Is Indirect Realism the Correct Theory of Perception?
Indirect realism is the view that the immediate objects of perception are mind
dependent objects (sense data) that are caused by and represent mind independent
objects. It is a realist view as it states that there are objects that exist outside of the
mind. We must then infer, on the basis of these sense data, the nature of that reality.
Because perception involves this inference, it is indirect. In this essay I will argue that
indirect realism is not the correct theory of perception. I will first show that indirect
realism doesn’t face the same criticisms direct realism faces, such as the issue of
perceptual variation, illusions, and hallucinations. I will then critique that by showing
that indirect realism faces scepticism about the nature of the external world, and then
show that indirect realism eventually faces the threat of solipsism, which is the view
that your own mind is the only thing that exists.
Indirect realism accommodates for perceptual variation, which is a problem that direct
realists face. Direct realism is the view that the immediate objects of perception are
mind independent objects. The argument of perceptual variation states that when you
look at an object from different angles, the shape of the object changes. Since the table
itself doesn’t change shape, we must distinguish the real table from the one appearing
in our minds. This proves direct realism false. Indirect realism, however, is not
impacted. Indirect realists say that what we directly perceive need not always be an
accurate representation of reality. Perceptual variations can occur while the real object
remains unchanged. Likewise, illusions (seeing one thing when it is really another thing)
occur when the appearance of an object doesn’t match the reality. Hallucinations occur
when there is no real object corresponding to our sense data, and the time-lag can be
explained because what I am immediately aware of is not the same as what is really
there. So, indirect realism does not face the issues that direct realism faces, and this
shows that indirect realism is at least a better view than direct realism.
However, the fact that what we perceive are sense data leads to a problem for indirect
realists. If all we perceive are sense data and must infer the existence of objects beyond
the mind, how can we know what reality is truly like? Our ideas (sense data) can be
distorted.
A reply to this criticism is Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Locke defines ideas as what the mind perceives, and qualities as the power to produce
any idea in the mind. According to Locke, there are primary and secondary qualities,
where primary qualities are ideas of certain properties of objects that resemble their
real properties. These are things such as size, shape, motion. Secondary qualities are
powers that produce an idea or sensation in us. These are the insensible parts of
objects that we cannot directly observe, such as colour, taste, and sound. Primary
Indirect realism is the view that the immediate objects of perception are mind
dependent objects (sense data) that are caused by and represent mind independent
objects. It is a realist view as it states that there are objects that exist outside of the
mind. We must then infer, on the basis of these sense data, the nature of that reality.
Because perception involves this inference, it is indirect. In this essay I will argue that
indirect realism is not the correct theory of perception. I will first show that indirect
realism doesn’t face the same criticisms direct realism faces, such as the issue of
perceptual variation, illusions, and hallucinations. I will then critique that by showing
that indirect realism faces scepticism about the nature of the external world, and then
show that indirect realism eventually faces the threat of solipsism, which is the view
that your own mind is the only thing that exists.
Indirect realism accommodates for perceptual variation, which is a problem that direct
realists face. Direct realism is the view that the immediate objects of perception are
mind independent objects. The argument of perceptual variation states that when you
look at an object from different angles, the shape of the object changes. Since the table
itself doesn’t change shape, we must distinguish the real table from the one appearing
in our minds. This proves direct realism false. Indirect realism, however, is not
impacted. Indirect realists say that what we directly perceive need not always be an
accurate representation of reality. Perceptual variations can occur while the real object
remains unchanged. Likewise, illusions (seeing one thing when it is really another thing)
occur when the appearance of an object doesn’t match the reality. Hallucinations occur
when there is no real object corresponding to our sense data, and the time-lag can be
explained because what I am immediately aware of is not the same as what is really
there. So, indirect realism does not face the issues that direct realism faces, and this
shows that indirect realism is at least a better view than direct realism.
However, the fact that what we perceive are sense data leads to a problem for indirect
realists. If all we perceive are sense data and must infer the existence of objects beyond
the mind, how can we know what reality is truly like? Our ideas (sense data) can be
distorted.
A reply to this criticism is Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Locke defines ideas as what the mind perceives, and qualities as the power to produce
any idea in the mind. According to Locke, there are primary and secondary qualities,
where primary qualities are ideas of certain properties of objects that resemble their
real properties. These are things such as size, shape, motion. Secondary qualities are
powers that produce an idea or sensation in us. These are the insensible parts of
objects that we cannot directly observe, such as colour, taste, and sound. Primary
