PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due August 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2
Due August 2025
EXCEPTIONALLY CRAFTED
Response 1
1. Reconceptualizing 'Conduct' in the Law of Delict: Beyond Mechanical Action
In South African delictual jurisprudence, the threshold requirement of conduct is
traditionally defined as a voluntary human act or omission, signifying a bodily movement
or restraint under the conscious control of the mind (Neethling, Potgieter & Visser,
2015:30). This foundational principle distinguishes between behaviour that attracts legal
consequences and that which, due to automatism or unconsciousness, does not.
Tumelo’s case implicates this boundary directly: the fatal stabbing occurred during an
episode of sleepwalking—a state which prima facie negates volitional control.
Precedent supports this conclusion. In R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N), the court
excluded conduct liability where the accused acted during an epileptic seizure.
Sleepwalking, as a form of parasomnia, similarly falls outside the ambit of culpable
conduct due to the absence of mental control.
However, modern jurisprudence resists a purely mechanistic interpretation of conduct.
Courts and scholars increasingly interrogate the antecedent conditions that enable
harmful acts, particularly where the actor had knowledge of and failed to mitigate
foreseeable risks. This shift aligns with broader normative objectives of accountability,
shifting legal focus from the moment of harm to the actor's capacity to prevent it.
Assignment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due August 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2
Due August 2025
EXCEPTIONALLY CRAFTED
Response 1
1. Reconceptualizing 'Conduct' in the Law of Delict: Beyond Mechanical Action
In South African delictual jurisprudence, the threshold requirement of conduct is
traditionally defined as a voluntary human act or omission, signifying a bodily movement
or restraint under the conscious control of the mind (Neethling, Potgieter & Visser,
2015:30). This foundational principle distinguishes between behaviour that attracts legal
consequences and that which, due to automatism or unconsciousness, does not.
Tumelo’s case implicates this boundary directly: the fatal stabbing occurred during an
episode of sleepwalking—a state which prima facie negates volitional control.
Precedent supports this conclusion. In R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N), the court
excluded conduct liability where the accused acted during an epileptic seizure.
Sleepwalking, as a form of parasomnia, similarly falls outside the ambit of culpable
conduct due to the absence of mental control.
However, modern jurisprudence resists a purely mechanistic interpretation of conduct.
Courts and scholars increasingly interrogate the antecedent conditions that enable
harmful acts, particularly where the actor had knowledge of and failed to mitigate
foreseeable risks. This shift aligns with broader normative objectives of accountability,
shifting legal focus from the moment of harm to the actor's capacity to prevent it.
