MBE AM Exam Questions with Correct Answers 100% Verified| Guaranteed Success
A woman purchased a new toaster, manufactured by a well-known appliance manufacturer,
from an appliance store. The first morning the woman had the toaster, the toaster burnt the
woman's toast, so she took the toaster back to the store to complain. The store's technician
adjusted the toaster's darkening dial and assured the woman that the toaster should work
properly in the future. The next morning, the woman's sister came over for breakfast and
decided to try the new toaster. When the sister went to retrieve her toast from the toaster, she
received an electrical shock and was injured.
The sister sued the appliance manufacturer on a theory of strict liability for her injuries. At trial,
the parties stipulated to the above facts. The sister presented evidence that the electrical shock
was caused by a defective power cord. At the close of evidence, the manufacturer moved for a
directed verdict.
How should the court rule The court should deny the motion. To hold a manufacturer
strictly liable for a defect in a product, the product must have reached the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was supplied. The jury could find that the toaster
was defective when it left the manufacturer's control, so that the manufacturer produced a
product that is so defective as to be unreasonably dangerous. This defective product actually
and proximately caused the sister's injuries; hence, the manufacturer's motion should be
denied. (A) is wrong because, unlike (B), it ignores the requirement that the defect be
attributable to the manufacturer. (C) is wrong because the sister's strict liability action is based
on a defect in the electrical cord of the toaster. The facts do not establish that the technician's
adjusting of the darkening dial had any effect on the toaster's power cord. Thus, the
technician's input does not preclude the success of the sister's action against the manufacturer.
(D) is wrong because a history of defects in this model of toaster would show that the
manufacturer should have had notice of the problem. Such notice would be relevant to a
negligence action, but not to an action for strict liability.
A defendant was convicted in federal court of possession of one kilogram of heroin with intent
to distribute. She was sentenced to a prison term. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted by
a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute the same kilogram of heroin. She moved to
dismiss the indictment.
Should her motion be granted?
,A No, because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply when the second prosecution is for
violation of a separate statute.
B No, because each prosecution requires proof of an element that the other does not.
C Yes, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects her against a second prosecution for the
same criminal conduct.
D Yes, because the Due Process Clause protects her against double punishment for the same
criminal conduct. The defendant's motion should be denied because a prosecution for
conspiracy is distinct from a prosecution for any substantive offense involving the same
conduct as the conspiracy. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. The general rule is that two crimes do not constitute the same
offense if each crime requires proof of an additional element that the other crime does not
require, even though some of the same facts may be necessary to prove both crimes.
[Blockburger v. United States (1932)] Furthermore, a prosecution for conspiracy is not barred
merely because some of the alleged overt acts of that conspiracy have already been
prosecuted. [United States v. Felix (1992)] Here, both the conspiracy charge and the possession
charge require proof of an element that the other charge does not; hence, there is no double
jeopardy problem with the indictment. (A) is incorrect because it is too broad a statement. The
fact that separate statutes are involved does not establish that these are not the "same
offense" for purposes of double jeopardy. (C) is incorrect because the "same conduct" test is
not currently used by the Supreme Court to evaluate a double jeopardy claim. (D) is incorrect
because the question involves the defendant's motion to quash an indictment and not her
ultimate punishment.
A realty company developed a residential development encompassing single-family dwellings,
town houses, and high-rise apartments. Included in the deed to each unit was a covenant under
which the grantee and the grantee's "heirs and assigns" agreed to purchase electrical power
only from a plant that the realty company had constructed within the development. The plant
did not supply power outside the development. After constructing and selling half of the units,
the realty company sold its interest in the development to an investment firm. The investment
firm operated the power plant and constructed and sold the remaining units. Each conveyance
from the investment firm contained the same covenant relating to electrical power that the
realty company had included in the conveyances it had made.
A woman bought a dwelling unit from a man who had purchased it from the realty company.
Subsequently, the woman, whose lot was a If the woman prevails, it will be because the
covenant does not touch and concern the land. The investment firm is seeking to enforce the
,covenant by means of an equitable remedy. Thus, this question concerns an equitable
servitude. An equitable servitude relates to a promise that touches and concerns the land. A
covenant touches and concerns the land when it makes the land itself more useful or valuable
to the benefited party. Here, an agreement to purchase electrical power only from a specified
source probably does not touch and concern the land. (B) is incorrect because a common
development scheme is not necessary for an equitable servitude. Generally, equitable
servitudes are created by covenants contained in a writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
Negative equitable servitudes that may be implied from a common scheme for development
are one exception to the writing requirement. (C) is incorrect because the covenant here does
not restrain alienation. (D) is incorrect because privity of estate is not required for enforcement
of an equitable servitude. In any event, privity is present here because (i) at the time the
promisor (the man) entered into the covenant with the promisee (the realty company), the two
shared some interest in the land independent of the covenant—i.e., grantor-grantee (horizontal
privity); and (ii) the successor in interest to the covenanting party (the woman) holds the entire
durational interest held by the covenantor (vertical privity).
A homeowner sued a contractor in federal court for damages resulting from an unsuccessful
roof repair. The court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the contractor.
The homeowner then filed her complaint in a federal court that could properly assert
jurisdiction over the contractor. In his answer the contractor asserts the affirmative defense of
claim preclusion.
Should the court dismiss the case?
A Yes, because the first case involved the same claimant against the same defendant.
B Yes, because there was a valid, final judgment in the first case.
C No, because dismissal was based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
D No, because the defense of claim preclusion should be raised at trial. The court should not
dismiss the case because the dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction is not a judgment
on the merits. For claim preclusion to apply: (i) the earlier judgment must be a valid, final
judgment on the merits; (ii) the cases must be brought by the same claimant against the same
defendant; (iii) and the same cause of action must be involved in the later suit. Certain
involuntary dismissals, such as those based on lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, are not
judgments on the merits and do not have claim preclusive effect. Therefore, the case should
not be dismissed. (B) is therefore incorrect. (A) is incorrect because claim preclusion requires
, more than just the same claimant bringing a case against the same defendant. (D) is incorrect
because claim preclusion is an affirmative defense that should be included in the defendant's
answer.
A buyer entered into a contract with a retail seller to purchase three computers of a specific
brand for $4,500 for use in his business office. However, when the computers arrived at his
office, the buyer saw that they were a different brand of computers. Because he was short of
computers, the buyer asked his secretaries to use the computers. One week later, however, his
secretaries complained about the computers, and therefore the buyer wrote to the seller that
he was "rejecting" the three computers that were sent to him, and asked for the return of the
$4,500. The seller refused to do so.
What was the legal effect of the buyer's retention and use of the computers for one week
before notifying the seller?
A An acceptance of the three computers, because the buyer was aware that the computers
were not the brand he ordered.
B An acceptance of the three computers if the buyer's use thereof was more than reasonably
requ The buyer's use of the computers is an acceptance only if the use was more than
reasonably necessary to determine whether they were suitable, since they did not conform to
the contract. The UCC gives a buyer the right to reject goods that do not conform to the
contract until he has accepted the goods. Acceptance occurs when the buyer: (i) indicates that
he will keep the goods, after reasonable inspection, even though they are nonconforming; (ii)
fails to reject within a reasonable time after tender or delivery of the goods or fails to
seasonably notify the seller of his rejection; or (iii) does an act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership. Thus, the buyer is allowed a reasonable time to inspect the goods before accepting
or rejecting them. Here, the buyer used the computers for a week and then found them to be
unacceptable substitutes for the computers that he ordered. If this trial period was reasonable,
he did not accept the goods and therefore may reject them. If the period is more than what
reasonably would be required to test them, the buyer will be seen as having accepted them and
can no longer reject them. (A) is wrong because it does not provide for the buyer's right to
reasonably inspect. It is not enough that the buyer simply knew that the computers he received
were nonconforming; he is entitled to inspect them to determine whether he will keep them
even though they are not what he ordered. (C) is wrong because even nonconforming goods
can be accepted. After reasonable inspection, a buyer may decide to keep the goods despite
the nonconformity, and this is an acceptance. (D) is wrong because, under the UCC, if a buyer
A woman purchased a new toaster, manufactured by a well-known appliance manufacturer,
from an appliance store. The first morning the woman had the toaster, the toaster burnt the
woman's toast, so she took the toaster back to the store to complain. The store's technician
adjusted the toaster's darkening dial and assured the woman that the toaster should work
properly in the future. The next morning, the woman's sister came over for breakfast and
decided to try the new toaster. When the sister went to retrieve her toast from the toaster, she
received an electrical shock and was injured.
The sister sued the appliance manufacturer on a theory of strict liability for her injuries. At trial,
the parties stipulated to the above facts. The sister presented evidence that the electrical shock
was caused by a defective power cord. At the close of evidence, the manufacturer moved for a
directed verdict.
How should the court rule The court should deny the motion. To hold a manufacturer
strictly liable for a defect in a product, the product must have reached the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was supplied. The jury could find that the toaster
was defective when it left the manufacturer's control, so that the manufacturer produced a
product that is so defective as to be unreasonably dangerous. This defective product actually
and proximately caused the sister's injuries; hence, the manufacturer's motion should be
denied. (A) is wrong because, unlike (B), it ignores the requirement that the defect be
attributable to the manufacturer. (C) is wrong because the sister's strict liability action is based
on a defect in the electrical cord of the toaster. The facts do not establish that the technician's
adjusting of the darkening dial had any effect on the toaster's power cord. Thus, the
technician's input does not preclude the success of the sister's action against the manufacturer.
(D) is wrong because a history of defects in this model of toaster would show that the
manufacturer should have had notice of the problem. Such notice would be relevant to a
negligence action, but not to an action for strict liability.
A defendant was convicted in federal court of possession of one kilogram of heroin with intent
to distribute. She was sentenced to a prison term. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted by
a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute the same kilogram of heroin. She moved to
dismiss the indictment.
Should her motion be granted?
,A No, because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply when the second prosecution is for
violation of a separate statute.
B No, because each prosecution requires proof of an element that the other does not.
C Yes, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects her against a second prosecution for the
same criminal conduct.
D Yes, because the Due Process Clause protects her against double punishment for the same
criminal conduct. The defendant's motion should be denied because a prosecution for
conspiracy is distinct from a prosecution for any substantive offense involving the same
conduct as the conspiracy. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. The general rule is that two crimes do not constitute the same
offense if each crime requires proof of an additional element that the other crime does not
require, even though some of the same facts may be necessary to prove both crimes.
[Blockburger v. United States (1932)] Furthermore, a prosecution for conspiracy is not barred
merely because some of the alleged overt acts of that conspiracy have already been
prosecuted. [United States v. Felix (1992)] Here, both the conspiracy charge and the possession
charge require proof of an element that the other charge does not; hence, there is no double
jeopardy problem with the indictment. (A) is incorrect because it is too broad a statement. The
fact that separate statutes are involved does not establish that these are not the "same
offense" for purposes of double jeopardy. (C) is incorrect because the "same conduct" test is
not currently used by the Supreme Court to evaluate a double jeopardy claim. (D) is incorrect
because the question involves the defendant's motion to quash an indictment and not her
ultimate punishment.
A realty company developed a residential development encompassing single-family dwellings,
town houses, and high-rise apartments. Included in the deed to each unit was a covenant under
which the grantee and the grantee's "heirs and assigns" agreed to purchase electrical power
only from a plant that the realty company had constructed within the development. The plant
did not supply power outside the development. After constructing and selling half of the units,
the realty company sold its interest in the development to an investment firm. The investment
firm operated the power plant and constructed and sold the remaining units. Each conveyance
from the investment firm contained the same covenant relating to electrical power that the
realty company had included in the conveyances it had made.
A woman bought a dwelling unit from a man who had purchased it from the realty company.
Subsequently, the woman, whose lot was a If the woman prevails, it will be because the
covenant does not touch and concern the land. The investment firm is seeking to enforce the
,covenant by means of an equitable remedy. Thus, this question concerns an equitable
servitude. An equitable servitude relates to a promise that touches and concerns the land. A
covenant touches and concerns the land when it makes the land itself more useful or valuable
to the benefited party. Here, an agreement to purchase electrical power only from a specified
source probably does not touch and concern the land. (B) is incorrect because a common
development scheme is not necessary for an equitable servitude. Generally, equitable
servitudes are created by covenants contained in a writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
Negative equitable servitudes that may be implied from a common scheme for development
are one exception to the writing requirement. (C) is incorrect because the covenant here does
not restrain alienation. (D) is incorrect because privity of estate is not required for enforcement
of an equitable servitude. In any event, privity is present here because (i) at the time the
promisor (the man) entered into the covenant with the promisee (the realty company), the two
shared some interest in the land independent of the covenant—i.e., grantor-grantee (horizontal
privity); and (ii) the successor in interest to the covenanting party (the woman) holds the entire
durational interest held by the covenantor (vertical privity).
A homeowner sued a contractor in federal court for damages resulting from an unsuccessful
roof repair. The court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the contractor.
The homeowner then filed her complaint in a federal court that could properly assert
jurisdiction over the contractor. In his answer the contractor asserts the affirmative defense of
claim preclusion.
Should the court dismiss the case?
A Yes, because the first case involved the same claimant against the same defendant.
B Yes, because there was a valid, final judgment in the first case.
C No, because dismissal was based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
D No, because the defense of claim preclusion should be raised at trial. The court should not
dismiss the case because the dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction is not a judgment
on the merits. For claim preclusion to apply: (i) the earlier judgment must be a valid, final
judgment on the merits; (ii) the cases must be brought by the same claimant against the same
defendant; (iii) and the same cause of action must be involved in the later suit. Certain
involuntary dismissals, such as those based on lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, are not
judgments on the merits and do not have claim preclusive effect. Therefore, the case should
not be dismissed. (B) is therefore incorrect. (A) is incorrect because claim preclusion requires
, more than just the same claimant bringing a case against the same defendant. (D) is incorrect
because claim preclusion is an affirmative defense that should be included in the defendant's
answer.
A buyer entered into a contract with a retail seller to purchase three computers of a specific
brand for $4,500 for use in his business office. However, when the computers arrived at his
office, the buyer saw that they were a different brand of computers. Because he was short of
computers, the buyer asked his secretaries to use the computers. One week later, however, his
secretaries complained about the computers, and therefore the buyer wrote to the seller that
he was "rejecting" the three computers that were sent to him, and asked for the return of the
$4,500. The seller refused to do so.
What was the legal effect of the buyer's retention and use of the computers for one week
before notifying the seller?
A An acceptance of the three computers, because the buyer was aware that the computers
were not the brand he ordered.
B An acceptance of the three computers if the buyer's use thereof was more than reasonably
requ The buyer's use of the computers is an acceptance only if the use was more than
reasonably necessary to determine whether they were suitable, since they did not conform to
the contract. The UCC gives a buyer the right to reject goods that do not conform to the
contract until he has accepted the goods. Acceptance occurs when the buyer: (i) indicates that
he will keep the goods, after reasonable inspection, even though they are nonconforming; (ii)
fails to reject within a reasonable time after tender or delivery of the goods or fails to
seasonably notify the seller of his rejection; or (iii) does an act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership. Thus, the buyer is allowed a reasonable time to inspect the goods before accepting
or rejecting them. Here, the buyer used the computers for a week and then found them to be
unacceptable substitutes for the computers that he ordered. If this trial period was reasonable,
he did not accept the goods and therefore may reject them. If the period is more than what
reasonably would be required to test them, the buyer will be seen as having accepted them and
can no longer reject them. (A) is wrong because it does not provide for the buyer's right to
reasonably inspect. It is not enough that the buyer simply knew that the computers he received
were nonconforming; he is entitled to inspect them to determine whether he will keep them
even though they are not what he ordered. (C) is wrong because even nonconforming goods
can be accepted. After reasonable inspection, a buyer may decide to keep the goods despite
the nonconformity, and this is an acceptance. (D) is wrong because, under the UCC, if a buyer
