Essay- Who Can Be Blamed for the Home Rule Crisis?
The Home Rule Crisis between 1905 and 1914 highlighted the deep
tension experienced in the British government during this time. Therefore, the
Liberals and the Conservatives in power have most responsibility for the crisis.
However, the issue was significantly worsened by the Ulster Unionists and
Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). Ultimately, it may be concluded
that the Liberals are the most responsible for the crisis as they had the most
power to resolve the problems which emerged by 1914.
When the Liberals came to power in 1906, they were already in a
precarious situation, and the political system became increasingly unsteady. It
can therefore be argued that it was a mistake for the Liberals to risk an
alliance with the Conservatives and Liberals both won 272 seats, making this
position increasingly insecure. This insecurity led opponents of Home Rule
accusing Asquith (leader of the Liberal Party) of striking a “corrupt
parliamentary bargain” with the IPP, promising Home Rule in exchange for
Irish support. Whilst this wasn’t true (the Liberals already had the support of
the Labour Party, which had 40 seats in the House of Commons). The Liberals
increased tensions with the 1911 Parliament Bill, which meant that any bill
rejected by the House of Lords would automatically be passed after two years.
Not only did this anger the Conservatives, it pushed the Unionists out of the
“parliamentary arena” (Fanning). Asquith and the Liberal government were
also incredibly naive about the strength of Ulster Unionism. Asquith dismissed
the Unionists as an “irreconcilable minority”, ignoring the fact that 17 out of 33
MPs in Ulster were Unionists. The Primrose Committee was established in
January 1911 to consider problems with Home Rule. However, Ulster was
ignored for thirteen months. Churchill was distracted by naval expansion,
whilst Lloyd George was preoccupied with the national insurance scheme.
When they finally suggested some form of Ulster exclusion at a meeting on
6th February 1912, Asquith favoured a “wait and see” approach which gave
, the initiative to his opponents and undermined his own power. This also
contributed to a growth in Unionist activity. Part of this lack of focus can be
blamed on Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Distracted by his terminally
ill wife, Birrell lacked dedication to his post and failed to raise his concerns
regarding Ulster opposition. The government was “poorly served” (Rees) by
Birrell during the crisis. Asquith also failed to address several instances of
division over Home Rule within the Liberal Party. For example, Asquith
opposed the Agar-Robartes Amendment (proposed 11th June 1912) which
suggested permanent exclusion of Derry, Down, Antrim and Armagh.
Agar-Robartes was a prominent member of the Liberal Party, and Asquith
failed to address growing calls for compromise from within the party. A similar
issue occurred with the Loreburn Letter, published in “The Times” on 11th
September 1913. A solution seemed to be within reach with the Asquith-Bonar
Law meetings in Autumn 1913. After the first two meetings (14th October
1913 and 6th November 1913), a compromise seemed within reach. However,
Asquith’s stubbornness contributed to a lack of understanding. For example,
on 27th November 1913, Asquith made a speech in Leeds where he
dismissed Bonar Law and the Unionists as “menaces of civil war”. This led to
a breakdown in relations by the third and final meetIng on 10th December
1913. The Liberals also deeply weakened their own position and contributed
to the crisis. On 14th March 1914, Paget (Commander in Chief in Ireland) was
informed that Churchill and Seely (Secretary of State for War) intended to use
the army to repress opposition to Home Rule in Ulster. Paget leaked the
information and, as a result, Gough led 58 offices threatening to mutiny. By
23rd March 1914, Seely had promised that the army would not be used in
Ulster. As a result, “Asquith’s sword broke in his hand” (Laffan), severely
weakening the Prime Minister’s position. However, it should be acknowledged
that, as a principled Liberal, it is highly unlikely that Asquith ever would have
used the army in Ulster. Ultimately, by the time that the Liberals finally held an
all-party conference with the Buckingham Palace Conference (21st-24th July
1914), it was “too late to avert a crisis” (Jalland).
The Home Rule Crisis between 1905 and 1914 highlighted the deep
tension experienced in the British government during this time. Therefore, the
Liberals and the Conservatives in power have most responsibility for the crisis.
However, the issue was significantly worsened by the Ulster Unionists and
Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). Ultimately, it may be concluded
that the Liberals are the most responsible for the crisis as they had the most
power to resolve the problems which emerged by 1914.
When the Liberals came to power in 1906, they were already in a
precarious situation, and the political system became increasingly unsteady. It
can therefore be argued that it was a mistake for the Liberals to risk an
alliance with the Conservatives and Liberals both won 272 seats, making this
position increasingly insecure. This insecurity led opponents of Home Rule
accusing Asquith (leader of the Liberal Party) of striking a “corrupt
parliamentary bargain” with the IPP, promising Home Rule in exchange for
Irish support. Whilst this wasn’t true (the Liberals already had the support of
the Labour Party, which had 40 seats in the House of Commons). The Liberals
increased tensions with the 1911 Parliament Bill, which meant that any bill
rejected by the House of Lords would automatically be passed after two years.
Not only did this anger the Conservatives, it pushed the Unionists out of the
“parliamentary arena” (Fanning). Asquith and the Liberal government were
also incredibly naive about the strength of Ulster Unionism. Asquith dismissed
the Unionists as an “irreconcilable minority”, ignoring the fact that 17 out of 33
MPs in Ulster were Unionists. The Primrose Committee was established in
January 1911 to consider problems with Home Rule. However, Ulster was
ignored for thirteen months. Churchill was distracted by naval expansion,
whilst Lloyd George was preoccupied with the national insurance scheme.
When they finally suggested some form of Ulster exclusion at a meeting on
6th February 1912, Asquith favoured a “wait and see” approach which gave
, the initiative to his opponents and undermined his own power. This also
contributed to a growth in Unionist activity. Part of this lack of focus can be
blamed on Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Distracted by his terminally
ill wife, Birrell lacked dedication to his post and failed to raise his concerns
regarding Ulster opposition. The government was “poorly served” (Rees) by
Birrell during the crisis. Asquith also failed to address several instances of
division over Home Rule within the Liberal Party. For example, Asquith
opposed the Agar-Robartes Amendment (proposed 11th June 1912) which
suggested permanent exclusion of Derry, Down, Antrim and Armagh.
Agar-Robartes was a prominent member of the Liberal Party, and Asquith
failed to address growing calls for compromise from within the party. A similar
issue occurred with the Loreburn Letter, published in “The Times” on 11th
September 1913. A solution seemed to be within reach with the Asquith-Bonar
Law meetings in Autumn 1913. After the first two meetings (14th October
1913 and 6th November 1913), a compromise seemed within reach. However,
Asquith’s stubbornness contributed to a lack of understanding. For example,
on 27th November 1913, Asquith made a speech in Leeds where he
dismissed Bonar Law and the Unionists as “menaces of civil war”. This led to
a breakdown in relations by the third and final meetIng on 10th December
1913. The Liberals also deeply weakened their own position and contributed
to the crisis. On 14th March 1914, Paget (Commander in Chief in Ireland) was
informed that Churchill and Seely (Secretary of State for War) intended to use
the army to repress opposition to Home Rule in Ulster. Paget leaked the
information and, as a result, Gough led 58 offices threatening to mutiny. By
23rd March 1914, Seely had promised that the army would not be used in
Ulster. As a result, “Asquith’s sword broke in his hand” (Laffan), severely
weakening the Prime Minister’s position. However, it should be acknowledged
that, as a principled Liberal, it is highly unlikely that Asquith ever would have
used the army in Ulster. Ultimately, by the time that the Liberals finally held an
all-party conference with the Buckingham Palace Conference (21st-24th July
1914), it was “too late to avert a crisis” (Jalland).
