THE COLLAPSE OF WEIMAR DEMOCRACY
Gleichschaltung is the term used to describe the Nazi rise to dictatorial power; literally
translating to ‘bringing into line’ or ‘co-ordination,’ in order to co-ordinate as many aspects of
German life along Nazi lines.
LONG TERM CAUSES
• Lack of belief in the republic: the political culture of the republic was not shaped by the belief
in democracy, but by the authoritarian heritage of Wilhelmine Germany. Feuchwanger: ‘the
most pervasive cause of Weimar’s failure was that too many Germans did not regard is as
a legitimate regime’.
• Weimar’s inheritance: Weimar was founded in the aftermath of a catastrophic defeat; leaving a
detrimental economic state and political attacks from both the left and right wing.
• The ‘November Criminals’/‘the Stab in the back’ myth: propagated by right wing enemies.
• Ine ective leaders: many of Germany’s leaders were more concerned about restoring
Germany’s international reputation and lost territories rather than establishing a secure
democracy. Some were not even supporters of democracy.
• Loopholes in the constitution: despite being one of the most democratic in the world,
loopholes such as ‘article 48’ undermined democracy and ‘proportional representation’
contributed to political fragmentation.
• Economic di culties: it became commonplace to criticise the Republic for not being able to
return Germany to its pre-war levels of prosperity. This ultimately led to the assertion that:
‘under the Kaiser everything was better’; as proclaimed by many Germans.
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Republic had experienced a decade of blame and criticism over its economic record. The
crisis only worsened inexorably after the Wall Street Crash of October 1929:
• Unemployment: by February 1932, there were 6 million o cially unemployed (though the real
gure was nearer 8 million). By the Autumn of 1932, those unemployed and those working part
time totalled more than those in full time work. The majority of the unemployed were under 25.
• Wage cuts: in 1932, real wages fell on average by 1/3.
These factors contributed to psychological despair that many Germans had felt since WW1. There
was a sense that the depression might go on forever; apathy and despair predominated.
THE POLITICS OF INTRIGUE
Muller’s ‘Grand Coalition’ (1928-1930)
• The ‘Grand Coalition,’ also known as a ‘cabinet of personalities’, was composed of the SPD,
DDP, DVP, BVP and ZP.
• However, this coalition was so broad that it was destined to be plagued by the involved parties’
internal divisions, which it proved to be.
• On 27/03/1930, Muller resigned when Hindenburg made it clear that he would not back Muller’s
government with emergency powers (granted by article 48). This led to Muller nding it
impossible to nd an agreed basis on which to tackle the economic crisis. This resignation was
a turning point!
Heinrich Brüning’s chancellorship (1930-1932)
• Brunings actions further undermined democratic procedures. He was also in favour of the
formation of a majority right-wing government.
• However, the September elections shown gains for the KPD, as well as the electoral
breakthrough of the Nazi’s, who won 107 seats and left Bruning leading a minority government.
• Bruning continued in o ce after these elections, but became increasingly reliant on the use of
article 48 to govern by emergency decree. Between the years of 1930 and 1932, the Reichstag
passed 29 minor bills, in comparison to the 109 emergency decrees rati ed by the President.
• By Spring 1932, Von Schleicher had lost con dence in Bruning and used his in uence with
Hindenburg to dismiss him. Bruning resigned on 30/05/1932 and was to be replaced by Franz
Von Papen.
Von Schleicher and the Nazis
• By the middle of 1931, Schleicher was already considering how he might use the Nazis to
further his own ambition.
, • He had the view that the Nazis could be ‘tamed’ by being brought into government and had
already been in contact with Rohm, head of the SA. He told him that he seen the SA developing
closer links with the army.
• Around the same time, Bruning (who was the current chancellor), banned the SA. Schleicher's
intrigues went into overdrive:
- Integrate the SA into the army: he planned to do this by engineering the resignation of
Groener who hated these ambitions.
- ‘Gentleman agreement’: he met with Hitler several times to ensure that he would support a
new presidential government if Bruning was to fall.
- Encourage Papens placement as chancellor: by persuading Hindenburg that Bruning was
unable to prevent a drift into war.
Von Papen’s chancellorship (June-November 1932)
• Von Papen was Schleichers nominee for the new chancellor as Schleicher believed he could
easily control him. Papen’s government too, undermined democracy, as no one within his
cabinet had been elected nor were they politicians, therefore, his cabinet became known as the
‘cabinet of barons’.
• In return for Nazi support for his government, Papen lifted the ban on the SA and the SS.
• In the July federal elections, the NSDAP saw the greatest gains, securing 37.3% of the vote
and becoming the largest party in the Reichstag. The combined seats of both anti-Republican
parties (the NSDAP and the KPD), totalled as over 50% of the Reichstag, which e ectively
blocked the creation of any majority government which did not include them.
• In the August, Hitlers demand to be chancellor was rejected by Hindenburg. Hitler then refused
to take any other post in Papen’s cabinet, reneging on his ‘gentleman agreement’ with
Schleicher.
• The November elections seen the Nazi party to drop to 33%, whilst the KPD and DNVP votes
increased.
• On 17/11/1932, Papen resigned after trying to form a coalition government with the Nazis but
deemed Hitler’s demands unacceptable.
Von Schleicher’s chancellorship (1932-1933)
• Schleichers arrogance convinced him that it was now ‘his time’ to succeed chancellorship. He
believed that Hitler needed him more than he needed Hitler, and that Hitler’s ‘all or nothing’
strategy was unsustainable.
• Schleicher began to negotiate with Strasser in a covert attempt to split the NSDAP so that the
more socialist sector would join his sector, however, this failed, and Schleicher’s control was
diminishing:
- Strasser’s resignation: Hitler forced Strasser to resign on 08/12/1932, preventing any possible
NSDAP split.
- Schleichers o ence: Schleicher had o ended Hindenburg’s son, Oskar, which led to
Hindenburg listening to Papen more than he did Schleicher.
- Opposition from the Agrarian league: whom were in uential, turned Hindenburg against
Schleicher because of the latter’s refusal to protect their interests by raising tari s on food
imports.
- Papen’s revenge: Papen wanted revenge on Schleicher for forcing him out of chancellorship.
He began to meet with Hindenburg and Hitler in secret, proposing a Hitler-led government with
Papen vice-chancellor. He promised an apprehensive and reluctant Hindenburg that Hitler
could be controlled.
• This ultimately led to Hitler becoming chancellor on 30/01/1933. The Nazis did not know where
they were going, but they knew that they had arrived. Nevertheless, Hitler was still chained by
democracy, meaning he had not yet achieved full dictatorship; but this was most de nitely the
beginning of his ultimate venture.
Gleichschaltung is the term used to describe the Nazi rise to dictatorial power; literally
translating to ‘bringing into line’ or ‘co-ordination,’ in order to co-ordinate as many aspects of
German life along Nazi lines.
LONG TERM CAUSES
• Lack of belief in the republic: the political culture of the republic was not shaped by the belief
in democracy, but by the authoritarian heritage of Wilhelmine Germany. Feuchwanger: ‘the
most pervasive cause of Weimar’s failure was that too many Germans did not regard is as
a legitimate regime’.
• Weimar’s inheritance: Weimar was founded in the aftermath of a catastrophic defeat; leaving a
detrimental economic state and political attacks from both the left and right wing.
• The ‘November Criminals’/‘the Stab in the back’ myth: propagated by right wing enemies.
• Ine ective leaders: many of Germany’s leaders were more concerned about restoring
Germany’s international reputation and lost territories rather than establishing a secure
democracy. Some were not even supporters of democracy.
• Loopholes in the constitution: despite being one of the most democratic in the world,
loopholes such as ‘article 48’ undermined democracy and ‘proportional representation’
contributed to political fragmentation.
• Economic di culties: it became commonplace to criticise the Republic for not being able to
return Germany to its pre-war levels of prosperity. This ultimately led to the assertion that:
‘under the Kaiser everything was better’; as proclaimed by many Germans.
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Republic had experienced a decade of blame and criticism over its economic record. The
crisis only worsened inexorably after the Wall Street Crash of October 1929:
• Unemployment: by February 1932, there were 6 million o cially unemployed (though the real
gure was nearer 8 million). By the Autumn of 1932, those unemployed and those working part
time totalled more than those in full time work. The majority of the unemployed were under 25.
• Wage cuts: in 1932, real wages fell on average by 1/3.
These factors contributed to psychological despair that many Germans had felt since WW1. There
was a sense that the depression might go on forever; apathy and despair predominated.
THE POLITICS OF INTRIGUE
Muller’s ‘Grand Coalition’ (1928-1930)
• The ‘Grand Coalition,’ also known as a ‘cabinet of personalities’, was composed of the SPD,
DDP, DVP, BVP and ZP.
• However, this coalition was so broad that it was destined to be plagued by the involved parties’
internal divisions, which it proved to be.
• On 27/03/1930, Muller resigned when Hindenburg made it clear that he would not back Muller’s
government with emergency powers (granted by article 48). This led to Muller nding it
impossible to nd an agreed basis on which to tackle the economic crisis. This resignation was
a turning point!
Heinrich Brüning’s chancellorship (1930-1932)
• Brunings actions further undermined democratic procedures. He was also in favour of the
formation of a majority right-wing government.
• However, the September elections shown gains for the KPD, as well as the electoral
breakthrough of the Nazi’s, who won 107 seats and left Bruning leading a minority government.
• Bruning continued in o ce after these elections, but became increasingly reliant on the use of
article 48 to govern by emergency decree. Between the years of 1930 and 1932, the Reichstag
passed 29 minor bills, in comparison to the 109 emergency decrees rati ed by the President.
• By Spring 1932, Von Schleicher had lost con dence in Bruning and used his in uence with
Hindenburg to dismiss him. Bruning resigned on 30/05/1932 and was to be replaced by Franz
Von Papen.
Von Schleicher and the Nazis
• By the middle of 1931, Schleicher was already considering how he might use the Nazis to
further his own ambition.
, • He had the view that the Nazis could be ‘tamed’ by being brought into government and had
already been in contact with Rohm, head of the SA. He told him that he seen the SA developing
closer links with the army.
• Around the same time, Bruning (who was the current chancellor), banned the SA. Schleicher's
intrigues went into overdrive:
- Integrate the SA into the army: he planned to do this by engineering the resignation of
Groener who hated these ambitions.
- ‘Gentleman agreement’: he met with Hitler several times to ensure that he would support a
new presidential government if Bruning was to fall.
- Encourage Papens placement as chancellor: by persuading Hindenburg that Bruning was
unable to prevent a drift into war.
Von Papen’s chancellorship (June-November 1932)
• Von Papen was Schleichers nominee for the new chancellor as Schleicher believed he could
easily control him. Papen’s government too, undermined democracy, as no one within his
cabinet had been elected nor were they politicians, therefore, his cabinet became known as the
‘cabinet of barons’.
• In return for Nazi support for his government, Papen lifted the ban on the SA and the SS.
• In the July federal elections, the NSDAP saw the greatest gains, securing 37.3% of the vote
and becoming the largest party in the Reichstag. The combined seats of both anti-Republican
parties (the NSDAP and the KPD), totalled as over 50% of the Reichstag, which e ectively
blocked the creation of any majority government which did not include them.
• In the August, Hitlers demand to be chancellor was rejected by Hindenburg. Hitler then refused
to take any other post in Papen’s cabinet, reneging on his ‘gentleman agreement’ with
Schleicher.
• The November elections seen the Nazi party to drop to 33%, whilst the KPD and DNVP votes
increased.
• On 17/11/1932, Papen resigned after trying to form a coalition government with the Nazis but
deemed Hitler’s demands unacceptable.
Von Schleicher’s chancellorship (1932-1933)
• Schleichers arrogance convinced him that it was now ‘his time’ to succeed chancellorship. He
believed that Hitler needed him more than he needed Hitler, and that Hitler’s ‘all or nothing’
strategy was unsustainable.
• Schleicher began to negotiate with Strasser in a covert attempt to split the NSDAP so that the
more socialist sector would join his sector, however, this failed, and Schleicher’s control was
diminishing:
- Strasser’s resignation: Hitler forced Strasser to resign on 08/12/1932, preventing any possible
NSDAP split.
- Schleichers o ence: Schleicher had o ended Hindenburg’s son, Oskar, which led to
Hindenburg listening to Papen more than he did Schleicher.
- Opposition from the Agrarian league: whom were in uential, turned Hindenburg against
Schleicher because of the latter’s refusal to protect their interests by raising tari s on food
imports.
- Papen’s revenge: Papen wanted revenge on Schleicher for forcing him out of chancellorship.
He began to meet with Hindenburg and Hitler in secret, proposing a Hitler-led government with
Papen vice-chancellor. He promised an apprehensive and reluctant Hindenburg that Hitler
could be controlled.
• This ultimately led to Hitler becoming chancellor on 30/01/1933. The Nazis did not know where
they were going, but they knew that they had arrived. Nevertheless, Hitler was still chained by
democracy, meaning he had not yet achieved full dictatorship; but this was most de nitely the
beginning of his ultimate venture.
