Philosophy of Mind and Substance Dualism
Objectives:
- What is the mind-body problem? How does it come about?
- What is wrong with most arguments in favour of substance dualism?
- Which central challenges does substance dualism face?
(1) Mind
Commonly used as an umbrella term referring to all states, processes, events and capacities
that we call ‘mental’
- Perceptions (seeing, smelling, hearing)
- Bodily sensations (hunger, thirst, pain)
- Emotions (anger, love, grief)
- Beliefs (‘Paris is the capital of France’)
- Intentions (‘I will move to Amsterdam’)
- Desires (‘I want ice cream’)
- Reasoning (‘if X, then Y’)
- Memory & imagination
1.1 Philosophy of Mind
Central aim of philosophy of mind is to
- Define what the mind is
- Define who we consider to be minded (eg adult humans, infants, machines, animals)
- Define what individual mental states are (eg beliefs, emotions, imagination)
- Define which properties mental states can have (eg conscious vs unconscious)
- Study internal structure of the mind (eg relation between perception and beliefs)
- Fathom the possibility to explain the mind in scientific terms
1.2 Mind-Body Problem
The mind and body problem concerns the extent to which the mind and the body are separate
or the same thing
- The mind has characteristics that the body does not have, and vice versa
Eg some mental states are conscious and have a particular phenomenal quality
(eg pain and itch)
Eg Some mental states have intentionality (ie they are about something → eg I
believe that there is a table in front of me)
, 1.2.1 Mind & Matter
Mind & Brain
- Is the mind identical to the brain?
- How do mental and brain states and processes interact?
- Can neuroscience at some point replace our study of the mind?
Mind & Body
- Are our mental states influenced by our (non-brain-based) body?
- Is the mind implemented in the body?
Mind & Environment
- Can and should we consider the mind in isolation from the physical and social environment of
the organism?
- Can our mind extend into the environment?
1.2.2 Solutions to Mind-Body Problem
1. Substance dualism: argues that the mind and the body are composed of different substances
2. Behaviourism: emphasised the outward behavioural aspects of thought and dismissed the
inward experiential, and the inner procedural, aspects
3. Identity theory: purports the mind and brain are the same. In other words, the state of mind is
the same as brain processes; that mental state is the same as the physical state of the brain
4. Functionalism: mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made
of
5. Computationalism: the functional organisation of the brain is computational
6. 4E Cognition: argues that cognition does not occur solely in the head, but is also embodied,
embedded, enacted, or extended by way of extra-cranial processes and structures
,(2) Substance Dualism
The mind and body are 2 independent substances. Thus, the mind and body are distinct and
can have different properties
- Mind/soul: set of mental processes (ie thinking, believing, wanting, perceiving,
remembering, experiencing emotions)
- Body/brain: Set of sensory and motoric processes
2.1 Arguments for Substance Dualism
1. Leibniz’ Law: The Identity of Indiscernibles
○ If x = y, x and y have the exact same properties
○ If x and y do not have the exact same properties, x ≠ y
○ Mind and body have different properties, hence mind ≠ body
2. Spatial Location/Extension (Descartes): Bodily states and processes have a spatial location
and extension. Mental states and processes don’t.
3. Rationality (Descartes): Mental entities are rational entities. It is excluded that material
entities are rational or can reason.
4. Intentionality (Brentano): Mental states can be about something. They can refer to
extra-mental entities (eg I believe that Paris is the capital of France)
5. Phenomenal Quality (Chalmers): mental states can have a subjective experiential quality, they
are characterised by a certain phenomenal character (eg pain)
6. Doubting Argument (Descartes): there is only 1 thing we cannot doubt, that there is
something or someone who is doubting
○ Our knowledge about physical things is fallible, as we gain knowledge about physical
things through our sense organs (eg illusions, hallucinations, evil genius)
○ I can doubt that I have a material body, but I cannot doubt that I exist as a mental
being. Hence, the mind is not identical to the body
Mind/soul Body/brain
- Not spatially located/extended - Spatially located/extended
- Rational - Non-relational
- Intentional - Non-intentional
- Phenomenal - Non-phenomenal
- Cannot be doubted - Can be doubted
, 2.2 Arguments against Substance Dualism
1. Intensional fallacy: what one thinks about something is not necessarily a property of that thing
itself. We cannot assume the identity of a subject’s knowledge of an object with the object
itself
○ Unjustified leap from epistemology to ontology
2. Interactionism: mind and body continuously interact and form a unit. Substance dualism
merely requires that mind and body can in principle exist as separate entities. How is it
possible that mind and body causally interact?
○ Causal interaction needs spatial contact: how can something non-spatial (mind/soul)
interact with something spatial (pineal gland)?
○ Insofar as the mind and body are supposed to be radically different, they lack the
commonalities necessary for interaction: spatial point of contact
2.3 Dualistic Alternatives
1. Parallelism (eg Leibniz)
○ Body and mind are different substances that do not interact with each other, but are
perfectly synchronised
○ God is the common cause of both causal strands (‘pre-stabalised harmony’)
2. Occasionalism (eg Malebranche)
○ Body and mind are different substances that do not interact directly with each other,
but God constantly mediates between the two; all finite created entities are absolutely
devoid of causal efficacy and that God is the only true causal agent
2.3.1 Causal Closure of the Physical Realm
We can give a full physical explanation of every physical event.
If so, which additional causal role is the mind supposed to play? None, the existence or the
inexistence of the immaterial mind would make no difference.
Epiphenomenalism: the mind might be caused by material events but itself has no causal impact
2.4 Introspection (ie psychological research based on substance dualism)
Introspection: subjective looking inwards
- However, introspective reports can never be verified or falsified by others and, as such,
cannot constitute the foundation for objectively valid scientific knowledge
Objectives:
- What is the mind-body problem? How does it come about?
- What is wrong with most arguments in favour of substance dualism?
- Which central challenges does substance dualism face?
(1) Mind
Commonly used as an umbrella term referring to all states, processes, events and capacities
that we call ‘mental’
- Perceptions (seeing, smelling, hearing)
- Bodily sensations (hunger, thirst, pain)
- Emotions (anger, love, grief)
- Beliefs (‘Paris is the capital of France’)
- Intentions (‘I will move to Amsterdam’)
- Desires (‘I want ice cream’)
- Reasoning (‘if X, then Y’)
- Memory & imagination
1.1 Philosophy of Mind
Central aim of philosophy of mind is to
- Define what the mind is
- Define who we consider to be minded (eg adult humans, infants, machines, animals)
- Define what individual mental states are (eg beliefs, emotions, imagination)
- Define which properties mental states can have (eg conscious vs unconscious)
- Study internal structure of the mind (eg relation between perception and beliefs)
- Fathom the possibility to explain the mind in scientific terms
1.2 Mind-Body Problem
The mind and body problem concerns the extent to which the mind and the body are separate
or the same thing
- The mind has characteristics that the body does not have, and vice versa
Eg some mental states are conscious and have a particular phenomenal quality
(eg pain and itch)
Eg Some mental states have intentionality (ie they are about something → eg I
believe that there is a table in front of me)
, 1.2.1 Mind & Matter
Mind & Brain
- Is the mind identical to the brain?
- How do mental and brain states and processes interact?
- Can neuroscience at some point replace our study of the mind?
Mind & Body
- Are our mental states influenced by our (non-brain-based) body?
- Is the mind implemented in the body?
Mind & Environment
- Can and should we consider the mind in isolation from the physical and social environment of
the organism?
- Can our mind extend into the environment?
1.2.2 Solutions to Mind-Body Problem
1. Substance dualism: argues that the mind and the body are composed of different substances
2. Behaviourism: emphasised the outward behavioural aspects of thought and dismissed the
inward experiential, and the inner procedural, aspects
3. Identity theory: purports the mind and brain are the same. In other words, the state of mind is
the same as brain processes; that mental state is the same as the physical state of the brain
4. Functionalism: mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made
of
5. Computationalism: the functional organisation of the brain is computational
6. 4E Cognition: argues that cognition does not occur solely in the head, but is also embodied,
embedded, enacted, or extended by way of extra-cranial processes and structures
,(2) Substance Dualism
The mind and body are 2 independent substances. Thus, the mind and body are distinct and
can have different properties
- Mind/soul: set of mental processes (ie thinking, believing, wanting, perceiving,
remembering, experiencing emotions)
- Body/brain: Set of sensory and motoric processes
2.1 Arguments for Substance Dualism
1. Leibniz’ Law: The Identity of Indiscernibles
○ If x = y, x and y have the exact same properties
○ If x and y do not have the exact same properties, x ≠ y
○ Mind and body have different properties, hence mind ≠ body
2. Spatial Location/Extension (Descartes): Bodily states and processes have a spatial location
and extension. Mental states and processes don’t.
3. Rationality (Descartes): Mental entities are rational entities. It is excluded that material
entities are rational or can reason.
4. Intentionality (Brentano): Mental states can be about something. They can refer to
extra-mental entities (eg I believe that Paris is the capital of France)
5. Phenomenal Quality (Chalmers): mental states can have a subjective experiential quality, they
are characterised by a certain phenomenal character (eg pain)
6. Doubting Argument (Descartes): there is only 1 thing we cannot doubt, that there is
something or someone who is doubting
○ Our knowledge about physical things is fallible, as we gain knowledge about physical
things through our sense organs (eg illusions, hallucinations, evil genius)
○ I can doubt that I have a material body, but I cannot doubt that I exist as a mental
being. Hence, the mind is not identical to the body
Mind/soul Body/brain
- Not spatially located/extended - Spatially located/extended
- Rational - Non-relational
- Intentional - Non-intentional
- Phenomenal - Non-phenomenal
- Cannot be doubted - Can be doubted
, 2.2 Arguments against Substance Dualism
1. Intensional fallacy: what one thinks about something is not necessarily a property of that thing
itself. We cannot assume the identity of a subject’s knowledge of an object with the object
itself
○ Unjustified leap from epistemology to ontology
2. Interactionism: mind and body continuously interact and form a unit. Substance dualism
merely requires that mind and body can in principle exist as separate entities. How is it
possible that mind and body causally interact?
○ Causal interaction needs spatial contact: how can something non-spatial (mind/soul)
interact with something spatial (pineal gland)?
○ Insofar as the mind and body are supposed to be radically different, they lack the
commonalities necessary for interaction: spatial point of contact
2.3 Dualistic Alternatives
1. Parallelism (eg Leibniz)
○ Body and mind are different substances that do not interact with each other, but are
perfectly synchronised
○ God is the common cause of both causal strands (‘pre-stabalised harmony’)
2. Occasionalism (eg Malebranche)
○ Body and mind are different substances that do not interact directly with each other,
but God constantly mediates between the two; all finite created entities are absolutely
devoid of causal efficacy and that God is the only true causal agent
2.3.1 Causal Closure of the Physical Realm
We can give a full physical explanation of every physical event.
If so, which additional causal role is the mind supposed to play? None, the existence or the
inexistence of the immaterial mind would make no difference.
Epiphenomenalism: the mind might be caused by material events but itself has no causal impact
2.4 Introspection (ie psychological research based on substance dualism)
Introspection: subjective looking inwards
- However, introspective reports can never be verified or falsified by others and, as such,
cannot constitute the foundation for objectively valid scientific knowledge
