MODULE : IOS2601
,IOS2601 Exam
Pack
Contains:
Exam Papers with Solutions
(2013-2018)
Comprehensive explanations
to exam questions
, Stuvia.com - The study-notes marketplace
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
MAY/JUNE 2013
Question 1
Question 1.1 = 4
Question 1.2 = 2
Question 1.3 = 3
Question 1.4 = 1
Question 1.5 = 1
Question 1.6 = 2
Question 1.7 = 1
Question 1.8 = 2
Question 1.9 = 3
Question 1.10 = 1
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Question 2
2.1. Compare the orthodox text based approach to a statutory interpretation to
the text in context approach to statutory interpretation. You must make use of
case law in your answer.
Orthodox text-based approach
The primary rule of the orthodox (literal) text based approach is that if the plain or
ordinary meaning of words in the legal text is unambiguous, then this clear meaning is
the intention (Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu) of the legislator.
An ordinary citizen may rely on the everyday meaning of legislation; therefor the courts
may not proceed beyond the plain meaning of the text. A dictionary must firstly be used
to settle interpretive questions.
The ‘golden rule’ of interpretation is that if the ‘plain meaning’ of words are ambiguous
(there exists more than one meaning of the word, in question, in the dictionary), vague
or misleading or if the strict literal interpretation would result in absurdity (Venter v R),
then the court may deviate to avoid such absurdity. The court will then turn to
‘secondary aids’ to interpret the intention of the legislator. ‘Secondary aids’ are the long
title of the statute, headings of chapters and sections, and the text in the other official
language etc. If the ‘secondary aids’ also do not lead to a satisfactory result, then the
court may refer to tertiary aids to interpretation. These tertiary aids are common law
presumptions that may be used. In these cases, the court will concedes that it cannot
determine what is intended by the legislature and that it will its own assumption about
what the legislature has intended.
The textual approach after 27 April 1994 (Interim Constitution came into effect)
The Appellate Division referred to with approval to the textual approach for statutory
interpretation in Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council: “[T]he rules of statutory
[exegesis] are intended as aids in resolving any doubts as to the legislature’s true
intention. Where this intention is proclaimed in clear terms either expressly or by
necessary implication the assistance of these rules need not be sought.”
The Supreme Court of Appeal the traditional rule of interpretation in Commissioner,
SARS v executor, Frith’s Estate: “The primary rule in construction of a statutory
2|Page
Downloaded by: LydiaMcKay |
Distribution of this document is illegal
,IOS2601 Exam
Pack
Contains:
Exam Papers with Solutions
(2013-2018)
Comprehensive explanations
to exam questions
, Stuvia.com - The study-notes marketplace
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
MAY/JUNE 2013
Question 1
Question 1.1 = 4
Question 1.2 = 2
Question 1.3 = 3
Question 1.4 = 1
Question 1.5 = 1
Question 1.6 = 2
Question 1.7 = 1
Question 1.8 = 2
Question 1.9 = 3
Question 1.10 = 1
1|Page
Downloaded by: LydiaMcKay |
Distribution of this document is illegal
, Stuvia.com - The study-notes marketplace
Question 2
2.1. Compare the orthodox text based approach to a statutory interpretation to
the text in context approach to statutory interpretation. You must make use of
case law in your answer.
Orthodox text-based approach
The primary rule of the orthodox (literal) text based approach is that if the plain or
ordinary meaning of words in the legal text is unambiguous, then this clear meaning is
the intention (Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu) of the legislator.
An ordinary citizen may rely on the everyday meaning of legislation; therefor the courts
may not proceed beyond the plain meaning of the text. A dictionary must firstly be used
to settle interpretive questions.
The ‘golden rule’ of interpretation is that if the ‘plain meaning’ of words are ambiguous
(there exists more than one meaning of the word, in question, in the dictionary), vague
or misleading or if the strict literal interpretation would result in absurdity (Venter v R),
then the court may deviate to avoid such absurdity. The court will then turn to
‘secondary aids’ to interpret the intention of the legislator. ‘Secondary aids’ are the long
title of the statute, headings of chapters and sections, and the text in the other official
language etc. If the ‘secondary aids’ also do not lead to a satisfactory result, then the
court may refer to tertiary aids to interpretation. These tertiary aids are common law
presumptions that may be used. In these cases, the court will concedes that it cannot
determine what is intended by the legislature and that it will its own assumption about
what the legislature has intended.
The textual approach after 27 April 1994 (Interim Constitution came into effect)
The Appellate Division referred to with approval to the textual approach for statutory
interpretation in Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council: “[T]he rules of statutory
[exegesis] are intended as aids in resolving any doubts as to the legislature’s true
intention. Where this intention is proclaimed in clear terms either expressly or by
necessary implication the assistance of these rules need not be sought.”
The Supreme Court of Appeal the traditional rule of interpretation in Commissioner,
SARS v executor, Frith’s Estate: “The primary rule in construction of a statutory
2|Page
Downloaded by: LydiaMcKay |
Distribution of this document is illegal
