H1 – What is theory
Planning acts in the interests of capital but needs to do so in ways that seem balanced, open
and fair. Theory provides a means by which planners can publicly justify their actions and
mask their true role. Truth and theory are socially produced.
The nature of theory
Giddens argues there will never be any universal laws in social science because of
difficulties with empirical testing and validation. The social sciences can never fully divorce
themselves from the subject that is being studied. If you observe classes, that itself is a
political position.
One of the main problems with falsification (as with logical positivism) is observation; they
are open to perspective. Science will never abandon a theory unless there is a better one to
replace it. So, falsification is not enough.
Kuhn: Different paradigms will have very different worldviews, often making them
incomparable.
Barnes and Bloor (1982), for example, claim that scientists always accept theories partly
because of factors other than purely scientific ones. They identify what they term a ‘strong
programme’ that, rather like Kuhn’s paradigm, dominates thinking, methodology,
interpretation and results.
Latour, Callon and Law initiated what is known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as an
approach to understanding the relations between science and society. It emphasizes and
explores the reliance and co-dependence of science and society. Science is thoroughly
political, it rejects the distinction between nature and society. Latour challenged this
understanding, seeing knowledge not as an object but as embedded in sets of social
relations.
ANT raises fundamental question of who decides what counts as knowledge in planning.
Rather than knowledge in the singular, planning is replete with multiple knowledges
representing multiple realities. There is no resource to facts to reveal an objective truth.
Instead one needs to ask why some knowledge is privileged over others and who decides
what counts as knowledge.
Unpacking theory
Theory as a discourse
,In Lyotard’s relativistic view, science has no more claim to objective knowledge than what
he terms narratives. Instead, science is itself based on higher-level narratives or meta-
narratives that involve values and assumptions.
The concept of discourse is difficult to pin down, but van Dijk distinguishes three main
dimensions: discourse as language use, as the communication of beliefs (cognition) and
interaction in social situations.
We can see that there are two major inputs into theory: normative elements (societal and
individual) and discursive elements, both of which are influenced by power.
Theory, structure and agency
In planning theory, the relationship between structure (society) and agency (individuals) is
equally important for a number of reasons. First, the use of theory by planners may be
limited by the influences of structures. Second, some theories ignore this relationship,
particularly theories in planning (i.e. how to go about planning) and thereby limit their
usefulness.
Two broad approaches to this relationship:
Structuralism is often associated with marxism and emphasizes the role of structure in
dictating and shaping actions and events. It has been criticized for ignoring the role and
influence of actors and portraying them as automatons. An alternative approach, termed
intentionalism, takes the extreme in focusing on individual action and the micro policies of
interaction and underpins approaches such as Public Choice Theory.
Giddens’ structuration replaces this dualism with duality. It attempts to switch attention to
the interrelationship between structure and agency. People make structures and structures
influence people. While Giddens, Bhaskar and Jessop all place different emphases on the
fusion of structure and agency, the general conclusions we can draw from their work is of
action producing:
1. Direct effects upon structural contexts within which it takes place and within which
future action occurs, producing a partial transformation on the structural context
2. Strategic learning on the part of actors involved, enhancing awareness of structures
and the constraints/opportunities they impose, providing the basis from which
subsequent strategy might be formulated.
The theory-practice gap
Academics argue that they think up new theories for planners to use and to justify planning
which are ignored by practitioners. Practitioners on the other hand claim that academic
theory has no bearing or meaning for practice that is based on common sense.
The relationship between planners, their professional body and the state ensures that
planners are not ‘free agents’ able to objectively investigate, explore or challenge existing
discourse or theories.
,H2 – The Current Landscape of Planning Theory
For Chadwick, planning practice was underpinned by a ‘unified planning theory’. In the past
30 years or so, such confidence and arrogance has been replaced by uncertainty and
introspection. This situation has come about for two reasons. The first is the perceived
failure of such technocratic approaches to address the problems that planners and others
were attempting to tackle. The second reason is less specific and relates to broad changes
in understanding and theory that have been ongoing in the past three decades; Kuhn’s
paradigms, relativist views of Feyerabend, rejection of meta-narratives and overarching
theories by Lyotard and the role of power and discourse in the formation, interpretation and
application of theory.
Positivism sought to systemize human life based on real (positive) as opposed to imagined
knowledge; empirical or mathematical observations. In planning the high point of positivism
was to be found in the systems and rational approaches of the 1960s. Values were
downplayed to provide the objectives. The ability to separate facts from values was itself a
problem with positivism. Post-positivism emphasizes:
● A rejection of positivist understandings and methodologies and embraces instead
approaches that contextualize theories and disciplines in larger social and historical
contexts.
● Normative criteria for deciding between competing theories.
● The ubiquity of variance in explanations and theories.
● An understanding of individuals as self-interpreting, autonomous subjects.
The post-positivist conception sees planners as fallible advisors who operate, like everybody
else, in a complex world where there are no ‘answers’, only diverse and indeterminate
options. The emphasis is on language. Fischer en Forester call this the linguistic turn.
Collaborative planning and post-structuralist/postmodern planning are two clear
examples of post-positivism.
Typologies of planning theory
Typologies provide a frame of subject area, methodologies, language and history of
development of ideas and practice beyond the random.
There are two reasons planning has no endogenous body of theory, unlike other social
sciences. The first is that planning as a state activity was legitimized by the government
before it developed any justification for itself. The second reason is that planners
themselves are not interested in theory, but focus on the technical aspects of planning.
Instead of its own set of theories, planning draws upon a wide range of theories and
practices from different disciplines.
Up until the early 1980s the dominant typology of planning theory had been provided by
Faludi, who based his approach on the distinction between substantive and procedural
theory: ‘Procedural theories define and justify methods of decision making whereas
substantive theories pertain to interdisciplinary knowledge relevant to the content of
planning: that is urban land use’. Procedures, or means, were to be the business of planning
and planners. Theory was dominated by the systems and rational approaches, both of which
emphasized process above substance. The substantive-procedural distinction was attacked
, for portraying planning as apolitical and technical. Subsequent developments by Faludi to
account for these criticisms merely accepted that different kinds of substantive theory
existed, but the proper concern of planning was procedural theory. Notwithstanding these
criticisms, the substantive procedural distinction remained a popular typology with which to
approach and understand planning theory.
One of the first attempts to account for the increasing pluralization of theory and relate to a
framework for understanding it was advanced by Nigel Taylor. He attempted an alternative
conception in an attempt to shift away from both Faludi’s substantive-procedural distinction
and his normative preference for process as the subject of planning. In rejecting Faludi's
dualism, Taylor replaced it with another that highlighted the difference between sociological
theories (empirically based) and philosophical questions (ideological and normative). In
place of dualism Cooke posited three theories of planning and spatial relations:
- Theories of the development process
- Theories of the planning process
- Theories of the state
Yiftachel’s typology sought to frame planning theory around the three questions:
● The analytical debate – What is urban planning?
● The urban form debate – What is a good urban plan?
● Procedural debate – What is a good planning process?
According to Faludi and Yiftachel, both procedural and substantive theories are required for
planning and neither has dominance over the other.
A criticism of Yiftachel’s typology from a post-positivism perspective concerns the issue of
space. Different theories and ideas can be located in time, but there is also a spatial
dimension that helps explain why these ideas were (de-)emphasized at different periods and
in different places. A reason why Yiftachel’s approach is no longer useful as a typology
relates to his categories of planning theory. Yiftachel’s three categories outlined earlier are
in turn based upon Faludi’s distinction between procedure and substance in planning theory.
Such a distinction has been widely criticized.
Five broad categories of theory that provide a typological framework to help define and map
theory in planning:
● Exogenous theory. Planners have not always drawn upon various theories that
have a relevance for space, policy or governance. Exogenous theories differ from
Planning acts in the interests of capital but needs to do so in ways that seem balanced, open
and fair. Theory provides a means by which planners can publicly justify their actions and
mask their true role. Truth and theory are socially produced.
The nature of theory
Giddens argues there will never be any universal laws in social science because of
difficulties with empirical testing and validation. The social sciences can never fully divorce
themselves from the subject that is being studied. If you observe classes, that itself is a
political position.
One of the main problems with falsification (as with logical positivism) is observation; they
are open to perspective. Science will never abandon a theory unless there is a better one to
replace it. So, falsification is not enough.
Kuhn: Different paradigms will have very different worldviews, often making them
incomparable.
Barnes and Bloor (1982), for example, claim that scientists always accept theories partly
because of factors other than purely scientific ones. They identify what they term a ‘strong
programme’ that, rather like Kuhn’s paradigm, dominates thinking, methodology,
interpretation and results.
Latour, Callon and Law initiated what is known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as an
approach to understanding the relations between science and society. It emphasizes and
explores the reliance and co-dependence of science and society. Science is thoroughly
political, it rejects the distinction between nature and society. Latour challenged this
understanding, seeing knowledge not as an object but as embedded in sets of social
relations.
ANT raises fundamental question of who decides what counts as knowledge in planning.
Rather than knowledge in the singular, planning is replete with multiple knowledges
representing multiple realities. There is no resource to facts to reveal an objective truth.
Instead one needs to ask why some knowledge is privileged over others and who decides
what counts as knowledge.
Unpacking theory
Theory as a discourse
,In Lyotard’s relativistic view, science has no more claim to objective knowledge than what
he terms narratives. Instead, science is itself based on higher-level narratives or meta-
narratives that involve values and assumptions.
The concept of discourse is difficult to pin down, but van Dijk distinguishes three main
dimensions: discourse as language use, as the communication of beliefs (cognition) and
interaction in social situations.
We can see that there are two major inputs into theory: normative elements (societal and
individual) and discursive elements, both of which are influenced by power.
Theory, structure and agency
In planning theory, the relationship between structure (society) and agency (individuals) is
equally important for a number of reasons. First, the use of theory by planners may be
limited by the influences of structures. Second, some theories ignore this relationship,
particularly theories in planning (i.e. how to go about planning) and thereby limit their
usefulness.
Two broad approaches to this relationship:
Structuralism is often associated with marxism and emphasizes the role of structure in
dictating and shaping actions and events. It has been criticized for ignoring the role and
influence of actors and portraying them as automatons. An alternative approach, termed
intentionalism, takes the extreme in focusing on individual action and the micro policies of
interaction and underpins approaches such as Public Choice Theory.
Giddens’ structuration replaces this dualism with duality. It attempts to switch attention to
the interrelationship between structure and agency. People make structures and structures
influence people. While Giddens, Bhaskar and Jessop all place different emphases on the
fusion of structure and agency, the general conclusions we can draw from their work is of
action producing:
1. Direct effects upon structural contexts within which it takes place and within which
future action occurs, producing a partial transformation on the structural context
2. Strategic learning on the part of actors involved, enhancing awareness of structures
and the constraints/opportunities they impose, providing the basis from which
subsequent strategy might be formulated.
The theory-practice gap
Academics argue that they think up new theories for planners to use and to justify planning
which are ignored by practitioners. Practitioners on the other hand claim that academic
theory has no bearing or meaning for practice that is based on common sense.
The relationship between planners, their professional body and the state ensures that
planners are not ‘free agents’ able to objectively investigate, explore or challenge existing
discourse or theories.
,H2 – The Current Landscape of Planning Theory
For Chadwick, planning practice was underpinned by a ‘unified planning theory’. In the past
30 years or so, such confidence and arrogance has been replaced by uncertainty and
introspection. This situation has come about for two reasons. The first is the perceived
failure of such technocratic approaches to address the problems that planners and others
were attempting to tackle. The second reason is less specific and relates to broad changes
in understanding and theory that have been ongoing in the past three decades; Kuhn’s
paradigms, relativist views of Feyerabend, rejection of meta-narratives and overarching
theories by Lyotard and the role of power and discourse in the formation, interpretation and
application of theory.
Positivism sought to systemize human life based on real (positive) as opposed to imagined
knowledge; empirical or mathematical observations. In planning the high point of positivism
was to be found in the systems and rational approaches of the 1960s. Values were
downplayed to provide the objectives. The ability to separate facts from values was itself a
problem with positivism. Post-positivism emphasizes:
● A rejection of positivist understandings and methodologies and embraces instead
approaches that contextualize theories and disciplines in larger social and historical
contexts.
● Normative criteria for deciding between competing theories.
● The ubiquity of variance in explanations and theories.
● An understanding of individuals as self-interpreting, autonomous subjects.
The post-positivist conception sees planners as fallible advisors who operate, like everybody
else, in a complex world where there are no ‘answers’, only diverse and indeterminate
options. The emphasis is on language. Fischer en Forester call this the linguistic turn.
Collaborative planning and post-structuralist/postmodern planning are two clear
examples of post-positivism.
Typologies of planning theory
Typologies provide a frame of subject area, methodologies, language and history of
development of ideas and practice beyond the random.
There are two reasons planning has no endogenous body of theory, unlike other social
sciences. The first is that planning as a state activity was legitimized by the government
before it developed any justification for itself. The second reason is that planners
themselves are not interested in theory, but focus on the technical aspects of planning.
Instead of its own set of theories, planning draws upon a wide range of theories and
practices from different disciplines.
Up until the early 1980s the dominant typology of planning theory had been provided by
Faludi, who based his approach on the distinction between substantive and procedural
theory: ‘Procedural theories define and justify methods of decision making whereas
substantive theories pertain to interdisciplinary knowledge relevant to the content of
planning: that is urban land use’. Procedures, or means, were to be the business of planning
and planners. Theory was dominated by the systems and rational approaches, both of which
emphasized process above substance. The substantive-procedural distinction was attacked
, for portraying planning as apolitical and technical. Subsequent developments by Faludi to
account for these criticisms merely accepted that different kinds of substantive theory
existed, but the proper concern of planning was procedural theory. Notwithstanding these
criticisms, the substantive procedural distinction remained a popular typology with which to
approach and understand planning theory.
One of the first attempts to account for the increasing pluralization of theory and relate to a
framework for understanding it was advanced by Nigel Taylor. He attempted an alternative
conception in an attempt to shift away from both Faludi’s substantive-procedural distinction
and his normative preference for process as the subject of planning. In rejecting Faludi's
dualism, Taylor replaced it with another that highlighted the difference between sociological
theories (empirically based) and philosophical questions (ideological and normative). In
place of dualism Cooke posited three theories of planning and spatial relations:
- Theories of the development process
- Theories of the planning process
- Theories of the state
Yiftachel’s typology sought to frame planning theory around the three questions:
● The analytical debate – What is urban planning?
● The urban form debate – What is a good urban plan?
● Procedural debate – What is a good planning process?
According to Faludi and Yiftachel, both procedural and substantive theories are required for
planning and neither has dominance over the other.
A criticism of Yiftachel’s typology from a post-positivism perspective concerns the issue of
space. Different theories and ideas can be located in time, but there is also a spatial
dimension that helps explain why these ideas were (de-)emphasized at different periods and
in different places. A reason why Yiftachel’s approach is no longer useful as a typology
relates to his categories of planning theory. Yiftachel’s three categories outlined earlier are
in turn based upon Faludi’s distinction between procedure and substance in planning theory.
Such a distinction has been widely criticized.
Five broad categories of theory that provide a typological framework to help define and map
theory in planning:
● Exogenous theory. Planners have not always drawn upon various theories that
have a relevance for space, policy or governance. Exogenous theories differ from
