With reference to these extracts and your understanding of the historical context. Asses how convincing these two
extracts are in relation to the use of Russi cation in the reigns of A.II and A.III?
In Extract A, it claims “Alexander II had not engaged in systematic enforced Russi cation and had even made
signi cant concessions in some instances”. There are multiple accuracies within this statement which can be
directly evidenced through the policies of A.II early reign. A key example is A.II granting of amnesty for the
Decembrist rebels, who were Polish nationalists who had rebelled against N.I in 1825. Granting such leniency on
opposition/minority groups highlights A.II reluctancy for complete Russi cation; by allowing the rebels to challenge
the R autocracy without facing long term consequences, A.II showed that he was willing to give concessions to
minorities in order to ensure the stability of the autocracy. However, this was not always the case, as supported by
Extract A’s statement of this leniency being “in some instances’. Subsequent to the Polish rebellion in 1863, A.II
appointed Nikolai Milyutin as the Prime Minister of Poland, who held much more repressive ideals of Russi cation
which were enforced on the Polish. Milyutin removed Polish government of cials, con scated the Catholic Church
property and began initial Russi cation policies in education, which were nalised in statutes mandating Russian as
the language in universities by his successor, Alexander Apukhtin. The choice of Milyutin and his policies show that
A.II was not supportive of minorities in certain parts of his reign, creating Extract A’s argument to be very
convincing due to its accuracy in this regard. This accuracy is further expressed when considering Extract A’s
statement concerning the Jews, where it states that the government under A.III “reversed its earlier concessions to
the Jews”. The policies of A.II on the Jews were quite liberal, as he allowed some settlement of some Jews with
medical or mechanical skills outside the Pale of Settlement where they had been previously con ned. He also
allowed Jewish merchants to pay the registration fee to the rst guild, enabling them to do of cial business. Again,
this was only “in some instances” - after the 1863 Polish rebellion, A.II withdrew some rights from the Jews,
including restricting their ability to engage in local government. A.III further removed the initial concessions through
policies of Russi cation, supported by his advisors Konstantin Pobedonostsev & Nikolai Ignatiev. Policies such as
the May Laws 1882, restricting Jewish settlement even within the Pale of Settlement, and the prohibition of Jews in
legal & medical professions, show how the autocracy eventually “reversed its earlier concessions”. In conclusion
Extract A clearly shows its accuracy by providing an overarching view of how the Russian policy on minorities
changed through the 1800s and therefore makes a very convincing argument on Russi cation during the reign of
A.II and A.III.
Unconvincingly, Extract A states that A.III launched “an aggressive campaign of both administrative and cultural
Russi cation”. Although this is arguably true in most cases, such as A.III’s policies on the Jews as previously
mentioned, as well as through the laws limiting Ukrainian language and culture in the 1880’s, the statement can be
questioned on its use of “aggressive”, and in its application to the entirety of A.III’s policies. With the Ukrainians, the
most intensive Russi cation actually began under A.II, with his implementation of repression against Ukrainian
nationalism after its increase in 1876 through policies banning the usage of the Ukrainian language in most
situations. A.III merely continued these policies, only developing new restrictions in the expansion of military
service, making this not a “campaign” only a continuation. During A.III’s reign, the Ukrainians were considered as a
largely docile threat when compared to the reign of A.II, which did not require “aggressive” Russi cation, making
Extract A’s statement unconvincing. Furthermore, A.III had a personal liking of the Finnish minorities in Russia, and
indeed during his reign the Finnish people “enjoyed special protection” by the Tsar. A.III ignored Russian
nationalists who wanted to abolish Finnish autonomy, and even at the end of his reign only implemented the rst
minor policies of Russi cation in Finland. These policies, namely ruling Finland by edict, thus ignoring the Finnish
constitution, and introducing Russian as the 3rd of cial language, can hardly be considered “aggressive”, and were
fifi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi
extracts are in relation to the use of Russi cation in the reigns of A.II and A.III?
In Extract A, it claims “Alexander II had not engaged in systematic enforced Russi cation and had even made
signi cant concessions in some instances”. There are multiple accuracies within this statement which can be
directly evidenced through the policies of A.II early reign. A key example is A.II granting of amnesty for the
Decembrist rebels, who were Polish nationalists who had rebelled against N.I in 1825. Granting such leniency on
opposition/minority groups highlights A.II reluctancy for complete Russi cation; by allowing the rebels to challenge
the R autocracy without facing long term consequences, A.II showed that he was willing to give concessions to
minorities in order to ensure the stability of the autocracy. However, this was not always the case, as supported by
Extract A’s statement of this leniency being “in some instances’. Subsequent to the Polish rebellion in 1863, A.II
appointed Nikolai Milyutin as the Prime Minister of Poland, who held much more repressive ideals of Russi cation
which were enforced on the Polish. Milyutin removed Polish government of cials, con scated the Catholic Church
property and began initial Russi cation policies in education, which were nalised in statutes mandating Russian as
the language in universities by his successor, Alexander Apukhtin. The choice of Milyutin and his policies show that
A.II was not supportive of minorities in certain parts of his reign, creating Extract A’s argument to be very
convincing due to its accuracy in this regard. This accuracy is further expressed when considering Extract A’s
statement concerning the Jews, where it states that the government under A.III “reversed its earlier concessions to
the Jews”. The policies of A.II on the Jews were quite liberal, as he allowed some settlement of some Jews with
medical or mechanical skills outside the Pale of Settlement where they had been previously con ned. He also
allowed Jewish merchants to pay the registration fee to the rst guild, enabling them to do of cial business. Again,
this was only “in some instances” - after the 1863 Polish rebellion, A.II withdrew some rights from the Jews,
including restricting their ability to engage in local government. A.III further removed the initial concessions through
policies of Russi cation, supported by his advisors Konstantin Pobedonostsev & Nikolai Ignatiev. Policies such as
the May Laws 1882, restricting Jewish settlement even within the Pale of Settlement, and the prohibition of Jews in
legal & medical professions, show how the autocracy eventually “reversed its earlier concessions”. In conclusion
Extract A clearly shows its accuracy by providing an overarching view of how the Russian policy on minorities
changed through the 1800s and therefore makes a very convincing argument on Russi cation during the reign of
A.II and A.III.
Unconvincingly, Extract A states that A.III launched “an aggressive campaign of both administrative and cultural
Russi cation”. Although this is arguably true in most cases, such as A.III’s policies on the Jews as previously
mentioned, as well as through the laws limiting Ukrainian language and culture in the 1880’s, the statement can be
questioned on its use of “aggressive”, and in its application to the entirety of A.III’s policies. With the Ukrainians, the
most intensive Russi cation actually began under A.II, with his implementation of repression against Ukrainian
nationalism after its increase in 1876 through policies banning the usage of the Ukrainian language in most
situations. A.III merely continued these policies, only developing new restrictions in the expansion of military
service, making this not a “campaign” only a continuation. During A.III’s reign, the Ukrainians were considered as a
largely docile threat when compared to the reign of A.II, which did not require “aggressive” Russi cation, making
Extract A’s statement unconvincing. Furthermore, A.III had a personal liking of the Finnish minorities in Russia, and
indeed during his reign the Finnish people “enjoyed special protection” by the Tsar. A.III ignored Russian
nationalists who wanted to abolish Finnish autonomy, and even at the end of his reign only implemented the rst
minor policies of Russi cation in Finland. These policies, namely ruling Finland by edict, thus ignoring the Finnish
constitution, and introducing Russian as the 3rd of cial language, can hardly be considered “aggressive”, and were
fifi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi
