Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces
Author(s): Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives , Spring, 2007, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring,
2007), pp. 27-52
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30033716
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range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
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Perspectives
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, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 21, Number 2-Spring 2007-Pages 27-52
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and
their Driving Forces
Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
he family is not a static institution. In recent decades, marriage rates have
fallen, divorce rates have risen, and the defining characteristics of mar-
riage riage have changed. The economic approach to the family seeks to
explain these trends by reference to models that can also explain how and why
families form. Gary Becker's (1981) Treatise on the Family proposed a theory based
on "production complementarities," in which husband and wife specialize in the
market and domestic spheres, respectively. Production complementarities also
arise in the production and rearing of one's own children. However, production
complementarities-at least as initially described-are decreasingly central to mod-
ern family life. Increased longevity and declining fertility mean that most of one's
adult life is spent without one's own children in the household. Also, the rise in
marital formation at older ages, including remarriage, means that many families
form with no intention of producing children. Moreover, increases in female labor
force participation suggest that household specialization has either declined or, at
least taken on a different meaning.
These changes have come about as what is produced in the home has been
dramatically altered both by the emergence of labor-saving technology in the home
and by the development of service industries that allow much of what was once
provided by specialized homemakers to be purchased in the market. The availabil-
* Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers are both Assistant Professors of Business and Public
Policy, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Wolfers is
also Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts; Research Affiliate, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom;
and Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany. Their e-mail
addresses are (betsey.stevenson@wharton. upenn.edu) and (jwolfers@wharton. upenn.edu),
respectively.
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:25:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
, 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives
ity of birth control and abortion has affected the potential consequences of sex
both in and out of marriage, while changes in divorce laws have altered the terms
of the marital bargain. These forces also have important feedback effects, changing
the pool of marriageable singles across the age distribution, thereby affecting
search, marriage, remarriage, and the extent of "churning" in the marriage market.
To remain relevant to the twenty-first century, the economics of the family will
need to push beyond the production of own children and traditional notions of
specialization, and seek to uncover the forces that yield the modern family form.
This may mean reconceiving the notion of household production or, as we argue,
extending models of the family beyond the notion of a household-based firm and
toward emphasizing motivations such as consumption complementarities and in-
surance as central to marriage. Furthermore, the economic theory of the family as
originally developed was a theory of household formation, rather than a theory of
legal marriage. Couples have become increasingly likely to form households with-
out entering into a marriage, adding a new dimension for considering decisions
surrounding family formation. This article lays the groundwork for a reconsidera-
tion of the theory of the family by describing the tremendous changes in family
forms related to marriage and divorce, pointing to some of their driving forces, and
suggesting ways of expanding our thinking about the family to understand its future
better.
Trends in Marriage and Divorce
Figure 1 lays out some facts about marriage and divorce in the United States
over the last 150 years: the divorce rate-measured as the number of new divorces
each year on a per capita basis-has risen, while the marriage rate has fluctuated
around a relatively stable mean. The timing of these changes suggests that social
and economic factors strongly influence the marriage market. Marriage rates rose
during, and in the wake of, the two world wars and fell during the Great Depres-
sion. The divorce rate fell during the Depression and spiked following World
War II.
Developments since the 1960s appear to reflect more subtle influences, and
have been the focus of heated political debate. Divorce rates rose sharply, doubling
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. During this period, family life was
potentially altered by many factors: the rise of the women's liberation movement;
the sexual revolution; the Supreme Court's granting of marriage as a "fundamen-
tal" right under the U.S. Constitution and thus the abolition of laws restricting
marriage between races; the elimination in many states of fault-based divorce; and
a sharp rise in women's labor force participation. Yet when viewed over a longer
time period, we see that while the 1970s had exceptionally high divorce rates, the
low divorce rates in previous decades were also somewhat exceptional. Fitting a
simple trend line to the divorce rate between 1860 and 1945 (thereby excluding the
post-World War II surge in divorce) as shown in Figure 1, suggests that some of the
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:25:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Author(s): Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives , Spring, 2007, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring,
2007), pp. 27-52
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30033716
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact .
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Economic
Perspectives
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:25:14 UTC
, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 21, Number 2-Spring 2007-Pages 27-52
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and
their Driving Forces
Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
he family is not a static institution. In recent decades, marriage rates have
fallen, divorce rates have risen, and the defining characteristics of mar-
riage riage have changed. The economic approach to the family seeks to
explain these trends by reference to models that can also explain how and why
families form. Gary Becker's (1981) Treatise on the Family proposed a theory based
on "production complementarities," in which husband and wife specialize in the
market and domestic spheres, respectively. Production complementarities also
arise in the production and rearing of one's own children. However, production
complementarities-at least as initially described-are decreasingly central to mod-
ern family life. Increased longevity and declining fertility mean that most of one's
adult life is spent without one's own children in the household. Also, the rise in
marital formation at older ages, including remarriage, means that many families
form with no intention of producing children. Moreover, increases in female labor
force participation suggest that household specialization has either declined or, at
least taken on a different meaning.
These changes have come about as what is produced in the home has been
dramatically altered both by the emergence of labor-saving technology in the home
and by the development of service industries that allow much of what was once
provided by specialized homemakers to be purchased in the market. The availabil-
* Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers are both Assistant Professors of Business and Public
Policy, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Wolfers is
also Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts; Research Affiliate, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom;
and Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany. Their e-mail
addresses are (betsey.stevenson@wharton. upenn.edu) and (jwolfers@wharton. upenn.edu),
respectively.
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:25:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
, 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives
ity of birth control and abortion has affected the potential consequences of sex
both in and out of marriage, while changes in divorce laws have altered the terms
of the marital bargain. These forces also have important feedback effects, changing
the pool of marriageable singles across the age distribution, thereby affecting
search, marriage, remarriage, and the extent of "churning" in the marriage market.
To remain relevant to the twenty-first century, the economics of the family will
need to push beyond the production of own children and traditional notions of
specialization, and seek to uncover the forces that yield the modern family form.
This may mean reconceiving the notion of household production or, as we argue,
extending models of the family beyond the notion of a household-based firm and
toward emphasizing motivations such as consumption complementarities and in-
surance as central to marriage. Furthermore, the economic theory of the family as
originally developed was a theory of household formation, rather than a theory of
legal marriage. Couples have become increasingly likely to form households with-
out entering into a marriage, adding a new dimension for considering decisions
surrounding family formation. This article lays the groundwork for a reconsidera-
tion of the theory of the family by describing the tremendous changes in family
forms related to marriage and divorce, pointing to some of their driving forces, and
suggesting ways of expanding our thinking about the family to understand its future
better.
Trends in Marriage and Divorce
Figure 1 lays out some facts about marriage and divorce in the United States
over the last 150 years: the divorce rate-measured as the number of new divorces
each year on a per capita basis-has risen, while the marriage rate has fluctuated
around a relatively stable mean. The timing of these changes suggests that social
and economic factors strongly influence the marriage market. Marriage rates rose
during, and in the wake of, the two world wars and fell during the Great Depres-
sion. The divorce rate fell during the Depression and spiked following World
War II.
Developments since the 1960s appear to reflect more subtle influences, and
have been the focus of heated political debate. Divorce rates rose sharply, doubling
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. During this period, family life was
potentially altered by many factors: the rise of the women's liberation movement;
the sexual revolution; the Supreme Court's granting of marriage as a "fundamen-
tal" right under the U.S. Constitution and thus the abolition of laws restricting
marriage between races; the elimination in many states of fault-based divorce; and
a sharp rise in women's labor force participation. Yet when viewed over a longer
time period, we see that while the 1970s had exceptionally high divorce rates, the
low divorce rates in previous decades were also somewhat exceptional. Fitting a
simple trend line to the divorce rate between 1860 and 1945 (thereby excluding the
post-World War II surge in divorce) as shown in Figure 1, suggests that some of the
This content downloaded from
192.184.221.66 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 22:25:14 UTC
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