Solution manual for
Fundamentals of Financial Management Concise 10th Edition by Eugene f.
Brigham Joel F.Houston
With All Web Appendixes 5A-16A
Chapter 1-17
Table Of Contents:
Chapter 1 An Overview of Financial Management 1
Chapter 2 Financial Markets and Institutions 7
Chapter 3 Financial Statements, Cash Flow, and Taxes 23
Chapter 4 Analysis of Financial Statements 49
Chapter 5 Time Value of Money 81
Chapter 6 Interest Rates 125
Chapter 7 Bonds and Their Valuation 151
Chapter 8 Risk and Rates of Return 189
Chapter 9 Stocks and Their Valuation 225
Chapter 10 The Cost of Capital 259
Chapter 11 The Basics of Capital Budgeting 281
Chapter 12 Cash Flow Estimation and Risk Analysis 321
Chapter 13 Capital Structure and Leverage 363
Chapter 14 Distributions to Shareholders: Dividends and Share Repurchases 401
Chapter 15 Working Capital Management 427
Chapter 16 Financial Planning and Forecasting 455
Chapter 17 Multinational Financial Management 481
Answers and Solutions 1
, Chapter 1
An Overview of Financial Management
Answers to End-of-Chapter Questions
1-1 A firm’s intrinsic value is an estimate of a stock’s ―true‖ value based on accurate risk and return
data. It can be estimated but not measured precisely. A stock’s current price is its market price—
the value based on perceived but possibly incorrect information as seen by the marginal investor.
From these definitions, you can see that a stock’s ―true‖ long-run value is more closely related to its
intrinsic value rather than its current price.
1-2 Equilibrium is the situation where the actual market price equals the intrinsic value, so investors are
indifferent between buying and selling a stock. If a stock is in equilibrium then there is no
fundamental imbalance, hence no pressure for a change in the stock’s price. At any given time,
most stocks are reasonably close to their intrinsic values and thus are at or close to equilibrium.
However, at times stock prices and equilibrium values are different, so stocks can be temporarily
undervalued or overvalued. Investor optimism and pessimism, along with imperfect knowledge
about the true intrinsic value, leads to deviations between the actual prices and intrinsic values.
1-3 If the three intrinsic value estimates for Stock X were different, you would have the most
confidence in Company X’s CFO’s estimate. Intrinsic values are strictly estimates, and different
analysts with different data and different views of the future will form different estimates of the
intrinsic value for any given stock. However, a firm’s managers have the best information about
the company’s future prospects, so managers’ estimates of intrinsic value are generally better than
the estimates of outside investors.
1-4 If a stock’s market price and intrinsic value are equal, then the stock is in equilibrium and there is
no pressure (buying/selling) to change the stock’s price. So, theoretically, it is better that the two
be equal; however, intrinsic value is a long-run concept. Management’s goal should be to maximize
the firm’s intrinsic value, not its current price. So, maximizing the intrinsic value will maximize the
average price over the long run but not necessarily the current price at each point in time. So,
stockholders in general would probably expect the firm’s market price to be under the intrinsic
value—realizing that if management is doing its job that current price at any point in time would
not necessarily be maximized. However, the CEO would prefer that the market price be high—
since it is the current price that he will receive when exercising his stock options. In addition, he
will be retiring after exercising those options, so there will be no repercussions to him (with respect
to his job) if the market price drops—unless he did something illegal during his tenure as CEO.
1-5 The board of directors should set CEO compensation dependent on how well the firm performs.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain the CEO but not go beyond
what is needed. Compensation should be structured so that the CEO is rewarded on the basis of
the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option exercise date. This
means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number of years so the
CEO will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. If the intrinsic value could be
measured in an objective and verifiable manner, then performance pay could be based on changes
in intrinsic value. However, it is easier to measure the growth rate in reported profits than the
intrinsic value, although reported profits can be manipulated through aggressive accounting
procedures and intrinsic value cannot be manipulated. Since intrinsic value is not observable,
2 Answers and Solutions
, compensation must be based on the stock’s market price—but the price used should be an average
over time rather than on a specific date.
1-6 The different forms of business organization are proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, and
limited liability corporations and partnerships. The advantages of the first two include the ease and
low cost of formation. The advantages of corporations include limited liability, indefinite life, ease
of ownership transfer, and access to capital markets. Limited liability companies and partnerships
have limited liability like corporations.
The disadvantages of a proprietorship are (1) difficulty in obtaining large sums of capital; (2)
unlimited personal liability for business debts; and (3) limited life. The disadvantages of a
partnership are (1) unlimited liability, (2) limited life, (3) difficulty of transferring ownership, and (4)
difficulty of raising large amounts of capital. The disadvantages of a corporation are (1) double
taxation of earnings and (2) setting up a corporation and filing required state and federal reports,
which are complex and time-consuming. Among the disadvantages of limited liability corporations
and partnerships are difficulty in raising capital and the complexity of setting them up.
1-7 Stockholder wealth maximization is a long-run goal. Companies, and consequently the
stockholders, prosper by management making decisions that will produce long-term earnings
increases. Actions that are continually shortsighted often ―catch up‖ with a firm and, as a result, it
may find itself unable to compete effectively against its competitors. There has been much criticism
in recent years that U.S. firms are too short-run profit-oriented. A prime example is the U.S. auto
industry, which has been accused of continuing to build large ―gas guzzler‖ automobiles because
they had higher profit margins rather than retooling for smaller, more fuel-efficient models.
1-8 Useful motivational tools that will aid in aligning stockholders’ and management’s interests include:
(1) reasonable compensation packages, (2) direct intervention by shareholders, including firing
managers who don’t perform well, and (3) the threat of takeover.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain able managers but not go
beyond what is needed. Also, compensation packages should be structured so that managers are
rewarded based on the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option
exercise date. This means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number
of years so managers will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. Since intrinsic
value is not observable, compensation must be based on the stock’s market price—but the price
used should be an average over time rather than on a specific date.
Stockholders can intervene directly with managers. Today, the majority of stock is owned by
institutional investors and these institutional money managers have the clout to exercise
considerable influence over firms’ operations. First, they can talk with managers and make
suggestions about how the business should be run. In effect, these institutional investors act as
lobbyists for the body of stockholders. Second, any shareholder who has owned $2,000 of a
company’s stock for one year can sponsor a proposal that must be voted on at the annual
stockholders’ meeting, even if management opposes the proposal. Although shareholder-
sponsored proposals are non-binding, the results of such votes are clearly heard by top
management.
If a firm’s stock is undervalued, then corporate raiders will see it to be a bargain and will
attempt to capture the firm in a hostile takeover. If the raid is successful, the target’s executives
will almost certainly be fired. This situation gives managers a strong incentive to take actions to
maximize their stock’s price.
1-9 a. Corporate philanthropy is always a sticky issue, but it can be justified in terms of helping to
create a more attractive community that will make it easier to hire a productive work force.
This corporate philanthropy could be received by stockholders negatively, especially those
stockholders not living in its headquarters city. Stockholders are interested in actions that
maximize share price, and if competing firms are not making similar contributions, the ―cost‖ of
Answers and Solutions 3
, this philanthropy must be borne by someone—the stockholders. Thus, stock price could
decrease.
b. Companies must make investments in the current period in order to generate future cash flows.
Stockholders should be aware of this, and assuming a correct analysis has been performed,
they should react positively to the decision. The Chinese plant is in this category. Capital
budgeting is covered in depth in Part 4 of the text. Assuming that the correct capital budgeting
analysis has been made, the stock price should increase in the future.
c. U.S. Treasury bonds are considered safe investments, while common stocks are far riskier. If
the company were to switch the emergency funds from Treasury bonds to stocks, stockholders
should see this as increasing the firm’s risk because stock returns are not guaranteed—
sometimes they increase and sometimes they decline. The firm might need the funds when
the prices of their investments were low and not have the needed emergency funds.
Consequently, the firm’s stock price would probably fall.
1-10 a. No, TIAA-CREF is not an ordinary shareholder. Because it is one of the largest institutional
shareholders in the United States and it controls more than 900 billion in pension funds, its
voice carries a lot of weight. This ―shareholder‖ in effect consists of many individual
shareholders whose pensions are invested with this group.
b. For TIAA-CREF to be effective in wielding its weight, it must act as a coordinated unit. In order
to do this, the fund’s managers should solicit from the individual shareholders their ―votes‖ on
the fund’s practices, and from those ―votes‖ act on the majority’s wishes. In so doing, the
individual teachers whose pensions are invested in the fund have, in effect, determined the
fund’s voting practices.
1-11 Earnings per share in the current year will decline due to the cost of the investment made in the
current year and no significant performance impact in the short run. However, the company’s stock
price should increase due to the significant cost savings expected in the future.
1-12 The board of directors should set CEO compensation dependent on how well the firm performs.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain the CEO but not go beyond
what is needed. Compensation should be structured so that the CEO is rewarded on the basis of
the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option exercise date. This
means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number of years so the
CEO will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. If the intrinsic value could be
measured in an objective and verifiable manner, then performance pay could be based on changes
in intrinsic value. Since intrinsic value is not observable, compensation must be based on the
stock’s market price—but the price used should be an average over time rather than on a specific
date. The board should probably set the CEO’s compensation as a mix between a fixed salary and
stock options. The actions of the vice president of Company X would be different than if he were
CEO of some other company.
1-13 Setting the compensation policy for three division managers would be different than setting the
compensation policy for a CEO because performance of each of these managers could be more
easily observed. For a CEO an award based on stock price performance makes sense, while basing
the compensation for division managers on stock price performance doesn’t make sense. Each of
the managers could still be given stock awards; however, rather than the award being based on
stock price it could be determined from some observable measure like increased gas output, oil
output, etc.
4 Answers and Solutions
Fundamentals of Financial Management Concise 10th Edition by Eugene f.
Brigham Joel F.Houston
With All Web Appendixes 5A-16A
Chapter 1-17
Table Of Contents:
Chapter 1 An Overview of Financial Management 1
Chapter 2 Financial Markets and Institutions 7
Chapter 3 Financial Statements, Cash Flow, and Taxes 23
Chapter 4 Analysis of Financial Statements 49
Chapter 5 Time Value of Money 81
Chapter 6 Interest Rates 125
Chapter 7 Bonds and Their Valuation 151
Chapter 8 Risk and Rates of Return 189
Chapter 9 Stocks and Their Valuation 225
Chapter 10 The Cost of Capital 259
Chapter 11 The Basics of Capital Budgeting 281
Chapter 12 Cash Flow Estimation and Risk Analysis 321
Chapter 13 Capital Structure and Leverage 363
Chapter 14 Distributions to Shareholders: Dividends and Share Repurchases 401
Chapter 15 Working Capital Management 427
Chapter 16 Financial Planning and Forecasting 455
Chapter 17 Multinational Financial Management 481
Answers and Solutions 1
, Chapter 1
An Overview of Financial Management
Answers to End-of-Chapter Questions
1-1 A firm’s intrinsic value is an estimate of a stock’s ―true‖ value based on accurate risk and return
data. It can be estimated but not measured precisely. A stock’s current price is its market price—
the value based on perceived but possibly incorrect information as seen by the marginal investor.
From these definitions, you can see that a stock’s ―true‖ long-run value is more closely related to its
intrinsic value rather than its current price.
1-2 Equilibrium is the situation where the actual market price equals the intrinsic value, so investors are
indifferent between buying and selling a stock. If a stock is in equilibrium then there is no
fundamental imbalance, hence no pressure for a change in the stock’s price. At any given time,
most stocks are reasonably close to their intrinsic values and thus are at or close to equilibrium.
However, at times stock prices and equilibrium values are different, so stocks can be temporarily
undervalued or overvalued. Investor optimism and pessimism, along with imperfect knowledge
about the true intrinsic value, leads to deviations between the actual prices and intrinsic values.
1-3 If the three intrinsic value estimates for Stock X were different, you would have the most
confidence in Company X’s CFO’s estimate. Intrinsic values are strictly estimates, and different
analysts with different data and different views of the future will form different estimates of the
intrinsic value for any given stock. However, a firm’s managers have the best information about
the company’s future prospects, so managers’ estimates of intrinsic value are generally better than
the estimates of outside investors.
1-4 If a stock’s market price and intrinsic value are equal, then the stock is in equilibrium and there is
no pressure (buying/selling) to change the stock’s price. So, theoretically, it is better that the two
be equal; however, intrinsic value is a long-run concept. Management’s goal should be to maximize
the firm’s intrinsic value, not its current price. So, maximizing the intrinsic value will maximize the
average price over the long run but not necessarily the current price at each point in time. So,
stockholders in general would probably expect the firm’s market price to be under the intrinsic
value—realizing that if management is doing its job that current price at any point in time would
not necessarily be maximized. However, the CEO would prefer that the market price be high—
since it is the current price that he will receive when exercising his stock options. In addition, he
will be retiring after exercising those options, so there will be no repercussions to him (with respect
to his job) if the market price drops—unless he did something illegal during his tenure as CEO.
1-5 The board of directors should set CEO compensation dependent on how well the firm performs.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain the CEO but not go beyond
what is needed. Compensation should be structured so that the CEO is rewarded on the basis of
the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option exercise date. This
means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number of years so the
CEO will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. If the intrinsic value could be
measured in an objective and verifiable manner, then performance pay could be based on changes
in intrinsic value. However, it is easier to measure the growth rate in reported profits than the
intrinsic value, although reported profits can be manipulated through aggressive accounting
procedures and intrinsic value cannot be manipulated. Since intrinsic value is not observable,
2 Answers and Solutions
, compensation must be based on the stock’s market price—but the price used should be an average
over time rather than on a specific date.
1-6 The different forms of business organization are proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, and
limited liability corporations and partnerships. The advantages of the first two include the ease and
low cost of formation. The advantages of corporations include limited liability, indefinite life, ease
of ownership transfer, and access to capital markets. Limited liability companies and partnerships
have limited liability like corporations.
The disadvantages of a proprietorship are (1) difficulty in obtaining large sums of capital; (2)
unlimited personal liability for business debts; and (3) limited life. The disadvantages of a
partnership are (1) unlimited liability, (2) limited life, (3) difficulty of transferring ownership, and (4)
difficulty of raising large amounts of capital. The disadvantages of a corporation are (1) double
taxation of earnings and (2) setting up a corporation and filing required state and federal reports,
which are complex and time-consuming. Among the disadvantages of limited liability corporations
and partnerships are difficulty in raising capital and the complexity of setting them up.
1-7 Stockholder wealth maximization is a long-run goal. Companies, and consequently the
stockholders, prosper by management making decisions that will produce long-term earnings
increases. Actions that are continually shortsighted often ―catch up‖ with a firm and, as a result, it
may find itself unable to compete effectively against its competitors. There has been much criticism
in recent years that U.S. firms are too short-run profit-oriented. A prime example is the U.S. auto
industry, which has been accused of continuing to build large ―gas guzzler‖ automobiles because
they had higher profit margins rather than retooling for smaller, more fuel-efficient models.
1-8 Useful motivational tools that will aid in aligning stockholders’ and management’s interests include:
(1) reasonable compensation packages, (2) direct intervention by shareholders, including firing
managers who don’t perform well, and (3) the threat of takeover.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain able managers but not go
beyond what is needed. Also, compensation packages should be structured so that managers are
rewarded based on the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option
exercise date. This means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number
of years so managers will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. Since intrinsic
value is not observable, compensation must be based on the stock’s market price—but the price
used should be an average over time rather than on a specific date.
Stockholders can intervene directly with managers. Today, the majority of stock is owned by
institutional investors and these institutional money managers have the clout to exercise
considerable influence over firms’ operations. First, they can talk with managers and make
suggestions about how the business should be run. In effect, these institutional investors act as
lobbyists for the body of stockholders. Second, any shareholder who has owned $2,000 of a
company’s stock for one year can sponsor a proposal that must be voted on at the annual
stockholders’ meeting, even if management opposes the proposal. Although shareholder-
sponsored proposals are non-binding, the results of such votes are clearly heard by top
management.
If a firm’s stock is undervalued, then corporate raiders will see it to be a bargain and will
attempt to capture the firm in a hostile takeover. If the raid is successful, the target’s executives
will almost certainly be fired. This situation gives managers a strong incentive to take actions to
maximize their stock’s price.
1-9 a. Corporate philanthropy is always a sticky issue, but it can be justified in terms of helping to
create a more attractive community that will make it easier to hire a productive work force.
This corporate philanthropy could be received by stockholders negatively, especially those
stockholders not living in its headquarters city. Stockholders are interested in actions that
maximize share price, and if competing firms are not making similar contributions, the ―cost‖ of
Answers and Solutions 3
, this philanthropy must be borne by someone—the stockholders. Thus, stock price could
decrease.
b. Companies must make investments in the current period in order to generate future cash flows.
Stockholders should be aware of this, and assuming a correct analysis has been performed,
they should react positively to the decision. The Chinese plant is in this category. Capital
budgeting is covered in depth in Part 4 of the text. Assuming that the correct capital budgeting
analysis has been made, the stock price should increase in the future.
c. U.S. Treasury bonds are considered safe investments, while common stocks are far riskier. If
the company were to switch the emergency funds from Treasury bonds to stocks, stockholders
should see this as increasing the firm’s risk because stock returns are not guaranteed—
sometimes they increase and sometimes they decline. The firm might need the funds when
the prices of their investments were low and not have the needed emergency funds.
Consequently, the firm’s stock price would probably fall.
1-10 a. No, TIAA-CREF is not an ordinary shareholder. Because it is one of the largest institutional
shareholders in the United States and it controls more than 900 billion in pension funds, its
voice carries a lot of weight. This ―shareholder‖ in effect consists of many individual
shareholders whose pensions are invested with this group.
b. For TIAA-CREF to be effective in wielding its weight, it must act as a coordinated unit. In order
to do this, the fund’s managers should solicit from the individual shareholders their ―votes‖ on
the fund’s practices, and from those ―votes‖ act on the majority’s wishes. In so doing, the
individual teachers whose pensions are invested in the fund have, in effect, determined the
fund’s voting practices.
1-11 Earnings per share in the current year will decline due to the cost of the investment made in the
current year and no significant performance impact in the short run. However, the company’s stock
price should increase due to the significant cost savings expected in the future.
1-12 The board of directors should set CEO compensation dependent on how well the firm performs.
The compensation package should be sufficient to attract and retain the CEO but not go beyond
what is needed. Compensation should be structured so that the CEO is rewarded on the basis of
the stock’s performance over the long run, not the stock’s price on an option exercise date. This
means that options (or direct stock awards) should be phased in over a number of years so the
CEO will have an incentive to keep the stock price high over time. If the intrinsic value could be
measured in an objective and verifiable manner, then performance pay could be based on changes
in intrinsic value. Since intrinsic value is not observable, compensation must be based on the
stock’s market price—but the price used should be an average over time rather than on a specific
date. The board should probably set the CEO’s compensation as a mix between a fixed salary and
stock options. The actions of the vice president of Company X would be different than if he were
CEO of some other company.
1-13 Setting the compensation policy for three division managers would be different than setting the
compensation policy for a CEO because performance of each of these managers could be more
easily observed. For a CEO an award based on stock price performance makes sense, while basing
the compensation for division managers on stock price performance doesn’t make sense. Each of
the managers could still be given stock awards; however, rather than the award being based on
stock price it could be determined from some observable measure like increased gas output, oil
output, etc.
4 Answers and Solutions
