Article Review - The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows Is Wrong
The debates on the quality and the use of intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq (2002-2003) put the analysis of the failure and the search for its causes back at the heart
of the intelligence studies agenda. The book Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution
and the Iraq War published in 2011 by Robert Jervis is concrete evidence of that fact. Robert
Jervis, deceased in December 2021, was a professor of International Relations at Columbia
University. In his works, Robert Jervis has highlighted the important role of perceptions and
misperceptions in foreign policy decision-making. In Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian
Revolution and the Iraq War (2011), Robert Jervis continues the focus on the psychology and
politics of understanding international events but shifts his attention to the way information is
handled and analysis is produced within the intelligence community in the United States. The
chapter 3 of this book titled The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows Is Wrong
consists of a case study which is the result of the author's collaboration with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), offering a concise analysis on one of the biggest United States
intelligence failures devoted to the following theme: the erroneous assessment of Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program (WMD) by the intelligence community (IC).
Robert Jervis’s thesis is that the erroneous assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction program can be explained by the fact that although very plausible, the intelligence
community’s inferences drawn about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction were expressed with
too much assurance, failing therefore to consider other alternatives of Sadam Hussein’s behavior.
First and foremost, Robert Jervis begins his reflection by mentioning three points on which
conventional wisdom is indeed correct about the Iraq WMD intelligence failure. The first point
is that the inferences drawn about Iraq and WMD were expressed with too much certainty by the
analysts of IC. The second one is that because the inferences drawn about Sadam Hussein’s
behavior were expressed with too much certainty, no alternative explanations were considered
and proposed. Finally, the last point is that the IC suffered from insufficient imagination, few in
the IC having felt the need to go beyond the obvious proposition that Saddam Hussein was
developing active WMD programs. After having mentioned the three points on which
conventional wisdom is correct about the Iraq WMD intelligence failure, Robert Jervis
demonstrates that the most common explanations for explaining it are incorrect. The first
common but misleading explanation for the Iraq WMD intelligence failure is that the intelligence
on Iraq was developed by groupthink : the IC did not fall victim to groupthink since an
important deal of intelligence work dealing with Iraq was done by individuals working in an
isolated manner. The second one is that the decision-making process was marked by excessive
consensus : even though there was a general consensus on the fact that Sadam Hussein’s regime
was developing WMD programs, individuals and agencies were in reality willing to challenge or
disagree with each other on specific issues such as the ferocious interagency debate between the
CIA and other government entities such as the State’s Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research about the significance of aluminum tubes that Iraq had been importing. Finally, the last
common but misleading explanation for the Iraq WMD intelligence failure is that the IC bowed
to political pressure from the Bush administration and told the White House what it wanted to
hear : even though Robert Jervis does not deny that the Bush administration encouraged the
The debates on the quality and the use of intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq (2002-2003) put the analysis of the failure and the search for its causes back at the heart
of the intelligence studies agenda. The book Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution
and the Iraq War published in 2011 by Robert Jervis is concrete evidence of that fact. Robert
Jervis, deceased in December 2021, was a professor of International Relations at Columbia
University. In his works, Robert Jervis has highlighted the important role of perceptions and
misperceptions in foreign policy decision-making. In Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian
Revolution and the Iraq War (2011), Robert Jervis continues the focus on the psychology and
politics of understanding international events but shifts his attention to the way information is
handled and analysis is produced within the intelligence community in the United States. The
chapter 3 of this book titled The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows Is Wrong
consists of a case study which is the result of the author's collaboration with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), offering a concise analysis on one of the biggest United States
intelligence failures devoted to the following theme: the erroneous assessment of Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program (WMD) by the intelligence community (IC).
Robert Jervis’s thesis is that the erroneous assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction program can be explained by the fact that although very plausible, the intelligence
community’s inferences drawn about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction were expressed with
too much assurance, failing therefore to consider other alternatives of Sadam Hussein’s behavior.
First and foremost, Robert Jervis begins his reflection by mentioning three points on which
conventional wisdom is indeed correct about the Iraq WMD intelligence failure. The first point
is that the inferences drawn about Iraq and WMD were expressed with too much certainty by the
analysts of IC. The second one is that because the inferences drawn about Sadam Hussein’s
behavior were expressed with too much certainty, no alternative explanations were considered
and proposed. Finally, the last point is that the IC suffered from insufficient imagination, few in
the IC having felt the need to go beyond the obvious proposition that Saddam Hussein was
developing active WMD programs. After having mentioned the three points on which
conventional wisdom is correct about the Iraq WMD intelligence failure, Robert Jervis
demonstrates that the most common explanations for explaining it are incorrect. The first
common but misleading explanation for the Iraq WMD intelligence failure is that the intelligence
on Iraq was developed by groupthink : the IC did not fall victim to groupthink since an
important deal of intelligence work dealing with Iraq was done by individuals working in an
isolated manner. The second one is that the decision-making process was marked by excessive
consensus : even though there was a general consensus on the fact that Sadam Hussein’s regime
was developing WMD programs, individuals and agencies were in reality willing to challenge or
disagree with each other on specific issues such as the ferocious interagency debate between the
CIA and other government entities such as the State’s Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research about the significance of aluminum tubes that Iraq had been importing. Finally, the last
common but misleading explanation for the Iraq WMD intelligence failure is that the IC bowed
to political pressure from the Bush administration and told the White House what it wanted to
hear : even though Robert Jervis does not deny that the Bush administration encouraged the
