: the cultivation of stable,
and opportunities within a society (Rawls, etc.). socially shaped dispositions (virtues) that enable a good
life.
Care Ethics Experience Machine
A relational approach that prioritises responsiveness to the Nozick's thought experiment showing hedonism is
needs and vulnerability of particular others over abstract incomplete: people prefer doing real things over merely
principles. experiencing simulated pleasure.
Preference Utilitarianism Act Utilitarianism
A form of utilitarianism (Singer) that defines utility as the Evaluate each individual act by whether it maximises
satisfaction of preferences rather than pleasure per se. utility. Flexible but can justify exceptions to common-
sense moral rules.
Rule Utilitarianism Hedonism
Act according to rules that, if generally followed, produce The view (Bentham) that pleasure is the only intrinsic
the greatest good. More stable and socially coherent. good and pain the only intrinsic evil.
Supererogatory Speciesism
An action that is morally praiseworthy but goes beyond Moral discrimination based solely on species membership,
what duty strictly requires (e.g. donating a kidney). analogous to racism or sexism (Peter Singer).
Categorical Imperative Hypothetical Imperative
Kant's unconditional moral law: (1) act only on maxims A conditional 'if-then' rule. Unlike the categorical
you could universalise; (2) treat humanity always as an imperative, it depends on contingent desires.
end, never merely as means.
Model Essay Answers
All 20 exam questions — essay format, grounded in course theories and principles
PA RT I — F O U N D AT I O N S
QUESTION 01
What is meant by an 'ethico-onto-epistemology'?
The term 'ethico-onto-epistemology' signals that three philosophical domains — ethics, ontology, and
epistemology — are deeply and inextricably entangled, such that they cannot be studied or practised in
isolation from one another. To appreciate why this matters, each component must first be understood on its
own terms.
Ontology concerns how the world is — it asks what entities, processes, and relationships make up reality.
Epistemology concerns how we know things — it investigates the nature, sources, and limits of scientific and
everyday knowledge. Ethics concerns what we should do — it reflects on the principles and values that
ought to guide action. Taken separately, these three disciplines already raise profound questions. But the
insight captured by the compound term is that none of these questions can be answered without implicitly
engaging the other two.
Consider the concept of 'disease'. From a purely ontological perspective, one might define disease as any
deviation from statistically normal physiology. But this definition already relies on an epistemological choice
— the decision to privilege measurable biomarkers over the subjective experience of a patient who feels ill
but falls within the normal range. And both the ontological definition and the epistemological approach carry
ethical consequences: if disease is purely statistical, then conditions experienced by minorities may be
classified as abnormal not because they are harmful but merely because they are rare, which has direct
ethical implications for resource allocation and medical intervention.
The philosopher-scientist Karen Barad coined the term 'ethico-onto-epistemology' to argue precisely this: the
way we conceptualise what exists, the methods we use to generate knowledge about it, and the values we
bring to that enterprise are not three separate stages but one continuous entangled practice. Thomas Kuhn's
notion of paradigm shifts illustrates this well: when a new scientific framework emerges, it does not merely
revise our knowledge but transforms what counts as a fact, what counts as a phenomenon worth studying,
and what obligations scientists have toward their objects of inquiry.
A counterargument might hold that conflating these three domains risks compromising the objectivity of
science: if ethical commitments bleed into epistemology, do we not risk motivated reasoning? This objection
has force. However, the concept of inductive risk — the acknowledgement that scientists must weigh
,consequences when deciding how to treat false positives and false negatives in drug trials — shows that
value-neutrality is itself a myth. The 'standpoint epistemology' developed by feminist philosophers makes the
same point: objectivity is best served by acknowledging one's position rather than pretending to have none.
In conclusion, an ethico-onto-epistemological approach is not a call to abandon rigour but to practise it
honestly. It invites scientists and ethicists alike to recognise that the questions they ask, the methods they
trust, and the ends they pursue are always already connected — and that good scholarship requires attending
to all three dimensions simultaneously.
QUESTION 02
What do Thomas Hobbes and Frans de Waal say about the origins of morality?
The question of where morality comes from is one of the oldest in philosophy, and two thinkers offer
strikingly different yet ultimately complementary accounts: Thomas Hobbes grounds morality in rational
self-interest, while Frans de Waal grounds it in evolutionary biology and the emotional lives of animals.
For Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, the starting point is a thought experiment: imagine the 'state
of nature', a condition in which there is no political authority. In this state, competition over scarce resources
makes life, as he famously put it, 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. Morality, on this account, is not
innate — it is a product of egoistic prudence: rational individuals, recognising that mutual destruction serves
no one's interests, contract with one another to abide by a shared set of norms. These norms are then
institutionalised in laws and enforced by the state. Morality, for Hobbes, is thus essentially a social
technology — a calculated solution to the collective action problem posed by competing individuals.
Frans de Waal, the primatologist, challenges this picture from an empirical angle. His extensive research on
primates demonstrates that behaviours we associate with morality, such as fairness, empathy, and altruism,
are present in non-human animals. In famous experiments, capuchin monkeys refused unequal rewards even
when accepting a lesser reward was in their individual interest. De Waal argues that moral sensibility has
deep evolutionary roots: it did not arise solely from rational calculation but from social emotions and
relational bonds that emerged over millions of years of evolution. Morality is not merely a contract but a
biological inheritance.
One might object that what De Waal observes is not 'morality' but merely adaptive social behaviour that
mimics moral reasoning without genuine normative judgment. Hobbes might agree: for him, true morality
requires reason and the capacity to enter contracts. De Waal, however, would respond that the distinction
between 'true' morality and its emotional precursors is less sharp than we assume — and that human morality
is built on, not separate from, these earlier evolutionary foundations. The role of religion, taboo, and abstract
principle in human moral life adds layers absent in other animals, but it does not erase the underlying
emotional architecture.
, In conclusion, Hobbes and De Waal offer complementary rather than mutually exclusive accounts. Hobbes
explains why individuals agree to moral norms — it is in their rational interest. De Waal explains why those
individuals are not purely self-interested to begin with — evolution has furnished them with empathy, a
sense of fairness, and social bonds. Together, they suggest that morality has both a rational and an emotional-
biological foundation, and that neither alone is sufficient to explain the full phenomenon.
PA RT I I — M O R A L T H E O R I E S
QUESTION 03
Key Concepts — Definitions
Utilitarianism Deontology
The view that the right action is the one that maximises Ethics grounded in duties and rights, holding that some
overall good (utility) for all affected parties. actions are right or wrong regardless of consequences.
Theory of Justice Virtue Ethics
Principles governing fair distribution of goods, burdens, Ethics centred on character: the cultivation of stable,
and opportunities within a society (Rawls, etc.). socially shaped dispositions (virtues) that enable a good
life.
Care Ethics Experience Machine
A relational approach that prioritises responsiveness to the Nozick's thought experiment showing hedonism is
needs and vulnerability of particular others over abstract incomplete: people prefer doing real things over merely
principles. experiencing simulated pleasure.
Preference Utilitarianism Act Utilitarianism
A form of utilitarianism (Singer) that defines utility as the Evaluate each individual act by whether it maximises
satisfaction of preferences rather than pleasure per se. utility. Flexible but can justify exceptions to common-
sense moral rules.
Rule Utilitarianism Hedonism
Act according to rules that, if generally followed, produce The view (Bentham) that pleasure is the only intrinsic
the greatest good. More stable and socially coherent. good and pain the only intrinsic evil.
Supererogatory Speciesism
An action that is morally praiseworthy but goes beyond Moral discrimination based solely on species membership,
what duty strictly requires (e.g. donating a kidney). analogous to racism or sexism (Peter Singer).
Categorical Imperative Hypothetical Imperative
Kant's unconditional moral law: (1) act only on maxims A conditional 'if-then' rule. Unlike the categorical
you could universalise; (2) treat humanity always as an imperative, it depends on contingent desires.
end, never merely as means.
