APC3703
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 2 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: 2025
,The Politics of West and North Africa
SECTION A: WEST AFRICA
Question 1
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed repeated cycles in which former
military rulers re-emerge as civilian leaders. Onwutuebe (2002) contends that the
prevalence of democratic infractions in Nigeria’s current political system is largely due to
the enduring influence of a military political culture. This argument rests on the premise
that the authoritarian habits, hierarchical decision-making, and centralised power
structures embedded during decades of military rule have been transposed into civilian
governance, undermining the norms of democratic accountability.
Following independence, Nigeria’s first republic collapsed in 1966, ushering in a long
era of military dominance punctuated only briefly by civilian governments. Between
1966 and 1999, military regimes under leaders such as Yakubu Gowon, Murtala
Mohammed, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha concentrated
power in the executive, relied on decrees rather than legislative processes, and
suppressed dissent. Even after the return to civilian rule in 1999, the presidency was
occupied by former generals — Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and Muhammadu
Buhari (2015–2023) — whose governing styles often reflected command-and-control
approaches more akin to barracks discipline than participatory democracy.
Onwutuebe (2002) identifies several ways in which this military legacy continues to
shape Nigeria’s democracy. First, there is the centralisation of authority: the
presidency wields disproportionate power, often overriding other branches of
government. This imbalance undermines the legislature’s ability to check the executive
and erodes judicial independence. Second, intolerance of opposition persists, with
security agencies deployed to intimidate critics, restrict protests, and influence electoral
outcomes. Third, patron-client networks inherited from military-era rent distribution
remain central to political survival, fostering corruption and policy inconsistency. Finally,
institutional weakness is a by-product of decades in which formal processes were
subordinated to personal rule.
,These dynamics contribute directly to what Onwutuebe terms “democratic infractions”
— violations of constitutional norms, manipulation of electoral processes, disregard for
court rulings, and the instrumental use of anti-corruption agencies for political ends. The
military ethos prioritises order, obedience, and loyalty over debate, compromise, and
transparency — qualities essential for a healthy democracy.
However, while the military legacy is a significant explanatory factor, it is not the sole
cause of Nigeria’s democratic deficits. Other structural issues exacerbate the problem:
deep ethnic and religious cleavages make political competition zero-sum; dependence
on oil revenues encourages rent-seeking behaviour; poverty and inequality limit citizen
engagement; and weak internal democracy within political parties stifles new leadership.
Moreover, since 1999 there have been some democratic advances — such as the
peaceful transfer of power in 2015, judicial interventions in electoral disputes, and
growing media pluralism — suggesting that military influence can be gradually eroded.
In conclusion, Onwutuebe’s (2002) assertion holds considerable weight: the persistence
of a military political culture has left enduring marks on Nigeria’s democratic landscape,
fostering executive overreach, weak institutions, and rights violations. Yet, for a full
understanding of Nigeria’s democratic infractions, this factor must be situated alongside
socio-economic and structural drivers that also impede democratic consolidation.
Question 2
Despite Ghana’s reputation as one of West Africa’s most stable democracies, Sefa-
Nyarko (2022) argues that the country has not fully achieved democratic consolidation
and that a strong, independent, and effective civil society remains the most reliable
safeguard against state excesses. His analysis rests on the premise that while Ghana’s
formal checks and balances exist in law, they are often weakened in practice by political
dominance, partisanship, and institutional capture.
, Ghana’s Fourth Republic, inaugurated in 1992, has witnessed peaceful transfers of
power between the two dominant parties — the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the
National Democratic Congress (NDC). This stability has nurtured perceptions of
democratic maturity. However, Sefa-Nyarko notes that executive dominance persists,
particularly when the governing party controls both the presidency and a parliamentary
majority. In such contexts, parliament’s oversight role is diluted, while the judiciary,
though constitutionally independent, may be constrained by political pressure, limited
resources, or slow adjudication processes.
Against this backdrop, civil society organisations (CSOs), media outlets, faith-based
institutions, and grassroots advocacy groups become essential counterweights to state
authority. According to Sefa-Nyarko, a strong civil society serves three critical
democratic functions. First, it acts as a watchdog, exposing corruption,
maladministration, and rights violations. Notable examples include OccupyGhana,
which used legal action to compel government transparency, and investigative
journalists whose reporting uncovered high-level corruption scandals. Second, civil
society plays an agenda-setting role, pushing issues such as electoral reforms, access
to information, and anti-corruption measures onto the national policy agenda. Third, it
facilitates citizen mobilisation, ensuring that public protests, petitions, and campaigns
hold political leaders accountable between elections.
However, the capacity of civil society to restrain state excesses is not unlimited. Sefa-
Nyarko identifies structural and operational challenges that undermine its effectiveness.
Many Ghanaian CSOs depend heavily on external donor funding, raising questions
about sustainability and local legitimacy. Civil society space is often concentrated in
urban centres, limiting rural participation and inclusivity. Furthermore, political co-option
— where CSO leaders are offered government appointments or contracts — can blunt
activism and reduce independence.
Critically, while Sefa-Nyarko champions civil society as the most effective means of
constraining state overreach, it should not be viewed as a substitute for strong formal
institutions. Sustainable democratic consolidation requires an empowered parliament,
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 2 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: 2025
,The Politics of West and North Africa
SECTION A: WEST AFRICA
Question 1
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed repeated cycles in which former
military rulers re-emerge as civilian leaders. Onwutuebe (2002) contends that the
prevalence of democratic infractions in Nigeria’s current political system is largely due to
the enduring influence of a military political culture. This argument rests on the premise
that the authoritarian habits, hierarchical decision-making, and centralised power
structures embedded during decades of military rule have been transposed into civilian
governance, undermining the norms of democratic accountability.
Following independence, Nigeria’s first republic collapsed in 1966, ushering in a long
era of military dominance punctuated only briefly by civilian governments. Between
1966 and 1999, military regimes under leaders such as Yakubu Gowon, Murtala
Mohammed, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha concentrated
power in the executive, relied on decrees rather than legislative processes, and
suppressed dissent. Even after the return to civilian rule in 1999, the presidency was
occupied by former generals — Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and Muhammadu
Buhari (2015–2023) — whose governing styles often reflected command-and-control
approaches more akin to barracks discipline than participatory democracy.
Onwutuebe (2002) identifies several ways in which this military legacy continues to
shape Nigeria’s democracy. First, there is the centralisation of authority: the
presidency wields disproportionate power, often overriding other branches of
government. This imbalance undermines the legislature’s ability to check the executive
and erodes judicial independence. Second, intolerance of opposition persists, with
security agencies deployed to intimidate critics, restrict protests, and influence electoral
outcomes. Third, patron-client networks inherited from military-era rent distribution
remain central to political survival, fostering corruption and policy inconsistency. Finally,
institutional weakness is a by-product of decades in which formal processes were
subordinated to personal rule.
,These dynamics contribute directly to what Onwutuebe terms “democratic infractions”
— violations of constitutional norms, manipulation of electoral processes, disregard for
court rulings, and the instrumental use of anti-corruption agencies for political ends. The
military ethos prioritises order, obedience, and loyalty over debate, compromise, and
transparency — qualities essential for a healthy democracy.
However, while the military legacy is a significant explanatory factor, it is not the sole
cause of Nigeria’s democratic deficits. Other structural issues exacerbate the problem:
deep ethnic and religious cleavages make political competition zero-sum; dependence
on oil revenues encourages rent-seeking behaviour; poverty and inequality limit citizen
engagement; and weak internal democracy within political parties stifles new leadership.
Moreover, since 1999 there have been some democratic advances — such as the
peaceful transfer of power in 2015, judicial interventions in electoral disputes, and
growing media pluralism — suggesting that military influence can be gradually eroded.
In conclusion, Onwutuebe’s (2002) assertion holds considerable weight: the persistence
of a military political culture has left enduring marks on Nigeria’s democratic landscape,
fostering executive overreach, weak institutions, and rights violations. Yet, for a full
understanding of Nigeria’s democratic infractions, this factor must be situated alongside
socio-economic and structural drivers that also impede democratic consolidation.
Question 2
Despite Ghana’s reputation as one of West Africa’s most stable democracies, Sefa-
Nyarko (2022) argues that the country has not fully achieved democratic consolidation
and that a strong, independent, and effective civil society remains the most reliable
safeguard against state excesses. His analysis rests on the premise that while Ghana’s
formal checks and balances exist in law, they are often weakened in practice by political
dominance, partisanship, and institutional capture.
, Ghana’s Fourth Republic, inaugurated in 1992, has witnessed peaceful transfers of
power between the two dominant parties — the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the
National Democratic Congress (NDC). This stability has nurtured perceptions of
democratic maturity. However, Sefa-Nyarko notes that executive dominance persists,
particularly when the governing party controls both the presidency and a parliamentary
majority. In such contexts, parliament’s oversight role is diluted, while the judiciary,
though constitutionally independent, may be constrained by political pressure, limited
resources, or slow adjudication processes.
Against this backdrop, civil society organisations (CSOs), media outlets, faith-based
institutions, and grassroots advocacy groups become essential counterweights to state
authority. According to Sefa-Nyarko, a strong civil society serves three critical
democratic functions. First, it acts as a watchdog, exposing corruption,
maladministration, and rights violations. Notable examples include OccupyGhana,
which used legal action to compel government transparency, and investigative
journalists whose reporting uncovered high-level corruption scandals. Second, civil
society plays an agenda-setting role, pushing issues such as electoral reforms, access
to information, and anti-corruption measures onto the national policy agenda. Third, it
facilitates citizen mobilisation, ensuring that public protests, petitions, and campaigns
hold political leaders accountable between elections.
However, the capacity of civil society to restrain state excesses is not unlimited. Sefa-
Nyarko identifies structural and operational challenges that undermine its effectiveness.
Many Ghanaian CSOs depend heavily on external donor funding, raising questions
about sustainability and local legitimacy. Civil society space is often concentrated in
urban centres, limiting rural participation and inclusivity. Furthermore, political co-option
— where CSO leaders are offered government appointments or contracts — can blunt
activism and reduce independence.
Critically, while Sefa-Nyarko champions civil society as the most effective means of
constraining state overreach, it should not be viewed as a substitute for strong formal
institutions. Sustainable democratic consolidation requires an empowered parliament,
