Interference with Reputation – Defamation
Tort of Libel and Tort of Slander
Libel.
If the statement is in a permanent form.
Before – if it was something that would offend the eye.
Something you see.
Something you read.
Libel is actionable per se.
No need to prove that they have suffered any damage.
Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934).
The defendants made a film which falsely imputed that the plaintiff
had been raped or seduced by Rasputin.
The defamatory matter was in pictorial (as opposed to soundtrack)
part of the picture and was held as libel.
Slesser Lord Judge referred to a permanent matter capable of being
seen by the eye.
Monson v Tussauds Ltd (1894).
The claimant was tried for murder by gunshot in Scotland for which
the jury returned a verdict of “not proven”.
The defendants exhibited wax figures of famous/infamous persons
and included a model of the claimant with a gun.
The model could be viewed at an extra sixpence charge and was
displayed along with figures of Emperor Napoleon I and three other
persons known to have been involved in murders (including the one
the claimant was tried for). This room led to another, the “Chamber of
Horrors” where a further model of the claimant’s alleged crime.
The claimant sued for libel and asked for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from displaying the figure depicting him.
The defendants denied the existence of libel and did not attempt to
justify their action.
The Queen’s Bench Division granted the claimant’s requested
injunction, stating that the presence of libel was obvious in this case.
However, the further appeal concerned a question of whether the
claimant had actually consented to the exhibition he later complained
of.
The Court of Appeal held that there was some evidence that claimant
consented to the exhibition.
Thus, the case for libel was not sufficiently clear to justify the grant of
an injunction in this case.
However, the Court generally stated that there was jurisdiction to
issue libel-based injunctions even if the case does not concern trade
libels.
Libel can be in permanent form even if it is not in writing or print. A
statue, caricature, signs or pictures – and thus, a wax figure – may
also give rise to libel.
, Slander.
If the statement is in a temporary or transient form.
Before – if it was something that would offend the ear.
Something that was said.
Slander must prove that you have suffered ‘special damage’.
i.e. actual damage of financial loss or physical loss that is capable of
being estimated in monetary terms.
Exceptions when slander may be actionable per se.
Defamation Act 2013 section 14.
Theatres Act 1968.
Broadcasting Act 1990.
Defamation Act 2013.
Who Can Sue?
A natural living person.
An action for defamation will not survive death.
A company that is incorporated.
Because it has a legal identity.
But only if the defamation has damaged trading interests.
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe (2006).
‘…The good name of a company, as that of an individual, is a
thing of value…I find nothing repugnant in the notion that this
is a value which the law should protect’ – Lord Bingham.
Who Cannot Sue?
A trade union.
No legal identity.
A public or governmental body.
Freedom of speech.
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd (1993).
‘It is of the highest public importance that a democratically
elected governmental body…should be open to uninhibited
public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation
must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of
speech’ – Lord Keith.
A political party.
You can defame an individual within a political party.
Freedom of speech.
You can’t be sued by the actual body, but can by the individual.
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul (1997).
Role of Judge and Jury
Section 11(1) and (2) of the Defamation Act 2013.
Amends both the Senior Courts Act and the County Courts Act to remove
libel and slander from the list of proceedings where a right to jury trial exists.
The explanatory notes that the result will be that defamation cases will be
tried without a jury unless a court orders otherwise.
, Four Questions
Is the statement defamatory?
Does it refer to the claimant?
Has it been ‘published’ to a third party?
Are there any defences?
Is the Statement Defamatory?
‘…The publication of a statement which reflects on a person’s reputation and tends
to lower him (or her) in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally
or tends to make them shun or avoid him (or her)’ – Rodgers in Winfield and
Jolowicz.
Parmiter v Coupland and another (1840).
The claimant was the late mayor of Winchester.
A series of libels were published of him in a local newspaper between
November 1938 and March 1939, implying that he was corrupt and ignored
his duties as mayor and justice of the peace for his borough.
The defendants pleaded not guilty.
At trial, the judge directed the jury as to the difference between censures on
public and on private person.
He said that the character of public officials was public property to an extent
and as such, their actions can be criticised more openly than that of private
persons.
Furthermore, he provided a definition of libel to the jury and then left it to
them to decide whether the statements in question were intended to injure
the claimant’s character.
It was claimed that the jury was misdirected.
In libel cases, the judge is not legally obliged to state to the jury whether the
statement complained of is a libel or not – however, he must define what
libel is in law and then leave it to the jury to decide whether the statement in
question falls into that definition and, incidentally, whether the statement
was intended to injure the claimant’s character.
Secondly, while there are differences as to what might count as libel against a
private or a public person, allegations of corruption will be libellous in either
case.
Thirdly, libel will be established whenever a statement, intended to injure the
reputation of a person by exposing him/her to ridicule, hatred or contempt, is
published without justification or lawful excuse.
The court said, ‘a publication without justification or lawful excuse,
which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing
that person to hatred, contempt or ridicule would be defamatory’.
Difficult for companies to show that this has taken place.
Tort of Libel and Tort of Slander
Libel.
If the statement is in a permanent form.
Before – if it was something that would offend the eye.
Something you see.
Something you read.
Libel is actionable per se.
No need to prove that they have suffered any damage.
Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934).
The defendants made a film which falsely imputed that the plaintiff
had been raped or seduced by Rasputin.
The defamatory matter was in pictorial (as opposed to soundtrack)
part of the picture and was held as libel.
Slesser Lord Judge referred to a permanent matter capable of being
seen by the eye.
Monson v Tussauds Ltd (1894).
The claimant was tried for murder by gunshot in Scotland for which
the jury returned a verdict of “not proven”.
The defendants exhibited wax figures of famous/infamous persons
and included a model of the claimant with a gun.
The model could be viewed at an extra sixpence charge and was
displayed along with figures of Emperor Napoleon I and three other
persons known to have been involved in murders (including the one
the claimant was tried for). This room led to another, the “Chamber of
Horrors” where a further model of the claimant’s alleged crime.
The claimant sued for libel and asked for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from displaying the figure depicting him.
The defendants denied the existence of libel and did not attempt to
justify their action.
The Queen’s Bench Division granted the claimant’s requested
injunction, stating that the presence of libel was obvious in this case.
However, the further appeal concerned a question of whether the
claimant had actually consented to the exhibition he later complained
of.
The Court of Appeal held that there was some evidence that claimant
consented to the exhibition.
Thus, the case for libel was not sufficiently clear to justify the grant of
an injunction in this case.
However, the Court generally stated that there was jurisdiction to
issue libel-based injunctions even if the case does not concern trade
libels.
Libel can be in permanent form even if it is not in writing or print. A
statue, caricature, signs or pictures – and thus, a wax figure – may
also give rise to libel.
, Slander.
If the statement is in a temporary or transient form.
Before – if it was something that would offend the ear.
Something that was said.
Slander must prove that you have suffered ‘special damage’.
i.e. actual damage of financial loss or physical loss that is capable of
being estimated in monetary terms.
Exceptions when slander may be actionable per se.
Defamation Act 2013 section 14.
Theatres Act 1968.
Broadcasting Act 1990.
Defamation Act 2013.
Who Can Sue?
A natural living person.
An action for defamation will not survive death.
A company that is incorporated.
Because it has a legal identity.
But only if the defamation has damaged trading interests.
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe (2006).
‘…The good name of a company, as that of an individual, is a
thing of value…I find nothing repugnant in the notion that this
is a value which the law should protect’ – Lord Bingham.
Who Cannot Sue?
A trade union.
No legal identity.
A public or governmental body.
Freedom of speech.
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd (1993).
‘It is of the highest public importance that a democratically
elected governmental body…should be open to uninhibited
public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation
must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of
speech’ – Lord Keith.
A political party.
You can defame an individual within a political party.
Freedom of speech.
You can’t be sued by the actual body, but can by the individual.
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul (1997).
Role of Judge and Jury
Section 11(1) and (2) of the Defamation Act 2013.
Amends both the Senior Courts Act and the County Courts Act to remove
libel and slander from the list of proceedings where a right to jury trial exists.
The explanatory notes that the result will be that defamation cases will be
tried without a jury unless a court orders otherwise.
, Four Questions
Is the statement defamatory?
Does it refer to the claimant?
Has it been ‘published’ to a third party?
Are there any defences?
Is the Statement Defamatory?
‘…The publication of a statement which reflects on a person’s reputation and tends
to lower him (or her) in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally
or tends to make them shun or avoid him (or her)’ – Rodgers in Winfield and
Jolowicz.
Parmiter v Coupland and another (1840).
The claimant was the late mayor of Winchester.
A series of libels were published of him in a local newspaper between
November 1938 and March 1939, implying that he was corrupt and ignored
his duties as mayor and justice of the peace for his borough.
The defendants pleaded not guilty.
At trial, the judge directed the jury as to the difference between censures on
public and on private person.
He said that the character of public officials was public property to an extent
and as such, their actions can be criticised more openly than that of private
persons.
Furthermore, he provided a definition of libel to the jury and then left it to
them to decide whether the statements in question were intended to injure
the claimant’s character.
It was claimed that the jury was misdirected.
In libel cases, the judge is not legally obliged to state to the jury whether the
statement complained of is a libel or not – however, he must define what
libel is in law and then leave it to the jury to decide whether the statement in
question falls into that definition and, incidentally, whether the statement
was intended to injure the claimant’s character.
Secondly, while there are differences as to what might count as libel against a
private or a public person, allegations of corruption will be libellous in either
case.
Thirdly, libel will be established whenever a statement, intended to injure the
reputation of a person by exposing him/her to ridicule, hatred or contempt, is
published without justification or lawful excuse.
The court said, ‘a publication without justification or lawful excuse,
which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing
that person to hatred, contempt or ridicule would be defamatory’.
Difficult for companies to show that this has taken place.
