,LJU4801 October November Portfolio 2025 - Due
Date 28 October 2025; 100 % TRUSTED workings,
Expert Solved, Explanations and Solutions.
Introduction
Nelson Mandela’s 1962 court statement — that many thinking
Africans are driven into a conflict between conscience and the
law because the law is “immoral, unjust, and intolerable” —
poses directly the central problem in legal philosophy: what is
the relationship between law and morality, and when (if ever)
does a moral obligation to disobey the law arise? To answer the
question fully we must (1) set out the main positions in the
law–morality debate (natural law, legal positivism and its
variants, and interpretivist/rights-based alternatives), (2)
discuss influential mid-20th century interventions (Hart–Fuller,
Radbruch) and modern developments (Dworkin, Rawls on civil
disobedience), and (3) situate Mandela’s pronouncement
within those positions and evaluate its justificatory force. I
argue that Mandela’s claim most naturally sits within the
natural-law / moral-reading tradition and the civil-disobedience
literature: it treats law as losing moral authority when it is
grossly unjust, and it grounds the duty to oppose such law in
conscience and political morality. I also note the main positivist
counter-arguments and respond to them.
, 1. The central debate: two poles and the options between
them
Natural law tradition
Natural-law theory holds that law and morality are essentially
connected: there is a moral standard (derived from reason,
human nature, divine law, or human dignity) by which legal
norms are properly judged. When a positive law conflicts
fundamentally with that moral standard it is not a true law (or
at least it lacks full moral legitimacy). Classical exemplars:
Aristotle, Aquinas and later modern natural-law thinkers.
Natural law gives agents a principled basis to refuse or resist
laws that violate fundamental moral norms.
Legal positivism
Legal positivism insists on a conceptual separation of law and
morality: the existence and content of law are a matter of social
facts (rules, institutions, sources), not moral merit. Famous
positivists: John Austin (command theory), Hans Kelsen (pure
theory), and later H.L.A. Hart. Positivists accept that law can be
morally criticized, but they deny that such criticism changes
whether a rule is law. Two important variants:
Exclusive positivism: moral content never enters the
criteria of legal validity.
Date 28 October 2025; 100 % TRUSTED workings,
Expert Solved, Explanations and Solutions.
Introduction
Nelson Mandela’s 1962 court statement — that many thinking
Africans are driven into a conflict between conscience and the
law because the law is “immoral, unjust, and intolerable” —
poses directly the central problem in legal philosophy: what is
the relationship between law and morality, and when (if ever)
does a moral obligation to disobey the law arise? To answer the
question fully we must (1) set out the main positions in the
law–morality debate (natural law, legal positivism and its
variants, and interpretivist/rights-based alternatives), (2)
discuss influential mid-20th century interventions (Hart–Fuller,
Radbruch) and modern developments (Dworkin, Rawls on civil
disobedience), and (3) situate Mandela’s pronouncement
within those positions and evaluate its justificatory force. I
argue that Mandela’s claim most naturally sits within the
natural-law / moral-reading tradition and the civil-disobedience
literature: it treats law as losing moral authority when it is
grossly unjust, and it grounds the duty to oppose such law in
conscience and political morality. I also note the main positivist
counter-arguments and respond to them.
, 1. The central debate: two poles and the options between
them
Natural law tradition
Natural-law theory holds that law and morality are essentially
connected: there is a moral standard (derived from reason,
human nature, divine law, or human dignity) by which legal
norms are properly judged. When a positive law conflicts
fundamentally with that moral standard it is not a true law (or
at least it lacks full moral legitimacy). Classical exemplars:
Aristotle, Aquinas and later modern natural-law thinkers.
Natural law gives agents a principled basis to refuse or resist
laws that violate fundamental moral norms.
Legal positivism
Legal positivism insists on a conceptual separation of law and
morality: the existence and content of law are a matter of social
facts (rules, institutions, sources), not moral merit. Famous
positivists: John Austin (command theory), Hans Kelsen (pure
theory), and later H.L.A. Hart. Positivists accept that law can be
morally criticized, but they deny that such criticism changes
whether a rule is law. Two important variants:
Exclusive positivism: moral content never enters the
criteria of legal validity.
