Response Operations & Defending Network
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Security | Latest 2026 Update with complete
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solutions.
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Task 2: Evaluating Incident Response Operations & Defending Network Security
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Information Systems Security - C845
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A. Evaluate the organization's response to ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.
the security incident.
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A1. Three Actions the Organization Took in Response to the
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Incident.
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1. Containment:Theaffectedmachine(10.1.1.45)wasisolatedfromthenetworkby ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.
disabling its network port at 10:07.
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2. Eradication &Recovery:Theendpoint wasrestored fromabackupat13:45, and ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.
antivirus (AV) scans were initiated on the HR subnet.
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3. Post-IncidentImprovement: Antivirusdefinitionswereupdatedacrossallendpointson ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.
the following day (06/25 at 08:30).
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A2. Evaluation of Effectiveness Using a Recognized
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Framework.
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Using the NIST SP800-61Rev. 2 (ComputerSecurityIncident Handling Guide)framework,the
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effectiveness of these actions is evaluated as follows:
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• Action 1 (Containment via Port Disable): Partially Effective. According to NIST,
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containment strategies should be chosen based on the potential for damage and the
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need to preserve evidence. Disabling the switch port was a fast and effective way to
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, immediatelystopongoingdataexfiltrationorcommand-and-control(C2)traffic,aligning ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.
with the goal of minimizing immediate impact. However, the IDS log shows lateral
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movement via SMB from the infected host (10.1.1.45 to 10.1.2.10) at 10:45, which
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occurred after the initial containment at 10:07. This indicates the containment was
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either not fully effective on the first attempt or that a second, compromised host
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existed. A more robust containment strategy is needed.
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• Action 2 (Restoration from Backup & Subnet AV Scan): Effective for Recovery,
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Inadequate for Eradication. NIST emphasizesthat eradication must ensurethe malicious
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content is completely removed. Restoring from a clean backup is a valid and effective
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recovery tactic. Initiating AV scans on the HR subnet is a good eradication step to find
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other potential infections. However, the procedure relies on "removing known threats,"
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which maynot catch polymorphic malware ornew variants. The focus onthe HR subnet,
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while logical, may have missed the lateral movement to the Finance subnet (10.1.2.10),
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as shown in the IDS log.
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• Action 3 (Organization-wide AV Update): Effective. This is a clear and effective post-
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incident activity that aligns with the NIST "Post-Incident Activity" phase. By updating
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definitionsacrossallendpoints,theorganizationimprovesitsdefensivepostureagainst a
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recurrence of the same threat, strengthening its preparedness for future incidents.
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