, IOS2601 ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 2 2025 ANSWERS
DUE DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 2025
(a) Brief Facts
The case of Jaga v Dönges 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) arose against the backdrop of South
Africa’s constitutional and administrative law framework prior to 1994, a period marked by a
heavy reliance on common-law principles to guide judicial interpretation of statutory and
constitutional provisions1 (Klug, 2000, p. 45). During this era, courts often faced the delicate
task of reconciling formal statutory rules with broader principles of legality, fairness, and
procedural justice. The appellant, Jaga, brought the matter against Dönges, challenging the
validity of certain executive actions taken in his official capacity as a representative of the
state. At the heart of the dispute was whether the executive had overstepped its lawful
authority and whether such overreach violated fundamental legal safeguards, including due
process and the rule of law. The case therefore served as a pivotal illustration of the tension
between state authority and individual rights during the pre-constitutional period.
Specifically, Jaga contended that Dönges had acted beyond the limits of lawful executive
power by implementing measures that were inconsistent with established legal norms.
These actions, according to the appellant, undermined fundamental procedural safeguards
and contravened core principles of legality, which required that all executive action be
grounded in law and be subject to judicial oversight2 (Corder, 1994, p. 112). The Appellate
Division’s review of the matter was crucial because it brought to the fore divergent judicial
approaches to interpreting statutory provisions in the absence of a fully entrenched Bill of
Rights. The majority judgment emphasized adherence to strict legal formalism, insisting that
common-law principles and statutory wording must be applied conservatively to limit judicial
interference in executive affairs. Conversely, the minority judgment adopted a more
purposive approach, recognizing that executive power should be exercised in a manner
consistent with fairness, reasonableness, and the protection of individual rights3 (Hahlo &
Kahn, 2009, p. 78).
The factual matrix of Jaga v Dönges demonstrates not only the specific legal dispute but
also the broader context in which South African courts operated prior to 1994. The case
reflects the judiciary’s role in scrutinizing executive action while balancing respect for
1
Klug, H., Constitutional Law in South Africa, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 45.
2
Corder, H., The Law of South Africa, 3rd ed., Juta, 1994, p. 112.
3
Hahlo, H., & Kahn, E., The South African Legal System and Its Background, 5th ed., Juta, 2009, p. 78.
DUE DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 2025
(a) Brief Facts
The case of Jaga v Dönges 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) arose against the backdrop of South
Africa’s constitutional and administrative law framework prior to 1994, a period marked by a
heavy reliance on common-law principles to guide judicial interpretation of statutory and
constitutional provisions1 (Klug, 2000, p. 45). During this era, courts often faced the delicate
task of reconciling formal statutory rules with broader principles of legality, fairness, and
procedural justice. The appellant, Jaga, brought the matter against Dönges, challenging the
validity of certain executive actions taken in his official capacity as a representative of the
state. At the heart of the dispute was whether the executive had overstepped its lawful
authority and whether such overreach violated fundamental legal safeguards, including due
process and the rule of law. The case therefore served as a pivotal illustration of the tension
between state authority and individual rights during the pre-constitutional period.
Specifically, Jaga contended that Dönges had acted beyond the limits of lawful executive
power by implementing measures that were inconsistent with established legal norms.
These actions, according to the appellant, undermined fundamental procedural safeguards
and contravened core principles of legality, which required that all executive action be
grounded in law and be subject to judicial oversight2 (Corder, 1994, p. 112). The Appellate
Division’s review of the matter was crucial because it brought to the fore divergent judicial
approaches to interpreting statutory provisions in the absence of a fully entrenched Bill of
Rights. The majority judgment emphasized adherence to strict legal formalism, insisting that
common-law principles and statutory wording must be applied conservatively to limit judicial
interference in executive affairs. Conversely, the minority judgment adopted a more
purposive approach, recognizing that executive power should be exercised in a manner
consistent with fairness, reasonableness, and the protection of individual rights3 (Hahlo &
Kahn, 2009, p. 78).
The factual matrix of Jaga v Dönges demonstrates not only the specific legal dispute but
also the broader context in which South African courts operated prior to 1994. The case
reflects the judiciary’s role in scrutinizing executive action while balancing respect for
1
Klug, H., Constitutional Law in South Africa, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 45.
2
Corder, H., The Law of South Africa, 3rd ed., Juta, 1994, p. 112.
3
Hahlo, H., & Kahn, E., The South African Legal System and Its Background, 5th ed., Juta, 2009, p. 78.
