, PVL3703 Assignment 1 (COMPLETE ANSWERS)
Semester 2 2025 - DUE August 2025
Delictual Liability: The Element of Conduct in Tumelo’s Case
In the law of delict, a plaintiff must prove all elements of a
delict—namely conduct, wrongfulness, fault, causation, and
damage—in order to succeed with a claim. The present
question focuses only on the element of conduct. For conduct
to be established, there must be a voluntary human act or
omission under the control of the actor’s will.
Conduct in delict requires that the defendant’s behaviour is
volitional. Acts performed in states where the actor lacks
conscious control, such as during epileptic seizures,
sleepwalking, or reflex actions, are generally not regarded as
conduct. This principle was confirmed in R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA
260 (N), where the court held that a person who stabbed
another during an epileptic seizure had not acted voluntarily,
and thus there was no conduct in the legal sense. Similarly, in S
v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), it was held that involuntary
acts cannot be considered conduct for purposes of liability.
Applying this to Tumelo’s case, he stabbed Mandla while
sleepwalking. Sleepwalking is an involuntary state where
actions are not consciously controlled. Therefore, the stabbing
itself does not qualify as conduct for the purposes of the law of
delict, as it was not a voluntary act.
Semester 2 2025 - DUE August 2025
Delictual Liability: The Element of Conduct in Tumelo’s Case
In the law of delict, a plaintiff must prove all elements of a
delict—namely conduct, wrongfulness, fault, causation, and
damage—in order to succeed with a claim. The present
question focuses only on the element of conduct. For conduct
to be established, there must be a voluntary human act or
omission under the control of the actor’s will.
Conduct in delict requires that the defendant’s behaviour is
volitional. Acts performed in states where the actor lacks
conscious control, such as during epileptic seizures,
sleepwalking, or reflex actions, are generally not regarded as
conduct. This principle was confirmed in R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA
260 (N), where the court held that a person who stabbed
another during an epileptic seizure had not acted voluntarily,
and thus there was no conduct in the legal sense. Similarly, in S
v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), it was held that involuntary
acts cannot be considered conduct for purposes of liability.
Applying this to Tumelo’s case, he stabbed Mandla while
sleepwalking. Sleepwalking is an involuntary state where
actions are not consciously controlled. Therefore, the stabbing
itself does not qualify as conduct for the purposes of the law of
delict, as it was not a voluntary act.
