Week 1: The history of European integration
Lecture: The European Union in historical perspective: cooperation and
integration in the twentieth century
What is European integration?
Integration is the pooling of resources (sovereignty) in specific policy
areas. Historical examples include the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth
century and the German Zollverein in 1834. There is also a new functional
integration (Mitrany, 1943): cooperation in various important areas, such
as economics. Regional national integration has deep historical roots, but
its "starting point" is May 9, 1950. The Schuman Declaration proposed
pooling French and German coal and steel production and had three main
objectives: peace, reconciliation, and solidarity between France and
Germany, making war impossible, and raising the standard of living—the
beneficiaries of which were the factory workers.
What does this tell us?
European integration did not take place in a historical vacuum, but against
the backdrop of new social agendas (the economy was not abandoned to
its fate, but received support from governments) and the global context:
the rise and fall of European, but also American power (IMF, World Bank,
etc.), the rise of other powers (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Africa, etc.).
Global context: colonial history
“With increased resources, Europe will be able to fulfill one of its essential
tasks, namely the development of the African continent.” (Schuman, May
9, 1950)
The 1920s and 1930s: ‘Age of Frustration’ versus ‘Age of Experimentation’
The legacy of the First World War was twenty million dead; the Spanish flu
claimed many more; but: "a war to end all wars"? Thus, frustration
became central to the 1920s and 1930s: "The year 1933 [Hitler's rise to
power, the collapse of the League of Nations] ended in a phase of dismay
and anxiety. It was like that chilly silence, that wordless period of
suspense, which sometimes precedes the outbreak of a storm" (Wells, The
Shape of Things to Come, 1933). But it also ushered in an era of
experimentation, with new political priorities. Keynes, among others,
associated peace with prosperity and state responsibility, warning that
poverty and social chaos could drive "other temperaments to nervous
instability, hysteria, and frenzied despair." It would put an end to
unregulated global capitalism. He worried about the Treaty of Versailles,
which he saw as a threat to Europe's economic recovery; It failed to
anticipate Europe's recovery and entailed a vicious cycle of debt and
reparations: the United States lent money to Germany, which used it to
pay reparations to France and Great Britain, which used it to repay their
debts to the United States—with the United States acting as a "pivot"
because it was connected to the financial chaos in Europe. When the
French occupied the Ruhr because Germany could not pay its reparations,
the United States launched the Dawes Plan (1924), which helped establish
more friendly relations between France and Germany, but also helped
,define Europe as an "economic space." There was a basis for initiatives
and cooperation, for example, the Economic and Financial Organization
(EFO) of the League of Nations in Geneva, which served as a hub for
financial experts. But also: Loucheur (customs union), Stoppani, and
Coudenhove-Kalergi with his Paneuropa (1923); He advocated the need to
abandon the Kleinstaaterei (small statehood), which could not withstand
the rise of larger powers in the world. In the 1920s, the economic situation
in Europe improved, for example, due to the return of the gold standard;
Franco-German reconciliation took place (Germany's accession to the
League of Nations, 1926; the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 1928); 1929-1930: the
Briand Plan for a European federation. However, the stock market crash
led to the Great Depression. This had two consequences: the Young Plan
(1929, lending more money to Germany; German debts were
commercialized) was torpedoed, and countries pursued protectionist
policies. But it also brought about a "quantum leap" in state
interventionism (Patel), for example, the rise of fascism and National
Socialism, and government-designed programs and organizations, such as
the New Deal (Roosevelt, 1933); its purpose was to protect domestic
social and economic stability. Several attempts were made to ensure
social and economic stability by concluding agreements on international
trade, for example the Oslo Agreement (1930; fixing tariffs between
countries), the Ouchy Agreement (1932; lowering tariffs between a
smaller group of countries) and the World Economic Conference (1933;
abolishing tariffs between countries, but failed because the United States
torpedoed it by abandoning the gold standard, resulting in increased
nationalism. A response was the Stoppani Plan (1936), which stabilized
European currencies, hoping to prevent another war and improve
international trade – also supported by Paul van Zeeland, who traveled the
world between 1937 and 1938; by 1939 there was still no movement. The
legacy of the 1920s and 1930s was policymakers as ‘bearers of
continuity’, especially the financial expert in Geneva at the League of
Nations, or those acting on behalf of their national governments
(Hirschfeld, of Zeeland), and the policy preference for economic
multilateralism and social stability.
Europe in exile: divergent blueprints for an international order
There were several plans for the exiles' postwar planning, for example,
the Polish-Czechoslovak Federation (November 1940), Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg with financial and economic cooperation
(from spring 1941), Greece and Yugoslavia with their federation of Eastern
European countries (1942), and—first of all—Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Norway with a regional security pact (1942-1943). This created a
"miniature Europe" with functional European integration. The Russians
and Americans entered the war in 1941, which changed the dynamics
within Europe—for example, the weakened diplomatic position of the
Poles, because the Americans—who held considerable influence in
Western Europe—were fiercely opposed to Russia and its neighboring
countries. The American postwar goals were a free and open global
economy, for example, Lend-Lease (a US law that allowed the United
,States to provide material support to countries at war with Nazi Germany
without violating its own neutrality) and the Atlantic Charter. Retinger
wanted a diplomatic initiative for the unification of the European exiles;
Van Zeeland's findings (1942) focused primarily on economic cooperation,
resulting in the IMF, conceived by Bretton Woods (1944). However, there
was no real influence, and people were skeptical about the global
economy. A more appropriate approach was to protect Europe, rather
than expose itself again; this would become known as the United Nations
(1945).
Rise of preference for functional economic integration
There were ambitious goals for social and economic stability, such as the
welfare state and Western multilateralism; the social agendas of the
1920s and 1930s became important drivers of European integration after
1945. There was also a "productivity policy" to achieve prosperity and
economic recovery; for this, Europe needed America and its dollars.
Through the Marshall Plan, the Brenton Woods (OEEC) plan was applied
regionally through gradual trade liberalization and currency convertibility;
early European integration was driven by monetary cooperation.
Van Zon et al., The Unfinished History of European Integration
This overview article describes the many paths that led to European
cooperation between 1919 and 1958, emphasizing the role of the
economic crisis, the Cold War, and the German question.
The League of Nations, founded at the initiative of US President Woodrow
Wilson after World War I, served as the first institutionalized global peace
organization, and its Secretariat served as an important blueprint for later
organizations, such as the UN. This manifested itself in the following ways:
1. Pan-Europa (1923): Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi
advocated political and economic unification to counter European
decline and create a large economic entity (including Eurafrica);
2. American financial influence: Although the US was politically
isolationist, it was financially involved through the Dawes Plan
(1924) and the Young Plan (1929) to restructure German
reparations and stabilize the European economy;
3. Briand Memorandum (1930): this plan by the French minister
Aristide Briand for European cooperation within the League of
Nations, inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi, failed due to the death of
his German counterpart Gustav Stresemann and the rise of the
Great Depression;
4. Economic crisis: The Great Depression led to economic nationalism
and protectionism (tariff barriers). Although the Ouchy Convention
(1932) between the Benelux and Scandinavian countries was a step
toward tariff reduction, it failed due to British resistance. The lesson
was that new international economic governance was needed to
ensure domestic stability.
, The Cold War and the German question (how to ensure West Germany's
economic recovery without risking a resurgence of dominance) acted as
catalysts. This manifested itself in the following ways:
1. Marshall Plan (1947): Under US leadership (via George C. Marshall),
the European Recovery Program (ERP) was launched, which
demanded European economic integration as a condition for aid;
2. OEEC and EPU: The Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to manage Marshall
Plan funds. The OEEC was an intergovernmental organization. Its
work led to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which
made currencies convertible, economically reintegrated West
Germany, and facilitated the transition to the global Bretton Woods
system.
3. Federalism versus intergovernmentalism: After the war, the ideals of
federalism (complete transfer of sovereignty, promoted by figures
like Altiero Spinelli) and intergovernmentalism (states retaining
sovereignty) emerged. The Congress of Europe (The Hague, 1948),
organized by the European Movement (with Winston Churchill as a
keynote speaker), led to the creation of the Council of Europe
(1949), which, due to British resistance, remained
intergovernmental and did not acquire supranational powers.
4. Functionalist route: Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman chose the
functionalist route (sectoral integration) to enable supranational
integration. The Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, proposed
placing coal and steel production under a supranational High
Authority, with the primary goal of Franco-German reconciliation
and the material imposition of war. The Treaty of Paris (1951)
formalized the ECSC. The ECSC was the most supranational of the
early Communities.
However, several failures were also evident, including the plans for a
European Defense Community (EDC) (the Pleven Plan, 1950) and a related
European Political Community (EPC). These failed when the French
parliament rejected the EDC in 1954. After the EDC crisis, the focus
shifted to economic integration. The Dutch Beyen Plan (1952) advocated
for a customs union with supranational decision-making, which formed the
basis for the "relaunch." The gradual reduction of trade barriers (negative
integration) was to be accompanied by positive integration (policies to
compensate for social impacts, such as a European Investment Fund) to
protect the post-war welfare states. The Treaties of Rome (March 1957)
established the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom,
aimed at the gradual establishment of a common market (customs union).
The EEC had a less supranational character than the ECSC, as the Council
of Ministers (intergovernmental) assumed a more central role in decision-
making. The United Kingdom remained aloof from supranational projects
and launched an alternative: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
in 1960.
Segers, The Genealogy of Western Europe
Lecture: The European Union in historical perspective: cooperation and
integration in the twentieth century
What is European integration?
Integration is the pooling of resources (sovereignty) in specific policy
areas. Historical examples include the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth
century and the German Zollverein in 1834. There is also a new functional
integration (Mitrany, 1943): cooperation in various important areas, such
as economics. Regional national integration has deep historical roots, but
its "starting point" is May 9, 1950. The Schuman Declaration proposed
pooling French and German coal and steel production and had three main
objectives: peace, reconciliation, and solidarity between France and
Germany, making war impossible, and raising the standard of living—the
beneficiaries of which were the factory workers.
What does this tell us?
European integration did not take place in a historical vacuum, but against
the backdrop of new social agendas (the economy was not abandoned to
its fate, but received support from governments) and the global context:
the rise and fall of European, but also American power (IMF, World Bank,
etc.), the rise of other powers (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Africa, etc.).
Global context: colonial history
“With increased resources, Europe will be able to fulfill one of its essential
tasks, namely the development of the African continent.” (Schuman, May
9, 1950)
The 1920s and 1930s: ‘Age of Frustration’ versus ‘Age of Experimentation’
The legacy of the First World War was twenty million dead; the Spanish flu
claimed many more; but: "a war to end all wars"? Thus, frustration
became central to the 1920s and 1930s: "The year 1933 [Hitler's rise to
power, the collapse of the League of Nations] ended in a phase of dismay
and anxiety. It was like that chilly silence, that wordless period of
suspense, which sometimes precedes the outbreak of a storm" (Wells, The
Shape of Things to Come, 1933). But it also ushered in an era of
experimentation, with new political priorities. Keynes, among others,
associated peace with prosperity and state responsibility, warning that
poverty and social chaos could drive "other temperaments to nervous
instability, hysteria, and frenzied despair." It would put an end to
unregulated global capitalism. He worried about the Treaty of Versailles,
which he saw as a threat to Europe's economic recovery; It failed to
anticipate Europe's recovery and entailed a vicious cycle of debt and
reparations: the United States lent money to Germany, which used it to
pay reparations to France and Great Britain, which used it to repay their
debts to the United States—with the United States acting as a "pivot"
because it was connected to the financial chaos in Europe. When the
French occupied the Ruhr because Germany could not pay its reparations,
the United States launched the Dawes Plan (1924), which helped establish
more friendly relations between France and Germany, but also helped
,define Europe as an "economic space." There was a basis for initiatives
and cooperation, for example, the Economic and Financial Organization
(EFO) of the League of Nations in Geneva, which served as a hub for
financial experts. But also: Loucheur (customs union), Stoppani, and
Coudenhove-Kalergi with his Paneuropa (1923); He advocated the need to
abandon the Kleinstaaterei (small statehood), which could not withstand
the rise of larger powers in the world. In the 1920s, the economic situation
in Europe improved, for example, due to the return of the gold standard;
Franco-German reconciliation took place (Germany's accession to the
League of Nations, 1926; the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 1928); 1929-1930: the
Briand Plan for a European federation. However, the stock market crash
led to the Great Depression. This had two consequences: the Young Plan
(1929, lending more money to Germany; German debts were
commercialized) was torpedoed, and countries pursued protectionist
policies. But it also brought about a "quantum leap" in state
interventionism (Patel), for example, the rise of fascism and National
Socialism, and government-designed programs and organizations, such as
the New Deal (Roosevelt, 1933); its purpose was to protect domestic
social and economic stability. Several attempts were made to ensure
social and economic stability by concluding agreements on international
trade, for example the Oslo Agreement (1930; fixing tariffs between
countries), the Ouchy Agreement (1932; lowering tariffs between a
smaller group of countries) and the World Economic Conference (1933;
abolishing tariffs between countries, but failed because the United States
torpedoed it by abandoning the gold standard, resulting in increased
nationalism. A response was the Stoppani Plan (1936), which stabilized
European currencies, hoping to prevent another war and improve
international trade – also supported by Paul van Zeeland, who traveled the
world between 1937 and 1938; by 1939 there was still no movement. The
legacy of the 1920s and 1930s was policymakers as ‘bearers of
continuity’, especially the financial expert in Geneva at the League of
Nations, or those acting on behalf of their national governments
(Hirschfeld, of Zeeland), and the policy preference for economic
multilateralism and social stability.
Europe in exile: divergent blueprints for an international order
There were several plans for the exiles' postwar planning, for example,
the Polish-Czechoslovak Federation (November 1940), Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg with financial and economic cooperation
(from spring 1941), Greece and Yugoslavia with their federation of Eastern
European countries (1942), and—first of all—Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Norway with a regional security pact (1942-1943). This created a
"miniature Europe" with functional European integration. The Russians
and Americans entered the war in 1941, which changed the dynamics
within Europe—for example, the weakened diplomatic position of the
Poles, because the Americans—who held considerable influence in
Western Europe—were fiercely opposed to Russia and its neighboring
countries. The American postwar goals were a free and open global
economy, for example, Lend-Lease (a US law that allowed the United
,States to provide material support to countries at war with Nazi Germany
without violating its own neutrality) and the Atlantic Charter. Retinger
wanted a diplomatic initiative for the unification of the European exiles;
Van Zeeland's findings (1942) focused primarily on economic cooperation,
resulting in the IMF, conceived by Bretton Woods (1944). However, there
was no real influence, and people were skeptical about the global
economy. A more appropriate approach was to protect Europe, rather
than expose itself again; this would become known as the United Nations
(1945).
Rise of preference for functional economic integration
There were ambitious goals for social and economic stability, such as the
welfare state and Western multilateralism; the social agendas of the
1920s and 1930s became important drivers of European integration after
1945. There was also a "productivity policy" to achieve prosperity and
economic recovery; for this, Europe needed America and its dollars.
Through the Marshall Plan, the Brenton Woods (OEEC) plan was applied
regionally through gradual trade liberalization and currency convertibility;
early European integration was driven by monetary cooperation.
Van Zon et al., The Unfinished History of European Integration
This overview article describes the many paths that led to European
cooperation between 1919 and 1958, emphasizing the role of the
economic crisis, the Cold War, and the German question.
The League of Nations, founded at the initiative of US President Woodrow
Wilson after World War I, served as the first institutionalized global peace
organization, and its Secretariat served as an important blueprint for later
organizations, such as the UN. This manifested itself in the following ways:
1. Pan-Europa (1923): Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi
advocated political and economic unification to counter European
decline and create a large economic entity (including Eurafrica);
2. American financial influence: Although the US was politically
isolationist, it was financially involved through the Dawes Plan
(1924) and the Young Plan (1929) to restructure German
reparations and stabilize the European economy;
3. Briand Memorandum (1930): this plan by the French minister
Aristide Briand for European cooperation within the League of
Nations, inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi, failed due to the death of
his German counterpart Gustav Stresemann and the rise of the
Great Depression;
4. Economic crisis: The Great Depression led to economic nationalism
and protectionism (tariff barriers). Although the Ouchy Convention
(1932) between the Benelux and Scandinavian countries was a step
toward tariff reduction, it failed due to British resistance. The lesson
was that new international economic governance was needed to
ensure domestic stability.
, The Cold War and the German question (how to ensure West Germany's
economic recovery without risking a resurgence of dominance) acted as
catalysts. This manifested itself in the following ways:
1. Marshall Plan (1947): Under US leadership (via George C. Marshall),
the European Recovery Program (ERP) was launched, which
demanded European economic integration as a condition for aid;
2. OEEC and EPU: The Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to manage Marshall
Plan funds. The OEEC was an intergovernmental organization. Its
work led to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which
made currencies convertible, economically reintegrated West
Germany, and facilitated the transition to the global Bretton Woods
system.
3. Federalism versus intergovernmentalism: After the war, the ideals of
federalism (complete transfer of sovereignty, promoted by figures
like Altiero Spinelli) and intergovernmentalism (states retaining
sovereignty) emerged. The Congress of Europe (The Hague, 1948),
organized by the European Movement (with Winston Churchill as a
keynote speaker), led to the creation of the Council of Europe
(1949), which, due to British resistance, remained
intergovernmental and did not acquire supranational powers.
4. Functionalist route: Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman chose the
functionalist route (sectoral integration) to enable supranational
integration. The Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, proposed
placing coal and steel production under a supranational High
Authority, with the primary goal of Franco-German reconciliation
and the material imposition of war. The Treaty of Paris (1951)
formalized the ECSC. The ECSC was the most supranational of the
early Communities.
However, several failures were also evident, including the plans for a
European Defense Community (EDC) (the Pleven Plan, 1950) and a related
European Political Community (EPC). These failed when the French
parliament rejected the EDC in 1954. After the EDC crisis, the focus
shifted to economic integration. The Dutch Beyen Plan (1952) advocated
for a customs union with supranational decision-making, which formed the
basis for the "relaunch." The gradual reduction of trade barriers (negative
integration) was to be accompanied by positive integration (policies to
compensate for social impacts, such as a European Investment Fund) to
protect the post-war welfare states. The Treaties of Rome (March 1957)
established the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom,
aimed at the gradual establishment of a common market (customs union).
The EEC had a less supranational character than the ECSC, as the Council
of Ministers (intergovernmental) assumed a more central role in decision-
making. The United Kingdom remained aloof from supranational projects
and launched an alternative: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
in 1960.
Segers, The Genealogy of Western Europe
